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Abstract 
This dissertation concentrates on the case of organizations that engage with the future with 
the intent to shape it. Engaging with the future implies identifying and pursuing opportunities 
aligned with one’s vision for the future and that have the potential to enact the environment. 
My specific focus is on the properties that can make the organization more effective at 
pursuing its objectives, to understand why these properties are important and how they can 
enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future. The study builds on the extreme 
case of Greenpeace International, an organization that dedicates its actions to the enactment 
of a particular vision for the future. This vision implies the protection of the environment and 
the prevention of the depletion of species. The case is based on historiography. It uses 
historical documentation from Greenpeace International archives to reconstruct the intentions, 
structures, processes, and practices of the organization as well as the rationale behind its 
actions. The historical documentation is analyzed through periodization as well as through 
analytic constructs aligned with the process of engaging with the future. My study highlights 
the importance of the properties of flexibility (cognitive, operational, and financial), stability 
(attentional, structural, and in processes), and diversity (institutional, structural, and in the 
portfolio of action alternatives). What the research demonstrates is that flexibility, stability, 
and diversity are important to identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with one’s 
vision for the future. Implications for organization theory, strategic management, and 
international management are discussed.  
Keywords: Engaging with the Future; Organizational Properties; Enactment; Case Study; 
Historiography; Greenpeace International 
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“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to 
adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.” 
- Quote from “Man and Superman” (1903), a play by George Bernard Shaw 
  
“I am an unreasonable man! And Greenpeace's success to-date is based on the same 
premise of trying to adapt the world to our long-term goals and objectives! We are a 
most unreasonable gang of men and women - and, if we are to be worth our salt, 
precisely this is expected of us, with dedication.” 
- David McTaggart on the role of Greenpeace in society (1992) 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of time, there have been organizations with the odd intention to adapt the 
world to themselves. From the Catholic Church to Greenpeace and PETA, these 
organizations have dedicated their actions to the enactment of their vision for the future, to 
make this vision become reality. These organizations are not limited to extremes. In fact, we 
can find them in all spheres of society. Alcoa, at different moments of its history, attempted 
to introduce innovative materials to address challenges companies were expected to face in 
decades ahead but were not necessarily aware of. Monsanto pushed for the introduction of 
genetically modified organisms at a time when there was no market for it. Google, through its 
activities, attempts to reinvent the way we use information. Apple aims to change our 
interaction with technology, to make it more intuitive. Not all these initiatives can be 
considered successes, and some led to unintended consequences, but in large part, innovation 
and progress – economic, social, or environmental – depend on these organizations. 
Organizations that attempt to adapt the world to themselves can be described as 
engaging with the future: they go beyond the mere adaptation of their activities to a changing 
  2 
environment, and seek to fundamentally change that same environment.1 Changing the 
environment can take different forms: it can be a change in legislation, a change in the 
acceptable practices within an industry, a change in the preferences of individuals caused by 
a change in values and beliefs, or the introduction of innovative products and services. This 
process is called enactment (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 1988): by acting, individuals 
and organizations create structures, constraints, and opportunities that did not exist or were 
not necessarily noticeable before their actions. This is how we can evaluate whether or not an 
organization is successful at engaging with the future. For organizations that base their 
actions on the desire to enact a particular vision of the future, endurance in time is only a 
condition to achieve higher aims: all successes depend on their ability to shape the landscape 
through residuum of changes in their environment.  
In the literature, engaging with the future is often looked at from the perspective of 
entrepreneurs attempting to develop and implement novel ideas (e.g. Felin, Kauffman, Koppi, 
& Longo, 2014) or from the perspective of institutional change at the level of the 
environment (e.g. Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). These perspectives 
are important and contributed to highlight the difficulties of enabling important changes in 
the organization. Established organizations, however, face different sets of constraints and 
challenges. Internally, it requires leaders to develop foresight and beliefs with regards to the 
future, and to have this vision shared throughout the organization (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 
2004). Because organizations are governed by political coalitions rather than by unitary 
voices (March, 1962), this takes place through persuasion rather than hierarchy (Smircich & 
Stubbart, 1985). Externally, it requires the organization to undertake actions that have the 
                                                        
1
 The term “environment” is used interchangeably with “landscape”. King, Felin & Whetten (2010) 
conceptualize the landscape based on the position of the organization, including within this landscape the 
markets, the state, communities and individuals. I embrace the same definition of the organization’s landscape 
and adopt the view that shaping the landscape corresponds to shaping the future, as shaping the future takes 
place in the present, one step at a time. 
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potential to alter other’s view of reality (Gavetti, 2012; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985), to favor 
one future over alternative possibilities. In doing so, they are likely to go against the norm 
and to elicit resistance, as altering other’s view of reality implies attempting to change what 
they take for granted in terms of beliefs and behaviors. Because of this, engaging with the 
future with the intent to shape it is expected to require persistence (March, 1995) as well as 
opportunism (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  
In the recent years, a number of authors have attempted to explain why firms fail 
(succeed) at engaging with the future (or the distant, more generally), either empirically (e.g. 
Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010) or theoretically (e.g. Gavetti, 2012). 
There is a consensus that engaging with the future involves cognition and actions, and the 
feedback received from actions can inform representations of the landscape which, in -turn, 
will influence future actions. Explanations for firms’ failures (successes), however, often lie 
at the bottom of the organization level, focusing on the social practices that enable strategic 
foresight (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), or on strategic leaders'2 
ability to overcome the challenges associated with engaging with opportunities that are 
cognitively distant (Gavetti, 2012). These explanations are incomplete as they ignore the 
unique properties of organizations as social actors capable of behaving in a purposeful and 
intentional manner (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010). As a social actor, the organization “can 
exert influence on individuals, shape communities, and transform [its] environments” (King 
et al., 2010, p. 292). It can also develop unique properties that have the potential to mediate 
its ability to act on its environment (King et al., 2010). These properties are important 
because engaging with the future is expected to be a serendipitous process. If leaders cannot 
                                                        
2
 “Strategic leaders” refers to individuals in a position to impact the strategy of their organization. They include 
senior management as well as other key individuals in the development of the strategy of an organization.   
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predict pathways to the future, they can nevertheless favor the adoption of specific features 
that will enhance their firm’s ability to engage with the future. 3   
In contrast with previous literature, which anchored their explanations around 
strategic leaders (i.e. individuals who are in a position of influence on the organization’s 
future) (e.g. Gavetti, 2012; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014) or on the social practices that enable 
strategic foresight (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), I center my 
investigations on the organization itself and on the properties that can enhance the 
organization’s ability to engage with the future. Properties correspond to specific features 
that can be used to describe an organization. They are attributed to the organization as 
opposed to individuals because they are enabled through the culture, the structures, the 
processes, and the practices that have been adopted by organizational members over the years.  
Focusing on these properties is important for both theory and practice. If strategic leaders are 
expected to build the future and to ensure that their organization will last for years to come, 
they cannot be involved in all spheres of the organization’s activities. Creating the right 
context is considered the task that has the greatest impact on their firm’s longevity 
(Burgelman & Grove, 2007). Hence, my research can provide insights on a phenomenon that 
has received scant attention in the past. It can also lead to prescriptions that can inform 
strategic leaders in organizations on the properties or qualities that can help their organization 
succeed at engaging with the future.  
To generate insights on the properties that can enhance an organization’s ability to 
engage with the future, I conduct an in-depth case study of an unconventional organization 
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010): Greenpeace International. Born as a social movement, 
                                                        
3
 I use the term “ability” over “capability” to recognize the fact that an organization has little control over its 
environment when it comes to engage with the future. Capability entails being capable of something, such as 
adapting to a changing environment. It suggests a practical ability. Ability, on the other hand, implies 
possibility. With regards to the future, an organization cannot claim to be capable of shaping it: it is a mere 
possibility that it can influence it, hence the focus on ability over capability.  
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Greenpeace International has an explicit aim of raising awareness about environmental issues 
to change the way individuals behave. As described by scholars, Greenpeace challenges 
prevailing structures, and re-imagines possible meanings attached to current practices 
(Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2011). It achieves this by conducting long-term campaigns on 
specific environmental and social issues. These campaigns employ a variety of tactics, 
including lobbying, protests, and non-violent direct actions. Over the years, Greenpeace 
experienced several successes in its attempts to shape the landscape, but also numerous 
failures. Its senior leadership tried to learn from these successes and failures to develop 
structures, practices, and processes designed to improve the organization’s effectiveness with 
regards to its goals and objectives.  
In the current study, I revisit Greenpeace's history from 1979 to 2002 to understand: 
(1) what properties contributed to Greenpeace’s ability to shape the landscape over the years; 
(2) why these properties mattered; and (3) how they can influence the ability of an 
organization to engage with the future.  I achieve this by comparing the different periods in 
Greenpeace's history and by analyzing internal documentation from Greenpeace's archives 
(approximately 200,000 pages of internal documentation coming from meeting minutes, 
internal reports, and internal communications), to develop contextualized explanations on the 
reasons why they adopted specific features over the years, and with what effect on their 
ability to shape the landscape. To facilitate the analytical process put in place to identify the 
properties that contributed to Greenpeace's success (failures) and why/how they mattered, I 
built on analytical constructs (Ingram, Rao, & Silverman, 2012; Rowlinson, Hassard, & 
Decker, 2014). These analytical constructs were used to focus my attention on specific 
aspects of the data. These constructs are “Rationality” (i.e. ability to identify opportunities), 
“Plasticity” (i.e. ability to pursue opportunities), and “Shaping ability” (i.e. ability to shape 
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the landscape). These analytical constructs were proposed by Gavetti (2012) to explain why 
firms fail at engaging with the distant. I used these constructs to describe Greenpeace across 
the different periods of its history, to develop insights as to what contributed to enhance its 
ability to identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.    
 My research highlights the importance of flexibility (cognitive, operational, and 
financial), stability (attentional, structural, and financial), and diversity (institutional, 
structural, and in the portfolio of action alternatives). These three properties – along with 
their associate dimensions – are important if an organization is to succeed at identifying and 
pursuing opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Flexibility allows an 
organization to approach problems in different ways and to move resources around quickly, 
to seize opportunities that are time-sensitive. Stability allows an organization to focus on its 
primary mission and to concentrate its attention on environmental issues as opposed to 
organizational issues. In the case of complex issues, stability is also important to identify 
opportunities that can enact the landscape and which can only be identified through a 
sustained focus on the environment. Diversity within an organization, on the other hand, 
enhances the ability of an organization to develop creative ways to approach issues and 
design interventions that have the potential to change the way individuals and other actors in 
the environment behave. Combined, these three properties allow for greater effectiveness in 
identifying and pursuing opportunities to shape the landscape and, ultimately, enhance an 
organization’s ability to engage with the future.  
My study makes a contribution to three different streams of research. First, it 
contributes to organizational theory by focusing on one type of organization that has received 
scant attention in the past. Organizations that engage with the future live with the 
understanding that the future can be altered based on a specific set of desires (van der 
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Heijden, 2004). Organizations that engage with the future with the intent to change it are the 
ones that create the rules for others, placing them at the forefront of the changes within their 
environment. Most research focuses on “fitness” with its environment (Gavetti, 2012; 
Levinthal, 1997; Siggelkow, 2001, 2002) or ability to adapt to a changing environment (Gaba 
& Joseph, 2013; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Adapting to a changing environment is 
certainly important, but it reflects a conceptualization of the future as an unalterable path 
(van der Heijden, 2004). The future, from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has 
not happened yet. It is in the realm of imagination, meaning that there is not one future but 
many possible futures (March, 1995). The future can be changed, and projections of the 
future can inform actions (Lord, Dinh, & Hoffman, 2014). By focusing on an organization 
that engages with the future, I focus on one type of organization that received scant attention 
in the literature but nevertheless occupies an important role in enabling institutional change.  
Second, my study contributes to strategic management, in particular to a burgeoning 
literature concerned with understanding why firms might fail (succeed) at engaging with the 
distant (e.g. Gavetti, 2012). This literature can be associated with “behavioral strategy” 
(Gavetti, 2012; Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011) which is concerned with addressing questions, 
such as how to improve the psychological architecture of firms, how particular forms of 
behavior arise in and among organizations, and how individual cognition scales to collective 
behavior. It aims to ground strategic management theories in realistic assumptions about 
human cognition, emotion, and social interaction to enrich strategy theory. It also calls for a 
plurality of approaches to the study of strategy. My study contributes to this emerging stream 
of research by providing insights that are grounded in the case of an organization that 
engages with the distant future as part of its mission. The future contains issues to be and 
issues in the making: problems that will have to be solved, threats to be avoided or mitigated, 
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and opportunities to be seized. Some of the issues that are to be encountered in the future can 
be predicted, but many of them are unknown and are to remain unforeseen until they occur 
(Lord et al., 2014). My research highlights that although an organization cannot predict or 
anticipate a course of actions that will allow it to engage with the distant, it can adopt specific 
features that will enhance its ability to identify and pursue opportunities that align with its 
objectives. My research provides guidelines as to what these features are, why they matter, 
and how they influence the ability of an organization to engage with the future.  
Third, my study contributes to international management theory and practice. More 
specifically, it informs current research on cognition and attention in the multinational 
enterprise, a stream of research that has gained interest in the recent years (e.g. Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2009; Maitland & Sammartino, 2014). Specifically, it informs the current 
conversation on attention and cognition in the multinational enterprise by providing 
additional insights on the mechanisms enabling attention and action across the organization. 
While previous research suggests that the ability to identify changes in the environment can 
be enhanced through attention-sustaining and focusing devices (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2011; Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009) and through the allocation of individuals 
who have ties with the center of decision (Plourde, Parker, & Schaan, 2014), my study 
provides precisions with regards to these findings, clarifying how activities associated with 
“international attention” (i.e. activities that aim to improve an organization’s understanding 
of its global environment) influence the ability of the organization to identify and seize 
opportunities that are global in scope. My study provides contextualization to these findings, 
providing elements of reflections as to how an organization that is global in scope can 
enhance its ability to identify and seize opportunities aligned with its mission.  
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 In the next chapters, I provide further background on the study. In Chapter 2, I 
discuss the challenges of engaging with the future for an organization. In Chapter 3, I explain 
the method behind my research. In Chapter 4, I provide a brief history of Greenpeace divided 
by periods. In Chapter 5, I revisit these periods using the dimensions of rationality, plasticity, 
and shaping ability, which have been used to explain why firms might fail at engaging with 
the distant in the past and to understand what Greenpeace did during each period that has 
contributed to its successes (failures). In Chapter 6, I elaborate on the properties that 
contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future, and make a formal 
proposition explaining why/how these properties can enhance an organization’s ability to 
engage with the future. I also provide information as to what Greenpeace did to enable these 
properties in practice. In Chapter 7, I discuss the theoretical contributions, limitations and 
boundary conditions, as well as the transferability of the research to other settings, and 
briefly propose future research directions.   
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Chapter 2 
2. The future and the organization 
Engaging with the future corresponds to “seeing” what the future might offer and attempting 
to “enact” it (Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010). The term enactment emphasizes “the central 
point that when people act, they bring events and structures into existence and set them in 
motion” (Weick, 1988: p. 306). Shaping the future corresponds to the act of enacting, as it 
implies undertaking actions that have the potential to create new structures, constraints, and 
opportunities that are associated with a particular vision of the future. It takes place in the 
present and within a specific landscape, but is oriented towards the distant future.  
 The outcome of actions intended to shape the future corresponds to “residuum of 
changes produced by enactment” (Weick, 1988: p. 306). Residuum of changes can take 
different forms, from tangible objects (e.g. dominant design for a product or use of a product 
that did not exist before) to new legislations (e.g. at the city-government level, country level, 
or international level), mental representations (e.g. how we view the environment or how we 
view the use of a technology), or acceptable norms (e.g. how resources should be exploited 
or what is an acceptable way to promote products and services). These residuum of change 
are obtained through interactions with the environment to create structures, constraints, and 
opportunities that did not exist or were not necessarily noticeable before the actions were 
undertaken (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985).   
 The actions intended to shape the landscape correspond to commitments (Weick, 
1988: p. 310). A commitment occurs when actions are public, irrevocable, and volitional. 
When actions are public, irrevocable, and volitional, they take on a new significance because 
more is at stake. The word commitment is relevant for the current study because to impact 
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the landscape, actions must be public; if they are not public, they cannot impact the external 
environment. Actions must also have some degree of irrevocability; if they don’t, the 
organization might lose credibility, which can undermine its legitimacy. Finally, actions 
intended to shape the landscape are necessarily volitional; if they are not the result of 
intended choices, their consequences are unintended and cannot be associated with the 
desires of the organization.  
 Succeeding at enacting the environment through residuum of change brings a number 
of challenges for organizations. First, it requires strategic leaders to create the right 
organizational context, to encourage multiple realities, and to test and experiment with 
different actions (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Second, it is expected to require persistence 
(March, 1995), as creating residuum of changes can only occur over time. In this chapter, I 
discuss the challenges for organizing, which are divided into three interrelated categories: the 
challenge of determining what the future might and should entail; the challenge of sharing 
visions of the future internally; and, the challenge of undertaking actions that have the 
potential to enact a particular vision of the future. At the core of these challenges lays the 
need for an organization to identify and seize opportunities that have the potential to create 
residuum of change.  
2.1 Determining which future 
The first challenge for an organization that dedicates its actions to the enactment of a vision 
for the future is the one of making sense of what the future might entail and determining 
which future the organization wishes to see in times ahead. It includes dimensions of 
foresight about what the future might offer and also includes beliefs about what the future 
ought to be. Both foresight and beliefs are important and are tight with one another.  
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Determining (or attempting to determine) what the future might entail can be 
associated with foresight. Foresight “marks the ability to see through the apparent confusion, 
to spot developments before they become trends, to see patterns before they emerge, and to 
grasp the relevant features of social currents that are likely to shape the direction of future 
events.” (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004, p. 2). Foresight has been defined as an activity, a 
process, or an ability. Regardless of how it is defined, foresight refers primarily to 
conceptualizing the future in order to inform present actions. It can be said to be strategic 
when it is used to “penetrate and transgress established boundaries and seize the 
opportunities otherwise overlooked by others” (Chia, 2008, p. 27).  
Sensemaking is an important component of strategic foresight (Aaltonen, 2009; 
Nathan, 2004; Sarpong & Maclean, 2014). Sensemaking corresponds to the social process of 
identifying and interpreting subtle cues to form salient categories that can be used to inform 
action and sustain meanings and identities (Weick, 1995). Sensemaking is, in essence, 
retrospective as it builds on the past (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005); it can also be 
prospective (Gioia, 1986) and future-oriented (Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, 2010) to inform 
current actions (Lord et al., 2014).  Prospective sensemaking typically occurs when 
ambiguous situations require individuals to develop novel understandings and engage in 
forward-looking thinking to “structure the future by imagining some desirable state” (Gioia 
& Mehra, 1996: p. 229). For instance, it can be used to trigger innovation, to extrapolate 
actions into the future, or to construct images of the yet to be realized innovation (Sarpong & 
Maclean, 2014).  
Within an organization, foresight becomes an activity carried out by several 
individuals. Cues available at a given point in time are shared and discussed to speculate on 
possible futures (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Stigliani & Ravasi, 
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2012). The interpretation of these cues can be more or less controversial: individuals differ in 
the way they perceive the saliency of cues, which can translate into diverging interpretations 
about issues and concerns for the future. These interpretations might differ depending on 
individuals’ backgrounds (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, & Hambrick, 
2013; Kaplan, 2008a), concerns and values (Bansal, 2003), personal biases (Reitzig & 
Sorenson, 2013), cultural background (Barr & Glynn, 2004; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991), 
how distant they are from an event (Barreto & Patient, 2013), as well as from the knowledge 
base they can draw from (Dane, 2013). This diversity of perspectives can enhance or 
undermine the ability of the organization to develop foresight about what the future might 
entail.   
In terms of activities used by strategic leaders to speculate on possible futures (or on 
anticipating what the future might offer) and prepare their organization accordingly, we find 
activities such as contingency planning, scenario-based learning, scenario planning, 
forecasting techniques, and analogical reasoning (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). They vary in 
their degree of sophistication and in terms of their duration in time. Forecasting approaches, 
for instance, traditionally build on linear estimation of the future and tend to be formalized 
within strategic planning processes (Cuhls, 2003). Scenario planning and scenario thinking is 
a different type of intervention. It aims to identify possible trajectories and emerging trends 
that can be evaluated to prepare the organization in the case one of the identified scenarios 
occurs (Sarpong, 2011; van der Heijden, 1996). They usually are associated with a reactive 
mode to prepare for situations that are expected to occur rather than a proactive mode where 
the organization initiates specific actions to enact its environment (Tevis, 2010).  
These activities represent tools that can be used by organizations to prepare for the 
future, but they do not represent foresight by itself. Furthermore, because reality exists in the 
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present (Mead, 1932), and the present is ongoing, actions conducted by actors in the 
environment are expected to bring new cues to the attention of individuals. These cues can 
inform possible paths for the future. They can also validate or disconfirm representations of 
the direction the future is taking. This implies that foresight has to be flexible and in a state of 
perpetual becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).  
Determining which future should prevail refers to specific preferences or desires with 
regards to what the future ought to be. Because the future is in the realm of possibilities, 
actors can still influence the course of future events (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). For the 
organization, these preferences can be associated with a set of beliefs about what ought to 
become reality. These beliefs can be associated with a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986), or a set of parameters that serve as a justification for why firms do what they do 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005). They can also be associated with the intentions of the 
organization with regards to its actions (King et al., 2010), and/or, in extreme cases, an 
ideology (Hond & Bakker, 2007). Beliefs are expected to form through shared experiences 
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1982); they can also be influenced by values. Beliefs are expected to 
inform actions that are aligned with the vision of the future that the organization wishes to 
see in times ahead.  
It is important at this point to emphasize that beliefs can also refer to the specific role 
an organization might play in the future. For instance, strategic leaders might have foresight 
about the future and see a particular role for their organization. In these instances, beliefs 
become associated with a projection of what the future might look like for the organization 
and be used as an anchor that guides organizational actions (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). These 
representations can represent some form of future perfect thinking, whereas the future is 
imagined as having already occurred (Weick, 1979). In the process of developing these 
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beliefs, there might be multiple and conflicting interpretations about the organization’s 
situation (Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Weick, 1979). The past will also remain important as the 
organization attempts to determine its future, providing foundations for claims for future 
identity (Schultz & Hernes, 2013). Depending on the organizational past and interpretations 
of this past, the array of possible futures the organization can aim for can be broadened or 
narrowed. Hence, beliefs about the future and beliefs about the organization’s role in that 
future are distinct, but complementary, as they both have implications for the type of 
opportunities organizational members will look for. Beliefs about the organization’s role will 
be nested within beliefs about the future and the specific opportunities pursued by the 
organization will be aligned with beliefs about the organization’s role in the enactment of 
that future.  
In this section, I have discussed the role of beliefs and foresight in engaging with the 
future. Beliefs and foresight are important because they correspond to the underlying 
foundations of engaging with the future. They also correspond to distinguishing elements 
between an organization that seeks to adapt to a changing environment and one that aims to 
change what the future will be. Beliefs correspond to a set of preferences or desires about 
what the future ought to be. They can also refer to the organization’s role in that future. 
Foresight, on the other hand, can inform beliefs about where the environment is going and 
why it might be necessary to act to enact the future. It can also be used to identify 
opportunities that have the potential to enact a particular vision for the future. Beliefs become 
institutionalized within the organization’s long term goals and objectives; foresight 
corresponds to something organizations have or do as opposed to something they value. 
Keeping these definitions in mind, I review, in the next section, the challenges faced by an 
  16
organization in sharing visions of the future internally and on taking actions to shape the 
future.  
2.2. Sharing visions of the future internally 
In an organization, individuals “accept the joint commitment to uphold certain principles” 
(King et al., 2010), even if personal preferences would suggest an alternative course of action. 
These principles usually entail the mission of the organization, as well as its goals. With 
regards to engaging with the future, these principles are also expected to entail values as well 
as beliefs about the future and what it should entail. The acceptance of these beliefs is central 
to the pursuit of commitments, as Smircich & Stubbart (1985, p. 732-733) suggest: “for 
sizeable organizational enactments to succeed, a critical mass of beliefs and acceptance must 
be reached.” Reaching this critical mass depends on persuasion rather than objective factors 
and requires strategic leaders to justify their choices and actions to internal audiences with 
regards to their vision for the future (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004).  
The process of sharing visions for the future is akin to an institutionalization process 
where representations of what the future should entail become ingrained into the 
organization’s identity. Institutionalizing representations of what the future should entail, 
however, is not without risk. While belief systems can be a source of competitive strength 
(Collins & Porras, 1994; Porac & Rosa, 1996), they can also lead to wrongful assumptions 
about the future or be detrimental to an organization when its environment is changing 
(Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Furthermore, the institutionalization of beliefs about the future 
and the organization’s role can go against the identification of opportunities that might serve 
the organization’s objectives, but do not fit necessarily with shared representations (Tsoukas 
& Chia, 2002; Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004). Given that the future is in a state of perpetual 
becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002), it is thus expected that beliefs will evolve over time.  
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Renewing beliefs might imply giving new meanings to the organization’s purpose 
and actions, and thus renew the organization’s commitments. In these situations, it might 
violate some aspects of the organization’s identity (Tripsas, 2009; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). 
The violation of different aspects of the organization’s identity will imply important change 
efforts requiring an “unlearning” of what individuals within the organization have come to 
believe over the years. As Smircich and Stubbart emphasize, “organized people often 
struggle within the confines of their own prior enactments […]. Changing these patterns 
requires people to intentionally forget some of what they know and to disbelieve some of 
what they believe. Depending on the weight of prior commitments, changing may seem risky, 
foolish, or taxing” (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985, 732). Hence, proposing a different path for 
the future will require managerial efforts to persuade organizational members to pursue a 
new path for the organization.    
In circumstances when beliefs and visions for the future and the organization have to 
change, strategic leaders will have to engage in sensegiving activities. Sensegiving refers to 
the process of how visions are given or justified to others (Burgelman, 1994; Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Kaplan, 2008b; Rouleau, 2005). It occurs when managers try to 
communicate what organizational change means to other stakeholders, such as employees 
and investors. Sandberg and Tsoukas (2014) describe this process as such: “top executives 
are first involved in making sense of what an organizational change initiative implies, but 
once they have made sense of it, they then get involved in sensegiving, in their attempt to 
communicate the new sense of the organization to its stakeholders”(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
2014, p. 19). Sensegiving activities are expected to modify cognitive representations that are 
used to understand the organization and its priorities (Foldy, Goldman, & Ospina, 2008). 
These new representations might also require changes in its organization’s architecture to 
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seize these novel opportunities, a need that organizations often fail to recognize (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005).  
In this section, I briefly reviewed the implications of engaging with the future for an 
organization in terms of sharing beliefs about what the future ought to be and what is the 
organization’s role when moving towards that future, as well as the challenges that are likely 
to be encountered as these beliefs evolve. These beliefs are important as they are known to 
impact the identification of opportunities aligned with these beliefs and the conduct of 
actions that have the potential to enact the environment. In the next section, I develop further 
on these two parts of the process that are central to the pursuit of opportunities aligned with 
one’s vision for the future.   
2.3 Taking actions to shape the future 
Enacting the future implies undertaking actions that will have for effect to change individuals’ 
behavior, to make these behaviors aligned with one’s vision for the future. Undertaking these 
actions implies identifying and recognizing opportunities that have the potential to enact the 
future, evaluating the identified possibilities as well as their anticipated consequences, and 
acting on these opportunities to seize them.  
Opportunities can be defined as a favorable juncture of circumstances for attaining a 
goal. Opportunities are subject to ontological debate about whether they can be objectively 
observed, waiting to be “discovered” by individuals, or whether they arise from the 
interpretations and creative actions of individuals (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007; 
Grégoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010). Because enactment is obtained through interactions with 
the environment, it is safe to assume that some opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the 
future can be seen and objectively evaluated, while others are to be created to force people to 
think about their environment and change their behavior.  
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The process of opportunity recognition itself can be defined as “efforts to make sense 
of signals of change (e.g. new information about new conditions) to form beliefs regarding 
whether or not enacting a course of action to address this change could lead to net benefits” 
(Grégoire et al., 2010, p. 415). For Grégoire and colleagues, these net benefits can be for 
profits, growth, or competitive positioning, but also other forms of gains. With regards to the 
phenomenon under study, the beliefs are about the future and the opportunities are nested 
within these beliefs. Signals of change, however, remain important. They can modify beliefs 
about the future, be used to evaluate which opportunities to pursue, and they can also lead to 
the identification of opportunities arising from unforeseen events.  
When pursuing an opportunity, small wins can contribute to initiate a path that will 
lead to more substantial residuum of changes. Small wins implies seeking tangible outcomes 
of moderate importance to attract allies and deter opponents (Weick, 1984). It can imply the 
reformulation of issues into smaller problems. Small wins are particularly useful when an 
issue is so large that it cannot necessarily be conceived, which can preclude innovative 
actions. The idea of small wins was originally conceptualized in the context of policy-making, 
but it is also expected to be found in the context of organizations engaging with the future. 4 
The pursuit of opportunities might also involve seizing windows of opportunities. 
Windows of opportunities correspond to opportunities to take advantage of these moments in 
time when the organizations can interact with the environment to alter other’s view of reality 
and legitimize new courses of actions. In a technology context, these windows of opportunity 
                                                        
4
 A strategy of small wins can be illustrated with the example of the engagement of Alcoa in composite 
materials in the 80s. At the time, the CEO of Alcoa had strong beliefs that, in the future, materials with different 
properties would be necessary for industries like aerospace and microelectronics (Plourde, 2013). The 
opportunity for Alcoa was the development of composite materials combining the properties of aluminum with 
the properties of other materials. They initiated this shift through the development of specific applications of 
composite materials that could be used to convince customers and suppliers to engage in this shift. This strategy 
was very similar to the one adopted at its founding, when aluminum was unknown. Finding and developing 
specific applications for aluminum (e.g. utensils, cables, foils) represented small wins that could be used to 
pursue the opportunity offered by aluminum.  
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correspond to a moment in time when new technologies can still be explored and tested 
before adoption by users defines the way this technology ought to proceed (Tyre & 
Orlikowski, 1994). These windows can be sensed through the feedback received through 
interaction with the environment (Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, 2009). Sensing these 
windows is based on timing (Albert & Bell, 2002) and, once identified, routines and practices 
must be quickly enacted before the windows fade.    
As mentioned earlier, the identification and the recognition of opportunities is closely 
linked with the capture of signals in the environment. Within the organization, the 
recognition of these signals is about mental models and structural alignment (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Grégoire et al., 2010). It is driven by cognitive schema, maps, and 
sensemaking (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993; Weick, 1995), 
and is filled by the ability of leaders to capture signals in the environment (Ansoff, 1987).  
Signals can also be associated with events that are expected to happen but, nevertheless, 
cannot be predicted as to when they will happen. Cognitive frames provide templates to 
recognize these patterns and enact predetermined routines and practices to seize these 
opportunities.  
The ability to identify opportunities and to seize windows of opportunities cannot be 
considered independently from the broader organizational context. The frames that are used 
to capture signals in the environment can become institutionalized within the governance and 
operational channels of the organization (Ocasio, 1997, 2012; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). For 
instance, in multinational organizations, these patterns can be enhanced though an alignment 
of interests and cognition (Mahnke, Venzin, & Zahra, 2007) and through the adoption of 
attention-focusing and attention-sustaining devices (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009, 2011; 
Bouquet et al., 2009). In the multi-business firm, novel opportunities can be identified and 
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seized through greater integration across units (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012). The organizational 
context will also matter in determining whether or not individuals will be willing to 
communicate potential opportunities to the senior leadership (Bansal, 2003; Ren & Guo, 
2011). With that regard, the time orientation institutionalized within the organization will 
have a major impact on organizational members actions (Slawinski & Bansal, 2012). All of 
these effects related to the organizational context are important because previous research 
that focused on engaging with the future emphasized that the emergence and final 
determination of enactment “is a function of a series of interlocking contextual actions 
improvised in response to specific pattern recognition or projection often triggered by a 
problem driven search or a serendipitous event” (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014). This suggests 
that initiating a path aligned with a specific vision of the future is far from a linear process. 
Given this, creating favorable conditions to discover this path is expected to be a central part 
of an organization’s success when it comes to engage with the future.   
Overall, taking actions that have the potential to shape the future is expected to be 
demanding and to require resources, creativity, and persistence. As Smircich and Stubbard 
(1985, p. 732) posit: “enactment test one’s physical informational, imaginative, and 
emotional resources. Without sufficient resources (or without the ability to think 
imaginatively about what might constitute resources), one simply cannot support many 
conceivable enactments”. Many conceivable enactments are important because the future, 
from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has not yet happened. It is in the realm of 
imagination, meaning that there is not one future but many possible futures (March, 1995). A 
variety of actors in the environment are in a position to influence that future (Emirbayer & 
Mische, 1998; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985), sometimes with competing views and approaches 
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(Kilduff et al., 2011). We can thus expect that an organization engaging with the future with 
the intent to shape it will experience numerous failures before it becomes successful.   
2.4 Research question  
In the previous sections, I reviewed the implications for an organization to engage with the 
future. I presented these implications as part of a process that requires the organization to 
develop intentions that are informed by preferences with regards to what the future ought to 
be and to take actions that have the potential to enact that vision. Taking actions implies both 
the identification of opportunities aligned with beliefs about what the future ought to be, and 
the pursuit of these opportunities, to create residuum of change in the environment.  
 One aspect that has not been discussed is the question of how an organization can 
enhance its ability to enact a particular vision of the future and, more specifically, the 
properties that can enhance an organization’s ability to shape the landscape. Properties 
represent relatively unique features that distinguish organizations from one another.5 They 
can be used to explain why some organizations succeed where others have failed. As argued 
by King and colleagues (2010: p. 293), “the mission of the organization, its routines and 
practices, and individuals’ roles within hierarchy may elicit certain forms of behaviors and 
choices that are directly attributable to the organization rather than the individual”. This 
suggests that properties can be enabled through the culture, the structure, the processes, and 
the practices of an organization.  
There is evidence in the literature that certain properties might contribute to enhance 
an organization’s ability to engage with the future. Properties of fluidity and flexibility, for 
                                                        
5
 I use the term “properties”, but “characteristics”, “features”, or “attributes” could be used to describe what can 
make an organization effective at shaping the landscape. This terminology is aligned with the one used by King 
et al. (2010), to emphasize that my focus is on the organization; it is deemed appropriate because I am not 
looking at specific variables leading to success. I am looking at empirical concepts that are associated with 
winning conditions for an organization attempting to engage with the future. 
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instance, are deemed crucial for organizations evolving in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt, 
Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). Properties of flexibility are also 
deemed important for organizations developing novel ideas for the future (Narayanan & 
Fahey, 2004). While these properties potentially apply to organizations that aim to enact their 
environment, they have been studied from the perspective of organizations adapting to a 
changing environment. Focusing specifically on the properties that can help an organization 
engage with the future with the intent to shape it, I thus ask the following question: 
 
(RQ) How can an organization enhance its ability to enact a vision of the future 
aligned with its beliefs about what that future ought to be?  
 
In particular, my goal is to: 1) identify the properties that can help an organization 
enhance its ability to engage with the future; 2) understand why these properties are 
important; and 3) understand how they impact the ability of an organization to shape the 
future.  
Understanding these properties is important. The future contains problems to address, 
threats to be mindful off, and opportunities to identify and seize. If all organizations evolve in 
a changing environment, not all organizations have the intention to shape the future. 
Organizations differ in the way they conceptualize it, and depending on this 
conceptualization, the future can be seen as the result of an unalterable path or up for grab 
(van der Heijden, 2004). Organizations that adopt a conceptualization of the future as a future 
of desire are the ones that are expected to change the rules of the game, forcing others to 
adapt. By focusing on the properties an organization can develop to enhance its ability to 
engage the future, I intend to generate insights on the specific features strategic leaders can 
implement to help their organization succeed at engaging with the future.   
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Chapter 3 
3. Methods 
To investigate my research questions, I conduct an historical case study of an organization 
that dedicates its actions to the enactment of its environment. A single case study approach 
allows for greater accuracy by developing contextualized explanations of a given 
phenomenon (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). In the 
current study, I obtain this accuracy by building on changes over time to identify decisions, 
actions, and elements of context that have impacted the ability of the organization under 
investigation to enact its environment. Given that properties are not static and are expected to 
change over time (Buchanan & Bryman, 2007), this approach is the one that has the most 
potential to lead to meaningful insights on which of those properties are deemed important 
when it comes to shaping the landscape. 
The case is based on the in-depth study of historical documentation (i.e. “traces of 
history” considered as primary data), a method referred to as historiography (Lustik, 1996; 
Rowlinson et al., 2014). Historiography typically focuses on one organization or a limited 
number of organizations in order to make interpretations about why certain events occurred 
and/or how they unfolded over time. This approach has a long tradition in strategic 
management and organization theory (e.g. Burgelman, 1983; Chandler, 1962; Danneels, 
2011; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Mintzberg, 1978) with numerous calls in the recent years for a 
deeper engagement with historical methods (e.g. Burgelman, 2011; Farjoun, 2002; Kahl, 
Silverman, & Cusumano, 2012).  
 Historiography is appropriate for this dissertation because historians tend to reject the 
dualism of structure (determinism) and agency (voluntarism) and view the emergence of 
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structures as the result of past decisions (Burgelman, 2011). In the phenomenon under 
investigation, this dualism plays out at two different levels: the organization and the 
environment. At the level of the organization, the adoption of structures, practices, and 
processes that can be associated with certain properties corresponds to a process of 
institutionalization. This process is the result of a number of decisions made by strategic 
leaders over time. As Kiesler posits (1994: p. 611) “history teaches us to interpret existing 
organizational structures not as determined by laws but as the result of decisions in past 
choice opportunities, some of which were made intentionally and others more implicitly”. A 
focus on traces of history about decisions made by leaders allows for “seeing” the type of 
debates that took place within the organization to identify the reasons why specific decisions 
were made with regards to the adoption of structures, processes, and practices.  
At the level of the environment, the actions of the organization cannot be looked at in 
isolation from the environment that the organization attempts to enact. The structures which 
organizations that are engaging with the future attempt to change are institutional in nature. 
They correspond to widely accepted norms, practices, and/or accepted beliefs about the 
environment. Changing them requires actors to interact with other actors in the environment. 
A focus on traces of history allows for “seeing” how leaders approached their environment, 
and how they adjusted their actions based on the feedback they received from other actors in 
that environment. It thus provides an opportunity to develop unique insights about the 
challenges they encountered, why they encountered these challenges, how they modified 
their approach, and how the changes they made with regards to their structures, practices, and 
processes enhanced (or undermined) the organization’s ability to enact the future.  
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3.1 Research setting: Greenpeace International 
The organization I investigate in this dissertation is Greenpeace International. Greenpeace 
International is an organization that is global in scope with a mission to raise awareness about 
environmental issues. Its overarching goal is to elicit change in individuals’ behaviors. It 
focuses on a diverse portfolio of issues, from the protection of whales to prohibiting the use 
of genetically modified organisms. To address these issues, the organization challenges 
prevailing structures and re-imagine possible meanings attached to current practices (Kilduff 
et al., 2011). Its portfolio of action alternatives includes lobbying, fundraising, protests, and 
non-violent direct actions, such as the climbing of high-rise buildings and the illegal 
occupation of oil drilling platforms. These actions are intended to force change with regards 
to specific environmental problems by leveraging the media to create what Greenpeace 
founders call “mind bombs” (Dale, 1996; Weyler, 2004): images that stick to people’s minds 
affecting their perception of issues.  
A study in the context of Greenpeace International corresponds to unconventional 
research (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010): research that focuses on an unusual setting to test theory 
or explore phenomena or relations that are open to discovery. One aim of unconventional 
management research is to tap into a phenomenon that is uniquely or most easily observed in 
a non-business setting, but nonetheless has “critical implications for management theory” 
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010: p. 668). The value of the case lies in the possibility of isolating a 
phenomenon in a way that makes it transparently observable (Eisenhardt, 1989). There are 
two aspects of Greenpeace that makes it a rich research setting for the current study: its focus 
on a particular set of issues that are threatening the future of the planet, and the fact that it 
operates as a multinational enterprise. Below, I elaborate further on these two characteristics 
of Greenpeace and how they allow for a meaningful contribution to theory.   
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3.1.1 Particularities of Greenpeace as an organization focusing on issues 
Greenpeace is an organization that focuses on a specific set of issues. These issues varied 
over the years, but revolved around a number of environmental problems surrounding the 
destruction of ecosystems, the protection of species, and other issues related to peace and 
disarmament. These issues were identified as threats for the future of the planet; they also 
found their roots in human behaviors. It is through changes in human behaviors that these 
issues can effectively be solved. Because these behaviors are well anchored in individuals’ 
habitus, they require changing the way individuals think about their environment to adjust 
their behaviors accordingly.  
Greenpeace addresses issues through campaigns. Campaigns correspond to elaborate 
plans that are designed to influence a target, which can be a corporation, a government, or a 
supranational institution. Campaigns typically include a variety of tactics associated with 
activism, such as protests and direct actions (Spar & La Mure, 2003), as well as lobbying and 
behind-the-scenes strategies. Campaigns vary in lengths, lasting from a few weeks up to 3 to 
5 years, and include an explicit goal (e.g. change in the practice of a corporation, new piece 
of legislation, etc.). Actions associated with a given campaign are carefully scripted and 
practiced ahead of time. Once in motion, they cannot be undone, minimized, or disowned. 
Greenpeace’s focus on issues through campaigns implies that the goals of the 
organization are explicit and its actions are intended and in the public domain.6 This makes it 
possible to identify the commitments of the organization and to track them over time. It also 
provides an opportunity to determine whether or not the organization is succeeding at 
shaping its landscape through residuum of changes.  
                                                        
6
 Not all of their actions are public, as their strategies also draw upon behind-the-scenes strategies, such as 
lobbying, but their campaigns to address issues always include some form of commitment in the public domain. 
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INTERNATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
(reformed in 1984) 
• Elected by the Council during the AGM; 
• Appoints the International Executive Director (IED); 
• Monitors the operations of GPI and the work of the IED; 
• Review budget and audited accounts submitted to AGM. 
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GPI) (since 1979) 
GPI SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM (as of 1985) 
• Facilitates the overall decision making processes as laid out in the Governance procedures;  
• Facilitates the international planning and decision making processes on global Greenpeace campaigns;  
• Coordinates and carries out global Greenpeace campaigns;  
• Monitors Greenpeace's global strategic and financial performance; 
• Develops Greenpeace’s presence in priority regions;  
• Provides fundraising support and protects the Greenpeace trademark;  
• Provides cost-effective IT/web support to NROs and regional offices. 
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (since 1983) 
• Supervises the Senior Management Team (SMT) of GPI; 
• Oversees the formulation and the execution of the organization’s strategy. 
COUNCIL (since 1984) 
• Includes one representative from each country (called a “trustee”); 
• Meets once a year at the Annual General Meeting (AGM); 
• Elects/removes members of the International Board; 
• Approves/refuses the annual Greenpeace International budget; 
• Identify/approve/review environmental issues of strategic significance to be 
addressed by the organization and decides on the main orientations. 
GREENPEACE NATIONAL OFFICES (NROs) (see Figure 2) 
• Contribute financially to Stitching Greenpeace Council by providing a percentage of their 
income to GPI; 
• Are registered as charitable organizations in their respective country and are subject to 
annual independent external financial auditing reviews in accordance with local regulations; 
• Operate in accordance with the legal framework of the country they are registered in; 
• Are accountable for the use of the name Greenpeace in their country; 
• Run national campaigns, participate in international campaigns, and contribute to new 
campaign development; 
• Accountable to GPI and to their own board of directors, which is elected by a voting 
membership of volunteers and activists from the country.  
NATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
• Elected by a voting membership of volunteers and 
activists; 
• Oversees priorities and finances of the NRO; 
• Appoints the Executive Director of the NRO; 
• Appoints a trustee to Council.  
NROs send a portion of their 
earnings to GPI. GPI will 
facilitate communication of 
best practices and provide 
coordination on fundraising 
to NROs, but it will not 
raise funds over and above 
NROs except in 
exceptional circumstances 
(e.g. funding for specific 
projects or major donations 
from individuals). 
A number of committees link the operations of NROs 
with one another. The Executive Directors meetings 
(EDM), for instance, was created in 1992 to exchange 
knowledge about best practices and to make 
recommendations on global Greenpeace operations.  
 
GPI does not 
have formal 
authority over 
NROs, but 
individuals 
associated with a 
specific function 
at a NRO will 
report to the 
individual in 
charge for that 
function 
internationally.   
Figure 1: Greenpeace Main Governance Channels 
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3.1.2 Particularities of Greenpeace as an organization that is global in scope 
Greenpeace is also an organization that is global in scope. It has activities in 40 countries, 
with revenues of about 240 million euros collected from 2.5 million supporters worldwide (as 
of 2014 – see Appendices 1 and 2 for an overview of the organization’s income and 
expenditures over time). Its operations are divided between Greenpeace International (GPI), 
which corresponds to the organization’s international headquarters, and national offices 
(NROs), which manage Greenpeace's operations within their respective country. To 
coordinate the work of GPI and NROs, Greenpeace had to adopt clear governance and 
operational channels (see Figure 1). These channels, which evolved over the years, remained 
centered around main bodies: the Council, which includes one representative of each country, 
and the Board of Directors, whose members are elected by the Council. While the Council 
meets once a year at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) to discuss priorities as well as 
organizational issues, the Board of Directors meets four times a year to follow up on projects 
carried out by the International Executive Director (IED) and the Top Management Team 
(TMT) on behalf of Council. It is within these governance and operational channels that 
priorities, strategies, and organization of the work are discussed and debated.  
There are two particularities of Greenpeace as an organization that is global in scope 
that makes it appropriate for the current study. First, it allows for observing the conversations 
held within the governance and operational channels of the organization, to observe the 
different phases of engaging with the future, including the determination of which future to 
pursue (preferences), the sharing of this vision among all NROs, the identification of 
opportunities to pursue, as well as whether or not the pursuit of these opportunities is 
succeeding at shaping the landscape. This later point is important and makes the overall 
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process transparently observable, more so than within an organization that is limited in 
scope.7  
Second, Greenpeace’s funding is restricted to individual donations to ensure the 
transparency of the organization. The funds are collected by NROs with the support of GPI. 
GPI does not raise funds over and above NROs. NROs share a portion of their earnings with 
GPI. In return, NROs have a say in the orientations of the organization through the Council. 
They also receive services from GPI with regards to key functions (e.g. campaigning, 
fundraising, communications, etc.). Raising funds from individuals in different countries has 
important implications for the organization. If Greenpeace is not able to provide evidence 
that it is contributing to change behaviors on a global scale, it is unlikely that the organization 
will be sustainable in the long term. Nevertheless, and despite fluctuations in the number of 
donors and the amount of donations (see Graph 4 on page 69), the organization has been able 
to sustain since its founding. This suggests that Greenpeace must have learned from its 
successes and failures in order to last. This provides an opportunity to compare different 
periods in the history of the organization to identify properties (or the absence of properties) 
that contributed to Greenpeace's successes (failures).  
Overall, the fact that Greenpeace focuses on issues addressed through campaigns and 
operates on a global scale makes it a context where the phenomenon under investigation is 
transparently observable (Bamberger & Pratt, 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989). Because Greenpeace 
is an organization that is global in scope, its senior leadership has to define the goals for the 
organization and share these goals with organizational members. Greenpeace's organizational 
members also need to identify opportunities and undertake actions to seize these 
opportunities in order to enact their vision for the future. Hence, the intentionality of the 
                                                        
7
 Within an organization more limited in scope, the sharing of a vision for the future as well as the identification 
and pursuit of opportunities are more likely to be discussed throughout informal communications. 
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organization can be clearly identified within the governance channels of the organization, as 
well as the reasons behind the commitments that are made with regards to specific problems, 
since actions are carefully planned ahead of time and in the public domain once undertaken. 
This makes the goals of the organization clearly identifiable and transparently observable 
with regards to which future they want to pursue, how to pursue it, and with what effect. 
3.2 Data sources 
Given the research objectives, it was necessary to develop a comprehensive dataset. This 
dataset includes historical documentation from Greenpeace's archives, historical accounts 
from founders and independent analysts, media coverage, retrospective interviews with 
individuals that were closely tied with the organization, and direct observation of the 
organization in Canada. Sources criticism was central to the evaluation of each individual 
source (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2009: 107). Each individual source was serving a specific 
purpose, as is discussed in this section.  
3.2.1 Historical documentation 
The primary source of data is Greenpeace’s archives. These documents were created as part 
of normal life within the organization without being altered through a narrative or literary 
text (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Megill, 2007).8 Because these documents were intended to 
be used internally, they tend to present a high degree of authenticity (Gottschalk, 1969; 
Rowlinson, 2004). They can be considered as “real time data” because they reflect the 
discussions that were held within the organization at a certain point in time and the 
challenges its leaders were facing (Blazejewski, 2011). 
                                                        
8
 Historians consider these documents “primary sources” as they were not intended to be circulated to an 
external audience at the time they were produced, making them more reliable sources when it comes to 
understanding past decisions. 
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Greenpeace's archives were available at the International Institute for Social History 
(IISH) located in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The archives were donated to the IISH in 2004 by 
the Stitching Greenpeace Council as part of a legacy of the organization to social history. The 
archives at the IISH contain 151.4 meters of documents (approximately 200,000 pages) 
covering the years 1979 to 2004. They include minutes from various committees, budget 
proposals, special reports, reports on issues, proposals for campaigns, communications 
between headquarters and the national organizations, personal notes from executive directors, 
etc. As part of the convention between Greenpeace and IISH, access to these archives is 
restricted. Individuals must submit a formal proposal to the IISH and the Stitching 
Greenpeace Council evaluates each request on its own merit. I requested access to these 
archives in April 2012 through the submission of a formal proposal to the IISH. Unrestricted 
access was granted in May 2012. 
My first visit to the IIHS to consult Greenpeace's archives was in June 2012 for a 
period of three weeks (15 working days). During this first visit, I reviewed approximately 20 
percent of all the documents available and scanned approximately 25 percent of these 
documents (411 documents for a total of 10,204 pages – see Table 1 for a list of the scanned 
documents). Priority was given to meeting minutes, proposals, internal communications 
about issues, as well as important projects for the organization. These documents were 
considered important because they provide information on the decisions that were made at 
the time discussions about these decisions took place. They provide evidence of the internal 
debates that took place in regards to the main orientations of the organization, the allocation 
of resources, and the functioning of the organization. Two subsequent visits followed to fill 
in gaps in the data and to clarify and/or confirm interpretations of specific events and 
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decisions: second visit in December 2013 (3 days) and a third in July 2014 (1 day). Overall, I 
spent a total of 19 days in the archives (approximately 134 hours).   
To manage this large amount of data, I labeled each document based on the year of 
production and the type of information it included (e.g. Board Meeting Minutes for the third 
meeting of 1981 was labeled BMM1981c). I also organized the documents in PDF portfolios, 
with one PDF portfolio for each category of document. I ended up with five main portfolios: 
Annual General Meeting Minutes (39 documents – 3,210 pages), Board of Directors Meeting 
Minutes (88 documents, 1,793 pages), Executive Directors Meeting Minutes (15 documents, 
463 pages), Trustee Meeting Minutes (9 documents, 284 pages), and Senior Management 
Meeting Minutes. Other documents (26 documents, 1,138 pages) corresponding to specific 
projects or events, such as the “One Greenpeace” project, were not organized in portfolios, 
but filed in different folders. Proposals (137 documents, 2,150 pages) were also managed 
differently, as they provided additional information about issues and campaigns. They were 
kept in folders labeled by year and were surveyed when additional information about a 
project was required or when there was a reference to these proposals in the different meeting 
minutes.  
3.2.2 Historical accounts 
A second source of information was historical accounts from the founders about their 
experience with Greenpeace (Bohlen, 2001; Hunter, 1979, 2004; McTaggart, 2002; Moore, 
2010; Weyler, 2004), as well as analysis of the organization from independent observers 
(Dale, 1996; Lequenne, 1997). These accounts are associated with narrative sources and 
provide interpretations of past events (Howell & Prevenier, 2001). The historical accounts 
presented above were used to learn more about the modus operandi of Greenpeace and to 
develop a sense of the functioning of the organization, its practices, the discussions that took 
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place within the organization at different points in time, and the role of different actors over 
the years. Several discussions in these accounts provided additional information about the 
context of certain decisions identified in the meeting minutes, which contributed to enrich my 
own interpretation of the case study.  
3.2.3 Media coverage 
Media coverage includes audio and video material from CBC/Radio-Canada archives, and 
newspaper articles from European (Le Figaro, Le Monde, The Financial Times) and North 
American publications (La Presse, New York Times, Wall-Street Journal) obtained through 
Factiva and a French-Canadian database (Eureka – Biblio-Branché). This source of 
information has been partly collected for the years 1979 to 2004 and has not been the object 
of a formal analysis. Because individuals from outside the organization have produced media 
coverage, it cannot inform reliably on the discussions that took place internally within the 
organization. This source of information has been used sparsely to validate dates and seek 
additional information for special events (e.g. the downsizing of the organization in 1994).  
3.2.4 Retrospective interviews 
For historians, retrospective interviews are notoriously unreliable, especially when they are 
collected years later (Megill, 2007). Hence, this latter source of data was primarily used to 
gain more knowledge about the functioning of the organization, to become more sensitive to 
the challenges they were facing in their attempt to shape the landscape, and to discover the 
motivations behind the forming of Greenpeace as (1) a formal international organization (i.e. 
“Greenpeace International”) and (2) a professional organization (i.e. “Multinational of the 
Environment” and “Greenpeace Inc.”). 
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I obtained access to retrospective interviews used for a fifty-minute documentary 
made by CBC/Radio-Canada. This latter source of information was audio recorded in June 
2012 during a visit to the CBC/Radio-Canada archives. The material used for the 
documentary includes 16 hours of video material with 15 individuals directly involved with 
the organization (10 interviews were audio recorded, accounting for nine hours9 - see list in 
Table 2). The topics discussed during these interviews include how the activists became 
aware or were informed of some of the issues Greenpeace campaigned on, what led them to 
take action, their tactics, as well as how the organization evolved over the years to become a 
formal organization known as the “Multinational of the Environment” and “Greenpeace Inc.”. 
These topics were covered through questions on their major campaigns and victories, and 
critical events throughout the history of the organization.  
3.2.5 Direct observation 
Direct observation and informal discussions with several individuals were also used to 
mitigate the fact that archives is a remote-sensing type of data (Ingram et al., 2012). Because 
I was not familiar with the particular challenges encountered by activists, direct observation 
was useful to enhance my ability to search through Greenpeace's archives and understand the 
meaning of certain words they used, the approach favored by the activists with regards to 
actions, and the culture of the organization. While direct observation is not considered as a 
source of data by historians per se, it has been used by organizational scholars to enhance 
their interpretation of past events. A prominent example of this can be found in Vaughan’s 
(1996) study of the Challenger launch decision through a method she labeled as “historical 
ethnography”. 
                                                        
9
 Some interviews were conducted with the sons and daughters of the founders, talking about their parents and 
how they perceived their involvement with the movement. Given the time constraint during this trip to 
Vancouver, those interviews were not recorded.  
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 Direct observation was based on participation in Greenpeace's activities (5 activities for 
a total of 59 hours of observation). To date, this includes attendance at Greenpeace public 
events (2), volunteer meetings (2), and a three-day Earth Defenders training camp where 22 
prospective Greenpeace activists were introduced to the art of campaigning, non-violent 
direct actions, and civil disobedience – tactics that are the core of Greenpeace's strategy – by 
eight Greenpeace activists and campaigners10. For all the events I participated in, I kept 
written notes (40 pages) and verbal notes through a voice recorder (15 recordings: 66 
minutes). This second option was the one favored for Greenpeace's activities because it was 
more discreet (recording was done when I was aside from the group). Table 3 provides a 
summary of the activities attended and the notes and recordings taken during these activities. 
 In addition, informal discussions were conducted with environmentalists (8), 
Greenpeace activists (17), and Greenpeace campaigners (9). Whenever possible, I took 
detailed notes summarizing the exchange.  
                                                        
10
 Following the participation in the Earth Defenders training camp, I was invited to the official training offered 
to Greenpeace activists specialized in direct actions. This invitation was declined after discussions with the 
organizer: all Greenpeace activists specialized in direct actions have to be willing to face arrest, which means 
that any information regarding the participants must remain confidential. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
Greenpeace direct actions is based on the trust activists have with the other members of the team and the fact 
that all members of the team have equal status. Bringing an external observer to this team that is not in the same 
predisposition as the other members may have threatened the “esprit de corps” that is expected from the group. 
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Table 1: Historical documentation from Greenpeace International (1979-2004) 
Data produced within Greenpeace Number of 
documents 
Total pages 
Annual Reports (1992-2004) 12 312 
Annual General Meeting Minutes (1979-2001) 39 3,210 
Board of Directors Meeting Minutes (1979-2002) 88 1,793 
Executive Directors Meeting Minutes (1992-2002) 15 463 
Trustees Meeting Minutes (1983-1995) 9 284 
Campaigns Team Meeting Minutes (1991-1994) 4 62 
Other Committees (1987-1997) 64 786 
Proposals (1987-1998) 137 2,150 
Country Profiles (1989-1994) 17 256 
Global Resources Inventory Study (2001) 1 323 
Report on One Greenpeace project (2001) 1 78 
Greenpeace Global Presence (1998) 1 31 
Strategic Plan (1998) 1 84 
Finding Talent (1996) 1 22 
Strategic Thinking Report (1996) 1 31 
Emergency Response Team (1991) 1 104 
This is Greenpeace Project (1992-1993) 2 209 
 
  
Total  394  10,198 
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Table 2: Interviews from CBC/Radio-Canada 
Interviewee Link with Greenpeace Interview Date Interview Length 
Pierre Lacoste Admiral in charge of the French external intelligence agency from 
1982 to 1985. He gave the Green light to the sinking of the 
Rainbow Warrior in 1985 in a port in New-Zealand, a sinking 
during which a Greenpeace activist was killed. 
March 15th 2011 53:54 
Pierre Gleizes Photographer for Greenpeace since 1980. March 18th 2011 39:27 
Rémi Parmentier Founding member of Greenpeace International (1979) and several 
Greenpeace national organizations, including Greenpeace France 
(1977), Greenpeace Spain (1984), Greenpeace International's 
Mediterranean Project (1986), and Greenpeace Latin America 
(1987). He was a member of Greenpeace International’s Political 
Team since its creation in 1988, and the organization’s Political 
Director until 2003. 
March 15th 2011 1:06:58 
Steven Guilbeault Greenpeace campaigner and Quebec spokesperson from 1997 to 
2007. 
March 24th 2011 53:10 
Rex Weyler Served as a director of the original Greenpeace Foundation in 
Canada, as a campaign photographer, and publisher of the 
Greenpeace Chronicles. He was among the first members of 
Greenpeace and a cofounder of Greenpeace International in 1979.  
March 2011 1:21:52 
Sylvaine Zimmerman Greenpeace campaigner from 1987 to 1989. March 24th 2011 27:53 
Paul Watson Greenpeace activist from 1969 to 1977; Founder of the Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society in 1978.  
March 2011 1:07:04 
George Payrastre Documentary filmmaker and activist who followed Greenpeace in 
its early years. 
March 2011 23:22 
Patrick Moore Greenpeace activist from 1971 to 1986; President of Greenpeace 
Foundation in Canada from 1977 to 1986; Founding member of 
Greenpeace International in 1979; Member of the international 
board of directors from 1979 to 1985. 
March 2011 1:01:09 
Laurent Trudel Greenpeace activist from 1972 to 1979.  March 24th 2011 1:11:14 
 Total: 10 interviews 9:04:03 
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Table 3: Greenpeace activities attended for direct observation 
Activity Date Location in Canada Description 
Forest Alert! 10 years 
after 
April 4th 
2012 
Montréal, QC Showing of the movie Forest Alert! Followed by a discussion of 
what has happened since then and what are the current fights; 15 
people present; Duration of 4 hours; No recording; 12 pages of 
handwritten notes (notebook).  
Earth Defenders 
Training Camp  
September 
21-23rd 2012 
Orangeville, ON Activist Skillshare and Retreat; Agenda included campaign 
strategy, how to work with the media, building groups and 
growing support, non-violent direct action and civil disobedience; 
22 prospective Greenpeace activists and 6 Greenpeace 
campaigners present; Duration of 48 hours (started at 6pm on the 
Friday night and ended at 6pm on the Sunday night); 11 verbal 
recordings for a total duration of 46 minutes; 16 pages of 
handwritten notes (sheets) + 4 pages of notebook notes. 
Greenpeace Introduction 
Session 
October 3rd 
2012 
Toronto, ON Mandatory session to all individuals who want to become 
Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered include the history of the 
organization, its values, its current projects and the opportunities 
offered to volunteers; 18 people present; Duration of 3 hours; 2 
pages of handwritten notes + 2 verbal recordings for a total 
duration of 6 minutes.  
Greenpeace Volunteers 
Monthly Meeting 
November 
28th 2012 
Toronto, ON Monthly meeting for Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered 
include yearly campaigns and recent victories, opportunities in the 
coming year, and assessment of how well/bad the organization did 
in the past year; 16 people present; Duration of 2 hours; 4 pages of 
written notes (notebook); 1 verbal recording of a duration of 4 
minutes.  
Greenpeace Volunteers 
Monthly Meeting 
January 30th 
2012 
Toronto, ON Monthly meeting for Greenpeace volunteers; Topics covered 
include upcoming volunteers opportunities; 14 people present; 
Duration of 2 hours; 2 pages of written notes + 1 recording of 3 
minutes.  
  Total: 5 Activities       59 hours  
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3.3 Method for analysis and analytic constructs  
My approach to history is at the micro organizational level, and it leverages historical 
documentation from archives to examine and theorize about organizational properties 
(Kipping & Usdiken, 2014). More specifically, it corresponds to an analytically structured 
history where analytic constructs are used to search archives and to reconstruct a narrative 
where the organization is substituted to structures and events (Rowlinson et al., 2014).11 
Analytic constructs serve the purpose of bounding the attention of the researcher to specific 
aspects of the organization under investigation (Ingram et al. 2012).  
The analytic constructs that I use to structure my narrative are: rationality (i.e. ability 
to identify superior opportunities); plasticity (i.e. ability to act and seize opportunities); and 
shaping ability (i.e. ability to legitimize new opportunities and shape/construct the 
opportunity space). These dimensions were used by Gavetti (2012) to theorize about the role 
of individual agents within organizations in the pursuit of cognitively distant opportunities. 
My research differs substantially from Gavetti in that I focus on the organization as opposed 
to individual agents, but the dimensions of rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability 
nevertheless provide an analytical frame for the current study.  
There are many different analytical constructs that could be used to analyze the data, 
but the constructs proposed by Gavetti to explain why firms fail to engage with the distant 
are akin to the process of engaging with the future. Engaging with the future corresponds to 
engaging with the distant from a temporal perspective. It requires the identification of 
opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the future. It also requires to persuade 
                                                        
11
 Under this approach, the organization is considered as an actor on its own, at the expense of the names of the 
individuals that were responsible for making decisions. A prominent contribution to strategy using this approach 
is Chandler’s (1962) work on strategy and structure. The corporate entities are subordinate to the concepts of 
the M form as well as strategy and structure, and the narrative is structured around these concepts at the expense 
of names and events.  
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organizational members to pursue these opportunities and to undertake actions that will 
impact the landscape. It thus provides an opportunity to contextualize what distant is referred 
to, to embrace and extend the literature on the nascent field of behavioral strategy. More 
important, the performance of an organization engaging with the future cannot be assessed 
through traditional metrics of performance (e.g. endurance in time, return on investment, 
profitability, growth, etc.). Shaping the future requires impacting the landscape through a 
residuum of changes. The construct of shaping ability proposed by Gavetti to determine how 
successful an organization is at engaging with the distant thus provides precision with regards 
to what type of performance we are talking about.  
Below, I detail how these three dimensions are closely linked with the process of 
engaging with the future, and how they can help me move from the narrative to the 
generation of theoretical insights on the properties that contribute to enhance an 
organization’s ability to engage with the future.  
3.3.1 Rationality 
Rationality corresponds to the ability to identify superior opportunities (Gavetti, 2012), 
which are assumed to be (1) economic in nature12 and (2) cognitively distant. In Gavetti’s 
view (Gavetti, 2012; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007), opportunities that are cognitively distant are to 
be searched, discovered, and evaluated. It is based on the assumption that they can be 
objectively compared and assessed by leaders in organizations. For Gavetti (2012), failures to 
identify superior opportunities are explained by the limited ability of a strategic leader to 
manage the mental processes that underlie the identification of cognitively distant strategies.  
                                                        
12
 The opportunities Gavetti refers to correspond to asymmetries between prices and the rent-generating 
potential of some of their constituent elements. 
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With regards to engaging with the future, rationality corresponds to the ability to 
identify opportunities that are aligned with a particular vision of the future. As mentioned in 
the second chapter of this dissertation, the future is in the making. Hence, it is not possible to 
describe the future as a real object that can objectively be discussed. For a specific vision of 
the future to materialize, opportunities have to be identified and/or created and be pursued. 
The valuation of these opportunities will be based on what vision of the future is to be 
enacted.13  
In the case under investigation, Greenpeace envisioned over the years many possible 
futures, but its distant foresight (or, at least, the one that is driving the organization’s actions) 
is the one of a clean and sustainable future. The opportunities identified by Greenpeace 
correspond to issues that are global in scope or universal: climate change, deforestation, 
protection of biodiversity, etc. The pursuit of these opportunities might require the 
identification of small wins and other opportunities aligned with the meta-issues it aims to 
address.  
3.3.2 Plasticity 
Plasticity refers to the ability to act on opportunities (Gavetti, 2012). It is usually considered 
in the perspective of firms adapting to their environment (Levinthal & Marino, 2015). 
Because of bounded plasticity (which can be associated to some form of cognitive or 
identity-based inertia), firms might fail in their pursuit of superior opportunities. In Gavetti’s 
view (2012: p. 274), “strategic leaders’ limited ability to manage the mental processes that 
underlie internal audiences’ adoption of new strategic representations and identity codes to 
                                                        
13
 The beliefs can be right or wrong, but the evaluation of opportunities is based on the valuations one makes 
about whether or not the identified opportunities have the potential to serve these beliefs.  
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‘move toward the distant’ is a central behavioral impediment to achieving complete 
plasticity”.  
With regards to engaging with the future, an organization might be able to identify 
opportunities that have the potential to enact its vision of the future, but be unable to pursue 
them. The reasons for this can be manifold: the pursuit of opportunities might require a 
change in the way the organization conceptualizes its landscape or a change in the 
organization’s architecture It might also be that the portfolio of action alternatives is not 
sufficient and the organization needs to develop new capabilities.  
In the context of Greenpeace, the decision to pursue a specific opportunity is decided 
within the governance and operational channels of the organization. Although a decision can 
be made in Council to pursue a given opportunity, this does not necessarily translate into 
actions. Because Greenpeace is an organization that operates globally, it can happen that a 
number of priorities are not being followed by NROs. To facilitate the pursuit of 
opportunities, the organization adopted a number of structures, processes, and practices that 
are discussed in the data section.  
3.3.3 Shaping ability 
Shaping ability corresponds to the ability to legitimize opportunities and shape/construct the 
opportunity space (Gavetti, 2012). The opportunity space corresponds to a specific portion of 
the landscape, and the environment will be enacted for that portion of the landscape that is 
concerned by an opportunity. For Gavetti (2012), shaping ability failures are explained by the 
challenge of persuading external audiences to embrace conceptions that are cognitively 
distant.  
Engaging with the future means embracing external audiences in order to shape their 
thinking about what future to embrace. It implies convincing others to take actions aligned 
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with one’s vision of a preferred future. Hence, it is about legitimating a specific course of 
actions that is embedded within a specific vision of the future. Because the future is formed 
one step at a time, the shaping ability of an organization can only be observed based on the 
residuum of changes associated with specific commitments.  
In the context of Greenpeace, the landscape is multidimensional. It is also adaptable 
and can be broken into different landscapes (water, earth, air, geographies, etc.). Throughout 
the years, Greenpeace's conceptualization of its landscape changed to adapt to the collective 
understanding Greenpeace members had of their role and their environment. The space for 
Greenpeace's opportunities varied depending on what  the issue was at hand. For instance, its 
actions ranged from issues related to formal institution (e.g. International Whaling 
Commission), whereas the opportunity space could be considered as well defined with clear 
rules of the games, boundaries, and actors, to issues that concerned a plurality of actors that 
were not formally connected with one another.  
3.4 Analytical process14  
The analytical process to answer my research questions builds on (1) periodization and (2) 
the analytic constructs of “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. Periodization is a 
common method used by historians to break the history of individuals or organizations into 
manageable portions to help move from a narrative to analysis (Abbott, 2001; Rowlinson, 
2004). Periodization was obtained through the collection of information on Greenpeace and 
the identification of variations in Greenpeace's priorities over time. The analytic constructs 
                                                        
14
 Although the analytical process is presented as a linear process, it was an iterative process between theory, 
data collection, and data analysis. The initial questions that triggered my interest for the research setting (how 
does an issue become attended by a MNE internationally and how does the organizational context impact this 
process) led to additional data collection and analysis. In the process of analyzing the data, it became clear, 
however, that the issues that were the focus of Greenpeace were part of broader objectives of shaping the future 
of the planet. This observation forced me to reconsider the analytical framework initially proposed for my 
dissertation to take into consideration these motivations behind the organization’s actions. 
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were used to revisit each period and to compare them with one another. They contributed to 
binding my attention to specific dimensions of Greenpeace's activities within each period to 
develop theoretical insights on the properties that contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability 
to engage with the future. Below, I provide further details on the different steps that led to the 
theoretical insights presented in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. I also provide a map 
illustrating this process (see Table 4), along with the data sources for each period identified 
in the study (see Table 5).   
3.4.1 Step 1: Collecting information on Greenpeace over time 
The first step in the data analysis consisted of collecting information on Greenpeace over 
time. This step included developing maps and timelines representing changes within the 
organization over the years. The anchoring for these maps and timelines consisted of (1) the 
organizational focus in terms of issues; (2) the organizational context, with a focus on the 
organization’s governance and operational channels, structures, processes, and practices, 
including the events that led to their adoption; and (3) the organization’s performance. These 
maps were used to synthesize information and to facilitate subsequent analysis.   
In terms of organizational focus, I created a map of the different issues tackled by the 
organization from 1980 to 2002. The issues appearing on this map are the ones that were 
discussed within the annual budgeting process and approved in Council. This map is 
displayed in Figure 7 and Figure 8 (between Chapters 4 and 5). Information displayed on this 
map was verified and counter-verified using the different sources of information to ensure 
accuracy in their representation. The representation is based on how the different issues were 
managed internally. In total, a number of 5 iterations took place, in addition to a third visit to 
Greenpeace's archives to validate information. This map was important for subsequent 
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analysis: all issues on this map were considered international priorities and led to actions by 
GPI and NROs.  
With regards to the organizational context, my main focus was on the governance and 
operational channels of Greenpeace, as well as of the processes and practices implemented 
over the years. This includes changes in leadership (i.e. executive director), changes in the 
mission and values of the organization (e.g. adoption of a formal mission statement), changes 
in structures (e.g. adoption of policies with regards to subsidiaries having to report to 
headquarters, in the legal structure of the organization, or in the financial redistribution 
system), changes in the practices used internally (e.g. use of policies about issues or change 
in the way offices collaborate with one another), changes in the way information is presented 
(e.g. use of issue areas to discuss issues during meetings or in the way proposals are brought 
up to the committees), changes in the repertoire of action alternatives (e.g. international 
campaigns versus national campaigns), and changes in the resources available (human and 
financial) and their allocation (e.g. use of contingency funds, long-term planning, etc.). The 
timeline resulting from this exercise is displayed in Appendix 3 for reference. This summary 
was important in order to provide information on the key measures that were adopted over 
the years and could be used later on to identify periods that were relatively homogeneous as 
well as their junctures (see Step 2). A limited number of events were listed on this timeline: 
these events were included because they either forced the organization to change or provided 
elements of reflection about the functioning of Greenpeace as an organization.  
Finally, with regards to Greenpeace's performance, I focused on measures of 
effectiveness and efficiency: (1) membership and income, as a proxy for the overall support 
of the organization by donors (presented in Graph 1 in Chapter 5); (2) victories obtained by 
the organization in its attempts to influence formal international institutions and multinational 
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corporations (presented in Graph 3 in Chapter 5); and (3) profitability as well as fundraising 
as a percentage of expenditures, as measures of how efficient the organization has been in 
managing its funds (presented in Graph 2 in Chapter 5). These dimensions were selected 
because they could be tracked over time and they provide objective measures on how well 
the organization was doing in fulfilling its mission.   
3.4.2 Step 2: Identifying variations in Greenpeace context over time 
The second step in the data analysis consisted of identifying variations in the organizational 
context over time to establish periods that could be used to facilitate the analysis. Depending 
on the researcher’s objectives, periods can be based on changes in the senior leadership, 
changes in strategy or organizational design, or external events (Plourde, 2013; Rowlinson, 
2004). In the current study, periodization was used to identify periods that were relatively 
homogeneous in terms of the culture, design, processes, and practices used within 
Greenpeace. Turning points (also referred to as “junctures” by other authors – see Plourde, 
2013) from one period to another were based on significant events for the organization that 
led to a reflection on the changes to be undertaken. This is consistent with methods used to 
identify periods within organizations based on social parameters, “when novel elements are 
introduced and subsequently institutionalized in the new structure” (Whipp & Clark, 1986: 
19). In determining the junctures, I paid particular attention to crises (e.g. the bombing of a 
vessel of the organization by the French secret services, organizational crisis caused by 
financial difficulties, etc), as crisis plays a major role in the development of intentionality 
(King et al., 2010).  
This second step in the analysis of the data led to the identification of four periods in 
the history of Greenpeace. Beside the pre-Greenpeace International era where the different 
Greenpeace groups were unrelated to one another, the years 1979-1991 were years of 
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exponential growth when Greenpeace shifted from a decentralized form of organizing, with 
NROs enjoying significant independence and autonomy in deciding on their priorities, to a 
centralized form of organizing, where GPI (i.e. international headquarters) was playing a 
prominent role in setting up the organization’s agenda. The events surrounding the sinking of 
the Rainbow Warrior by the French Secret Services in 1985 is used as the turning point 
between what I label the “Muddling Through” period, where Greenpeace was attempting to 
organize itself as an international organization, and the “Centralization to engage into long 
jumps” period, where GPI asserted its influence over NROs by gaining control over a number 
of activities central to Greenpeace’s operations. It is also during this period that the desire to 
engage into long-term thinking about issues as well as the positioning of the organization 
became explicit.  
The last two periods, which cover the years 1991-2001, are associated with “One 
Greenpeace”. “One Greenpeace” is a concept that emerged from the desire to develop an 
organization that is neither centralized nor decentralized, two forms of organizing that were 
deemed inappropriate given Greenpeace’s activities. Under “One Greenpeace”, all NROs 
were expected to work with one another without GPI being formally involved in all decisions, 
and GPI was expected to provide guidelines on the main orientations of the organization. GPI 
is also expected to provide assistance to NROs in their ODPs, and to create the right context 
for NROs to effectively develop creative solutions. I divided the period dedicated to “One 
Greenpeace” into two: the period 1991-1995, where attention is dedicated to solving an 
organizational crisis and to imagining how Greenpeace ought to operate, and the period 
1995-2001, dedicated to the implementation of measures that favored the development of a 
global organization in the spirit of “One Greenpeace”. Two events influenced my decision to 
use 1995 as a turning point: the successes obtained with the Brent Spar campaign, which was 
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a major departure from previous campaigns, and the arrival of a new CEO that contributed to 
reform the organization.  
These periods are used to present the history of Greenpeace in Chapter 4. This 
narrative provides a general description of what happened in Greenpeace's history to provide 
subsequent background to the reader. This way of presenting periods in the history of 
Greenpeace is consistent with prior studies that built on periodization to present changes over 
time within an organization (e.g. Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; 
Ocasio & Joseph, 2008). The information presented in this narrative is mostly factual and 
relates to the functioning of the organization. Each piece of information was verified and 
counter verified. To facilitate the reading, sources have been left aside, at the exception of 
specific pieces of information that could not be validated through another source. 
3.4.3 Step 3: Revisiting the periods using analytic constructs  
The third step in my data analysis consisted of revisiting the periods identified in Step 2 
using the analytic constructs of “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. The use of 
analytic construct – common in historiography – was chosen to facilitate the analysis of the 
data. Analytic constructs are used in historiography to help the researcher move from a 
narrative to analysis (Rowlinson et al., 2014). It also helps the researcher to keep his focus on 
the phenomenon under study (Ingram et al., 2012).  
 For each period, I looked at Greenpeace's beliefs about the future, the ability of 
Greenpeace to identify opportunities aligned with these beliefs (“rationality”), the ability of 
Greenpeace to seize the identified opportunities (“plasticity”), and the ability of Greenpeace 
to create change with regards to the identified opportunities through its actions (“shaping 
ability”). The analysis of the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability for each period is 
based on an interpretation of the data and is presented in Chapter 5. Because it is an 
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interpretation of the data, each dimension is presented for each period with supporting data 
(both quotes and factual data), with an explanation for my interpretations of the dimension, 
and why Greenpeace was doing well or not so well during each period with regards to the 
identified dimensions.  
3.4.4 Step 4: Developing insights on the properties that contributed to Greenpeace 
success  
The fourth step in the analytical process was to develop theoretical insights on the properties 
that can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future. This fourth step was 
based on the comparison of the “rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability” of the 
organization across the different periods, and is derived from the data. This led to the 
identification of three properties that contributed to make Greenpeace a more effective 
organization when it comes to engage with the future: flexibility, stability, and diversity. 
Based on the analysis of the case, specific dimensions for each property could be identified. 
Supporting data for the importance of flexibility, stability, and diversity is presented 
throughout Chapter 5. Formal propositions, along with explanations for the importance of 
these properties, are presented in Chapter 6. The properties along with their specific 
dimensions are discussed in relation with the appropriate literature in Chapter 7. 
 
 
  51
 Table 4: Data analysis process 
 
Data analysis process 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Purpose of analysis Identification of factual 
information that can be used 
to describe Greenpeace over 
time 
Identifying periods in the 
history of Greenpeace that 
were relatively homogeneous 
in terms of the way the 
organization was operating 
Comparing the periods to 
identify similarities and 
differences that explain the 
performance of Greenpeace 
with regards to its ability to 
shape the landscape  
Developing explanation as to 
why the properties identified 
in the previous phase can 
enhance an organization’s 
ability to engage with the 
future 
Focus of analysis Events, structures, processes 
and practices 
Events, structures, processes, 
and practices 
Periods in the history of 
Greenpeace 
Rationality, Plasticity, and 
Shaping ability across periods 
Analytical tools Factual analysis Periodization  Analytical constructs  Observation/Interpretation 
Description of analysis Identification of “historical 
facts” through the analysis of 
“traces of history”; historical 
facts correspond to 
information about what 
happened in the past that is 
undisputable (although the 
interpretation for these facts is 
up for grab) 
Analysis of Greenpeace over 
time through the different 
events, maps, and graphs on 
resource allocation, and 
graphs on performance to 
identify periods that were 
relatively homogeneous; 
junctures were used to 
separate one period over the 
other; junctures were 
identified based on critical 
events 
Analysis of Greenpeace 
periods using the analytical 
constructs of “Rationality”, 
“Plasticity”, and “Shaping 
Ability”; the analytical 
constructs were used to focus 
my attention on specific 
dimensions of the data, to 
make interpretations as to 
what explained Greenpeace 
successes/failures 
This final phase in the analysis 
consisted in theorizing on the 
identified properties; it was 
based on my observation and 
my interpretation of the case, 
building on the previous 
analysis 
Intended outcome(s) Information that can be used 
for subsequent analysis 
Identification of periods that 
can be used to “break” the 
history of Greenpeace into 
manageable chunks 
Identification of properties 
that contributed to Greenpeace 
success over the years 
Explanations on why and how 
the properties identified in the 
previous phase can enhance 
the organization’s ability to 
engage with the future 
Key outcome(s) Table of events 
Map of issues over time 
Graphs on resource allocation 
Graphs on performance 
 
Identification of four periods: 
1979-1985 
1985-1991 
1991-1995 
1995-2001 
Identification of three 
properties: 
Flexibility 
Stability 
Diversity 
9 propositions on the effect of 
flexibility, stability, and 
diversity on the identification, 
the pursuit, and the capture of 
opportunities aligned with 
one’s vision for the future  
In the dissertation Tables, Figures, Graphs Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
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Table 5: Data per period 
 
Data per period 
Period 1: 1979-1985 Period 2: 1985-1991 Period 3: 1991-1995 Period 4: 1995-2001 
Stakeholders communications     
  Annual reports   Retrospective Retrospective 
Formal channels of communication     
  Annual General Meeting Minutes Real time Real time Real time Real time 
  Board of Directors Meeting Minutes Real time Real time Real time Real time 
  Executive Directors Meeting Minutes   Real time Real time 
  Trustee Meeting Minutes Real time Real time Real time  
  Campaign Team Meeting Minutes   Real time  
Internal reports and other 
documents related to strategic 
planning   
    
Proposals  Retrospective Prospective 
Retrospective 
Prospective 
Retrospective 
Prospective 
Long-Term Plan  Prospective   
Strategic Plan (1993)   Prospective  
Strategic Plan (1998)    Prospective 
 (1) Retrospective: provides edited information on what has been done in the past. 
 (2) Prospective: provides edited information on what will (or should) be done in the future.  
 (3) Real time: reflects real time discussions; can include retrospective and prospective information as part of the discussions. 
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Chapter 4 
4. A brief history of Greenpeace International 
Even though the focus of this study is covering the years 1979 to 2001, it is important to 
understand what led ‘Greenpeace’, a social movement, to become ‘Greenpeace’, a formal 
international organization. Greenpeace was born when Vancouver-based activists decided to 
protest against nuclear tests to be conducted by the US Navy in Amchitka, Alaska, in 1971. 
To protest the nuclear tests, the activists had plotted to send a boat within the nuclear test 
zone and to report on what they would see through various media. The plot was based on the 
Quaker philosophy of “bearing witnesses”. By sending a boat within the nuclear test zone 
and by reporting on what they were to see, they wanted people to react to the tests and 
demonstrate that they were willing to risk their life for the cause. The group did not make it 
to the nuclear test zone, but nevertheless reported their trip through various media. Thanks to 
the efforts of a team that had stayed on shore to organize public events and communicate 
information coming from the boat, their actions led to an important public mobilization. This 
public mobilization ultimately forced the US government to abandon its nuclear test program 
in the area within a few months.   
In light of the successes obtained in raising awareness on the dangers of the US 
nuclear tests, the activists decided to formally adopt the name ‘Greenpeace Foundation’ and 
to conduct another action the following year, this time in Mururoa, against the French 
government conducting nuclear tests in the area. The actions did not prove to be successful. 
Nevertheless, the crew decided to return in 1973. This time, however, an incident occurred 
between the French navy and the crew. During the altercation, the French navy boarded the 
sailboat and crewmembers were severally beaten. A female crewmember took pictures of the 
  54
altercation and hid them in her vagina, saving the evidence of the assault. Back on shore, the 
images were sent to various media worldwide. From this point on, other groups started to use 
the name ‘Greenpeace’ for their own activities, Greenpeace being associated more with a 
philosophy of actions than a formal organization.   
From 1974 to 1979, the ‘Greenpeace’ name remained unregistered, which led to its 
free use by an expanding number of independent and unconnected groups of people. It is 
only in 1977 that the basis for an international organization started to develop. In October of 
that year, the groups, upon the initiative of the Greenpeace Foundation, met for a “global 
reunion”. There were two objectives to the meeting: resolve political tensions and address 
financial issues faced by the Greenpeace Foundation. The meeting did not result in any 
agreement. Tensions emerged around the issue of decision-making rights and the fear by 
several groups of losing autonomy. A second meeting was to be held in January 1978. 
Meanwhile, Greenpeace San Francisco registered the name ‘Greenpeace USA’ in an attempt 
to take control over the other Greenpeace groups in the USA, and the UK group, under the 
recommendation of David McTaggart, registered a business under the name ‘Greenpeace UK 
Inc’. The second meeting resulted in more tensions between the different Greenpeace 
factions, and as the financial difficulties encountered by the Greenpeace Foundation in 
Canada became more salient, the Greenpeace Foundation filed a lawsuit against the San 
Francisco-based Greenpeace USA in the summer of 1979.  
The crisis was officially resolved in November 1979 when the different factions 
reached an agreement. Under this agreement, a new entity would be created as a Dutch 
Stitching: “Stitching Greenpeace Council” (commonly known as “Greenpeace International” 
– GPI hereafter). This new entity would become the trademark owner of the name 
‘Greenpeace’. As part of the agreement, there would be a single Greenpeace national 
  55
organization (NRO) per country, and that organization would have exclusive rights over the 
name Greenpeace for that country. In exchange, each NRO would provide a percentage of its 
revenues to GPI to cover the expenses of the operations at sea and provide the funding 
necessary to cover the expenses of the international headquarters. There would also be formal 
governance channels to facilitate decision-making processes with regards to which issues 
should be funded for campaigns and which ones should not. All the Greenpeace groups but 
two accepted this agreement,15 and GPI was officially born.  
4.1 Period 1 (1979-1985): Muddling through an unorganized, decentralized 
organization 
The period from 1979 to 1985 was dedicated to establishing the functioning of Greenpeace as 
an international organization. Organizational members had to set-up a financial, an 
operational, and a governance structure that would allow them to coordinate the work 
conducted by various NROs. The key achievements during the “muddling through” period 
were the creation of an international secretariat, the foundation of the Marine Division, and 
the reaching of an agreement over the principles behind the financial structure of Greenpeace 
(i.e. NROs paying a “pledge” to GPI). The development of Greenpeace was inhibited during 
this period by the fact that NROs used to be fully independent, making any attempt to 
organize their work a negotiation process, which GPI had little influence over.  
From 1979 to 1982, the discussions were unorganized, mixing several issues – 
organizational and environmental – within the same agenda items. It was frequent during 
those years to see a discussion evolve from an issue to how money should be managed. The 
                                                        
15
 Greenpeace Hawaii and London Greenpeace decided to maintain their independence. Although they were 
unrelated to Greenpeace International, they were authorized to keep using the name “Greenpeace”, as long as 
they made it clear that they were not affiliated with Greenpeace International.  
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key elements of discussions at that point in time were about the principles behind the creation 
of Greenpeace, the basic functioning of the organization, and how to cover the overhead of 
the international secretariat. Many of these processes discussed were quite simple to establish, 
requiring only some form of clarification as to how things should be done. This discussion 
surrounding the process for determining commitments illustrates well this point and also 
provides an idea of how limited were the resources of the organization at that time:  
“Unless our financial picture improves, no further international campaigns can 
take place. Should financing become available and a new campaign is put before 
the trustees - 1) proposal shall be sent to trustees by office proposing, including a 
deadline for votes (and Council); 2) Council shall contact each country to 
request their vote; 3) Council shall inform the proposing country and the other 
trustees of the result of that vote.” (SGC AGM 1980, July 28-31 p.)   
 
As the number of NROs increased, voting by majority was introduced, although there 
was confusion over voting rights. For instance, it was mentioned during the 1981 AGM that 
no voting membership request had been made because Australia and New Zealand felt they 
were not ready, which came as a surprise to Council members. The criterion to upgrade from 
a non-voting member to a voting member was then clarified: a country member had to be 
solvent, it had to be active and/or capable of doing campaigns, and it had to report in a 
manner acceptable to Council. It was also stated that the country member had to have some 
expertise in management, both for administration and campaign work, and present their 
proposal for obtaining voting status in writing at least 30 days ahead of Council. 
The confusion in the organization’s procedures and processes also existed with 
regards to Greenpeace’s focus, with a general lack of agreement about which issues should 
be considered international. Many offices were working on different projects, sometimes 
with no link at all with one another, a feature inherited from the pre-GPI era where all 
Greenpeace groups were independent. Discussions about issues were not organized by issue 
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area or common themes, and there were no clear guidelines that could facilitate discussions. 
Members regularly questioned what was an international issue/campaign and what was not, 
with issues shared by more than one NRO not even recognized as being alike despite obvious 
similarities. Some offices also refused to commit to move forward with actions that were 
aligned with the organization’s objectives if other offices did not make the same commitment. 
This translated into a limited number of issues securing support for funding, as illustrated 
through Graph 1 on the allocation of resources for the year 1982.  
Graph 1: Resource Allocation 1982 
 
 
As of 1982, however, this situation started to change. The organization had obtained a 
major victory at the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Following this victory, which 
had been obtained through greater coordination from GPI, a variety of measures were 
adopted to organize the work of the different NROs. First, the Council agreed to standardize 
the accounting year for all offices, to standardize the Greenpeace logo, to create an inventory 
of assets falling under the responsibility of the Marine Division, to create an inventory of the 
libraries of the European and North American photography departments, and to consolidate 
advertising and merchandising purchases to develop economies of scale. Second, the Council 
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voted for the separation of the functions of Chairman and Managing Director, and for the 
creation of a Board of Directors to oversee the work of the secretariat and make decisions 
between AGM/Council meetings. Voting in Council was then determined by the ability of 
NROs to pay 24 per cent of net income to GPI. The board at that point was made up of four 
members: two representing ‘Europe’ and two representing the ‘ANZUSCA’ region 
(Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and Canada). Board members were elected from the 
ranks of Executive Directors, Trustees, and Campaigners within these regions and took an 
active role in the management of Greenpeace. 
With regards to operations, the Council voted for the adoption of clear procedures for 
managing the international campaigns: the organization of discussions about environmental 
problems by issue areas, the creation of a Council Campaign Committee for administering 
the approved funds for campaigns area, and for selecting the international campaigners in 
charge of managing the day-to-day activities. International coordinators, which were by then 
used for all international campaigns, were responsible for coordinating the work of the 
different offices. The double-veto principle was also designed at that point, allowing 
international campaigners to veto an action that might be detrimental to GPI and the national 
campaigners to veto an action to be conducted in their country by GPI or another NRO that 
might be detrimental to their national objectives. A formal reporting system was also 
established as a way to ensure that campaigns were staying within budgets and spending  
done carefully. 
The changes in the way the organization was governed permitted it to carry more 
international campaigns and increase the number of priorities (see Graphs 2 and 3).  The 
changes, however, did not prevent issues from being denied funding – Trophy Hunting, the 
slaughtering of Kangaroos, and Reprocessing – all provide examples of proposals aiming to 
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raise awareness about issues that were denied support. Nevertheless, it was a much improved 
situation compared to the one that prevailed in the previous year, where close to all proposals 
were dismissed by organizational members.   
Graph 2: Resource Allocation 1983 
 
 
 
Graph 3: Resource Allocation 1984 
 
 
 
Despite the changes mentioned above, Greenpeace remained very decentralized with 
GPI having little influence over NROs. NROs remained free to fund any project that they 
deemed relevant for their volunteers and supporters. Some NROs even saw their voting rights 
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suspended because of their refusal to comply with the agreed principles. An example of this 
can be found in the refusal of Greenpeace Netherlands (see Figure 2 on voting rights) to 
transfer licensing rights of their logo to GPI. The case in point was that under the new 
framework negotiated between GPI and NROs, all copyrights were to belong to GPI, to make 
them free to use by all NROs: 
“Netherlands: If we transfer the trademark, we get back only the right to use it. 
Our position is that we will not transfer it until we have an agreed right to use it. 
The fact that we transfer money and manpower makes us part of Greenpeace 
International. 
Canada: What document would you show to prove that you are part of 
Greenpeace Council? 
Netherlands: The bylaws of Greenpeace Council. 
Canada: Do you agree that your opposition to transfer of the trademark is in 
violation of those bylaws? 
Netherlands: We refuse to transfer the trademark at this moment. Our 
contribution is our involvement. 
Chair: What we are talking about here is protection of the name Greenpeace. 
Netherlands: We agree that the name is important. National offices should be 
able to decide on policy and there should be limits on Council's interference with 
national offices.” (Board Meeting Minutes, November 23rd 1983, p. 2) 
 
This episode is representative of the conflicts that were taking place within the 
organization, with NROs still resisting the centralization of activities at GPI. The fact that the 
individuals working on campaigns were the same as the ones responsible for the management 
and the administration did not help as there was no separation of power between the 
governance and the operational channels.  
This situation was to change on July 10th, 1985, however, with the sinking of the 
Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace’s main ship, by the French Secret Services. The sinking of the 
boat, which caused the death of Fernando Pereira, a crewmember and photographer, brought 
significant visibility to Greenpeace. This visibility translated into a sharp increase in 
donations to GPI and NROs. The additional funds allowed for an increase in the number of 
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services offered by GPI to NROs, and the expansion of the senior management team to 
coordinate the work of the organization on a worldwide scale.  
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Figure 2: Greenpeace Global Presence with Voting Rights (1979-2000) 
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aBased on annual reports and AGM minutes. Greenpeace incomes correspond to all the funds raised by NROs worldwide in USD. Greenpeace membership 
corresponds to the number of donors worldwide.  
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4.2 Period 2 (1985-1991): Centralizing to engage into long jumps 
From 1985 to 1991, Greenpeace experienced significant growth, both in donations and 
supporters (see Graph 4), and scope, both geographically (growing from 15 NROs in 1985 to 
29 offices worldwide by 1991 – see Figure 2) and in terms of issues of interest (growing from 
four issue areas in 1985 to nine issue areas by 1991 – see various Graphs on resource 
allocation at the end of the presentation of this period and Figure 7 and 8 at the beginning of 
the next section). The organization also became more bureaucratic with several attempts from 
GPI to centralize the organization’s key functions at the international headquarters in 
Amsterdam, and to exert greater control over the message, both internally (across the 
different NROs) and externally (with the media and the public). Long-term objectives were 
developed during this period and choices were made about which issues should be prioritized 
across the organization with the explicit aim to focus the organization’s attention on the most 
important issues it could impact rather than having NROs prioritizing issues that were 
primarily of interest to their local supporters.  
A number of measures favoring greater coordination and standardization of practices 
across the different NROs were adopted during the turmoil surrounding the bombing of the 
Rainbow Warrior: policies on controversial issues were discussed to ensure greater coherence 
in all Greenpeace activities; an auditing contract was signed with a single international 
auditing firm to solve problems with regards to differences in terminology, format and 
interpretation of figures; the photo division was moved from Paris to Amsterdam as part of a 
plan to bring the three service divisions and the administration under the same roof; an 
international media coordinator role was created to educate the media about what Greenpeace 
was about and to facilitate media access for planned campaigns and during actions; the 
lobbying work conducted regionally and internationally across issues was centralized under 
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the Convention project to strengthen, in the long term, the preservation of the oceans; a skill 
sharing program was initiated to facilitate knowledge transfer between NROs; and new rules 
were formally adopted with regards to voting rights, tying a NRO’s right to vote in Council 
to its financial contribution to GPI (i.e. the 24 percent rule).16 As a result of this increase in 
resources available to GPI, the Board of Directors was slowly moving out from daily 
administration to give greater responsibilities to the executive committee.  
Meanwhile, how the organization approached the activities related to its mission was 
changing. From this point on, science was used as a way to engage into the most impactful 
issues and to develop deep knowledge about complex problems. The Greenpeace Science 
Unit was created and a principle on the use of science within Greenpeace campaigns was 
adopted, stating that Greenpeace was to build its campaigns on qualitative evidences rather 
than quantifiable evidences to protect the reputation of the organization from counter-attacks 
from corporations that could question their findings and methods on the basis of different 
quantifiable evidences. Hence, based on this policy, the mere presence of pollutants would be 
considered more important than its quantity. This principle was then tied to the precautionary 
principle, stating that in case of doubts, it is better to wait to ensure that a technology or a 
practice is fully safe for humans and the environment. From this point on, the Greenpeace 
Science Unit was used by the different NROs and GPI as a way to develop evidences of 
environmental issues and to provide background for policies on a number of complex 
problems, such as the use of chlorine by various industries, the release of pollutants into the 
atmosphere, or the development of new technologies that can impact biodiversity, such as 
biotechnologies.  
                                                        
16
 The 24 percent rule, however, will be loosely applied, becoming less and less enforced over the years, with 
each office’s voting status still determined by the political process of a vote of Council, giving GPI an important 
say on whose NROs have the right to vote and which ones do not through its influence over Council and its 
control of the organizational agenda. 
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To improve the effectiveness of communications – both internally and externally –, 
the Council voted for the creation of Greenpeace Communications Ltd. The aim was to 
streamline operations and to exert a better control of information by consolidating all media-
related activities. Greenpeace Communications originated from a merger of the Photo 
department in Paris and Greenpeace Films, and was established in London, UK, where most 
media agencies were located. Greenpeace Communications was to provide communication 
services to GPI and NROs. Its mandate was also to secure maximum media coverage for 
Greenpeace campaigns and to provide international news agencies with photos, prints, and 
video material originating from, or acquired by, Greenpeace. Greenpeace Communications 
soon became central to Greenpeace's strategy, providing training as well as advices to NROs 
and GPIs.  
The Political Unit was also created to supervise the Conventions Project, to develop 
intelligence for behind-the-scenes strategies, and to state the position of the organization on 
controversial issues in the political environment.  
During this period, Greenpeace's approach to new countries changed as well. 
Potential new countries were carefully evaluated and compared based on their potential for 
growth in memberships and fundraising, and specific issues were targeted to facilitate market 
entry.17 This new approach was in sharp contrast with the ‘Muddling Through’ period, where 
groups from new countries could become members of Greenpeace on the basis of a simple 
request.  
                                                        
17
 For instance, eight new potential locations are considered in 1985: Argentina, to increase Greenpeace 
presence in Latin America (opened in 1985); Norway, conditional to a positive outcome on the whaling issue 
(opened in 1986); India, a non-aligned country, at the forefront of disarmament, and a country with a high level 
of awareness for environmental issues, especially since the events in Bhopal (not realized); Italy, which counts 
on enormous support, and which might become a priority if the Mediterranean campaign goes ahead; Finland , 
because of its link with USSR, and a potential entry through the Baltic Sea and its strategic importance for the 
campaign; and Africa, because it corresponds to a clear blank spot for the organization. 
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It is during the ‘Centralization’ period that Greenpeace engaged openly into ‘distant 
foresight’ and attempted to anticipate the changes that were occurring globally and what was 
Greenpeace's role in this new world, with a particular reflection on the impact of 
multinational corporations (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to Council, p. 2-
3). As part of this reflection, Greenpeace launched its first strategic planning exercise in 1986, 
which culminated in 1988 with the publication of the Long-Term Plan. The strategic 
planning exercise was led by GPI and the Council was invited to provide its feedback. 
Brainstorming sessions were conducted over a series of meetings to establish a list of the 
most important threats to the planet in the decades ahead, and which ones were the ones 
Greenpeace should target.  
By 1987, the group delivered a preliminary report identifying, among other things, a 
list of major environmental problems (deforestation, proliferation of nuclear power, 
destruction of the atmosphere, climate change, development of genetically modified 
organisms, etc.). Council members once again provided feedback and the Long-Term Plan 
was finally published in 1988. The Plan called for a number of initiatives: the creation of a 
‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign; expansion into Russia, Latin America, and Japan in a ‘first 
tier’ expansion, and China, India, and Africa as a second-tier expansion; and a new voting 
right system. The ‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign was primarily built around a single issue 
(i.e. the slaughtering of Kangaroos in Australia) and was implemented as a short-term 
measure, but abandoned two years later. Geographic expansion in first-tier countries occurred 
within two years, but failed for second-tier countries in the short and medium term. The 
revision of the voting right structure led to the implementation of the regional trustees voting 
system.  
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Although few of the recommendations of the Long-Term Plan ended up being 
implemented, the report nevertheless had an enduring effect on Greenpeace: it provided 
direction to the organization. Many of the issues targeted as priorities at the time were the 
ones Greenpeace was focusing on several decades later. These priorities guided Greenpeace's 
resource allocation process, leading to further actions for issues Greenpeace was already 
involved with and policies for issues Greenpeace had no prior involvement with.  
By 1991, GPI had managed to increase its influence over NROs and Council – at least 
in determining the organization’s agenda –, a drastic change compared to the situation that 
prevailed a decade earlier and throughout the ‘Muddling Through’ period. NROs had to work 
on the priorities determined by GPI, with close to 95 percent of budget pre-allocated to 
specific campaigns, and have their actions approved by GPI ahead of time. Greenpeace 
Communications was also exercising significant influence over the process with a strict 
control of information directed outside Greenpeace. By the end of the period, the first signs 
of an emerging organizational crisis started to appear with expenditures increasing at a higher 
rate than incomes (see Graph 11), and NROs reporting difficulties in selling their issues to 
local supporters. The centralization trend that had occurred in the recent years was identified 
as an impediment to their capacity to engage volunteers in their causes.  
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Graph 5: Resource Allocation 1985 
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Graph 6: Resource Allocation 1986 
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Graph 7: Resource Allocation 1987 
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Graph 8: Resource Allocation 1988 
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Graph 9: Resource Allocation 1989 
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Graph 10: Resource Allocation 1990 
 
 
  
  
Graph 11
aBased on annual reports and minutes from the board of directors. GPI and Greenpeace surplus/deficit provide information on the free
and NROs. Fundraising expenditures provide guidance on the efficiency of the organization regarding the use of its resources, fundraising expenditures
 usually being used as a proxy for the efficiency of NGOs.
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4.3 Period 3 (1991-1995): Solving the crisis and imagining ‘One Greenpeace’ 
The years following the centralization period are dedicated to resolving a critical issue for 
Greenpeace: how to operate as a single, global organization dedicated to the protection of the 
environment, a concept known as ‘One Greenpeace’. ‘One Greenpeace’ was deemed 
necessary because of the increasing tensions between GPI and NROs, and amongst different 
NROs. The sources of these tensions were manifold. There was, on one hand, the increased 
reliance on a bureaucratic form of organizing, with GPI playing a prominent role in the 
establishment of priorities. On the other hand, NROs were struggling to follow guidelines 
that they felt were often disconnected from the concerns of their supporters. The financial 
difficulties experienced as of the early 90s’, after years of continuous growth from 1971 to 
1991, contributed to exacerbate these tensions and forced the organization to focus on 
organizational issues that had largely been ignored until then. ‘One Greenpeace’ was then 
seen as a necessary condition to put these tensions aside, to adapt to a globalized world, and 
to increase Greenpeace's effectiveness.   
Signs of financial difficulties started to appear with a first deficit for GPI in 1990 
(which went almost unnoticed), and a second year of deficits in 1991 (see Graph 11), for both 
GPI and Greenpeace. These deficits were symptomatic of the way Greenpeace had evolved 
over the recent years: a bureaucratic organization driven primarily by GPI. The Council 
discussed some issues related to the crisis as well as different viewpoints in terms of the 
direction to be taken, but with no clear consensus over a course of action. It was recognized, 
however, that the organization had to be more responsive to its changing environment and 
more responsive to the challenges faced by NROs. As preliminary measures, a number of 
working groups are established to provide solutions to some of the issues faced by 
Greenpeace: a Rapid Response Team Working Group, responsible for designing a system 
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that would allow Greenpeace to deploy an emergency plan in the case of unexpected events 
(e.g. oil spills, nuclear incidents, or any other disaster that falls within Greenpeace’s focus 
and that might require a rapid response); a Voting Rights Working Group in charge of 
rethinking the governance of Greenpeace, and to give more weight to small NROs and/or 
NROs located in strategic markets; and a Global Issues Working Group in charge of deciding 
on which issues had to be prioritized.18  
In 1992, Greenpeace's financial difficulties became more salient and the crisis was 
now in a full blow out. The situation was judged as sufficiently important for David 
McTaggart, former Chairman and Executive Director, to share his vision about the original 
idea behind Greenpeace through a letter to all members (SGC 1992 AGM, Chairman’s 
Speech to Council, p. 41-45: reproduced in Appendix 4). The speech provides a sense of the 
organizational climate at the time, where open conflicts were frequent. The speech is also 
important because it includes some of the founding elements of what would later be known 
as ‘One Greenpeace’, a concept that had been more or less in the air before. Following 
McTaggart’s speech, and upon Greenpeace Germany's request, Council approved the 
creation of a Working Group to provide answers with regards to the reasons behind the crisis 
(SGC 1992 AGM Minutes, p. 8). It was made explicit that the role of this group was not to 
identify scapegoats, but to analyze the mistakes that were made so that the whole 
organization could learn from them. The working group reported back to Council later in the 
meeting, emphasizing the lack of a clear strategic direction for the organization as well as the 
need for greater integration and clarity in the lines of accountability. 
Council agreed to the working group’s suggestion to address these issues within the 
                                                        
18
 Besides the Voting Rights Working Group, which will see its recommendations for a regional trustee system 
implemented, the Rapid Response Team and the Global Issues Working Groups will see their work 
compromised by the restructuration. The Global Issues Working Group, in particular, will see its work 
suspended until 1992 as its members will not be able to meet, and will eventually publish its report in 1993.    
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planning process. A number of short-term measures aiming to improve Greenpeace's 
effectiveness were also voted in: the revision of the Training Project to cope with increased 
competition for media attention; the creation of an International Action Team to decrease 
response time when major unexpected events occur; the creation of a working group on 
internal communications to deal with issues of multilingualism; and greater coordination 
among the fundraisers of different countries to share best practices and develop economies of 
scope. Meanwhile, a ‘Regional Trustees’ structure was created to give governance authority 
to those offices disenfranchised by the economics of the 24 per cent rule.  
The 1993 AGM was a turning point in the crisis, with a clear consensus that the 
organization was too bureaucratic and hierarchical to have the flexibility necessary to 
effectively fulfill its mission. As a basis for discussions for the ‘new Greenpeace’, Paul 
Gilding, the new Executive Director of GPI, circulated two documents: the Strategic Plan and 
the Global Resource Report. The Strategic Plan, which was the result of an organization-wide 
consultation, provided a reflection on the internal challenges faced by Greenpeace and what 
was required for the organization to respond to its changing environment. Internally, the 
report claims that the change in the management structure made the organization expensive 
to run and that increased demand for resources and their decreasing availability, in addition 
to changes in leadership across all boards, contributed to exacerbate the crisis. Externally, the 
report claimed that a shift in paradigm occurred in the external environment and that the 
organization had to adapt to this shift if it was to continue to be an agent of change.  
The report identifies a number of tangible measures to be adopted to favor greater 
effectiveness and efficiency, as well as for a deeper reflection of what Greenpeace is about. 
One of the central measures of the report is the creation of area advisors with a broad range 
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of expertise (i.e. campaigning, fundraising, media, finance).19 The goal of area advisors was 
to “help eliminate the need for all issues to go through the International Executive Director's 
office, which is an impractical arrangement. This network will create direct links with and 
between offices to facilitate the direct exchange of expertise across national borders. The 
intention is that only those things that cannot be resolved between offices end up in the center” 
(SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 23). The report also includes a reflection on how coordinators 
must be supported in order to improve Greenpeace effectiveness in tackling issues, and how 
the selection process should take place.  
The discussions on what had be achieved by Greenpeace to be successful led to 
discussions on the adoption of a formal mission statement, which could be used as a catalyst 
to unify the different NROs and facilitate collaboration, while leaving them enough 
autonomy to pursue their mission (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 36):  
“International and national campaign staff cooperate in the process of 
developing campaign proposals, defining policies and formulating goals, 
strategies, objectives and tactics. The basis of the relationship is the reality that 
the former are in the best position to judge what will contribute positively 
internationally to the global Greenpeace mission, while the latter are in the best 
position to judge what will or will not be effective in their respective countries.” 
 
The plan also called for a revision of the way resources were allocated. It favored a 
format where 50 percent of resources should be allocated to priority campaigns, 20 30 percent 
                                                        
19
 Prior to 1993, all issues had to go through the International Executive Director’s office to centralize 
information and decision-making.  
20
 ‘Priority campaigns’ (or priority targets) are similar to what was called ‘campaign pushes’ (i.e. very 
specific goals representing a move forward for the relevant issue area and/or for Greenpeace or for 
environmental goals generally). It is not an entire campaign, but a distinct element of a larger on-going 
campaign. Other issues that might be priority targets include an anticipated shift in position at key 
international foray, requiring a period of intensive high-profile work to prevent or encourage the shift; 
or a way of setting the environmental agenda (e.g. by encouraging a shift in attitude or perceptions on a 
given issue). Priority campaign pushes are generally pro-active. The timeframe for priority targets will 
necessarily be flexible, varying from one or two months to one or two years, depending on the goals. 
The campaign priorities will probably require a commitment of substantial organizational resources and 
energy.  
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to ongoing campaigns,21 and 20 percent to opportunistic campaigns,22 as opposed to 95 
percent of resources pre-allocated to specific campaigns ahead of time, as it had been used 
before. This way, Greenpeace could maintain unallocated funds to respond to unexpected 
events. This shift in approaching issues will deem important, and will ultimately lead to a 
reduction in the number of issue areas, as well as a shift in the way issues were approached: 
instead of specific problems discussed during Council, area advisors and campaigners were 
to be requested to provide general guidelines with a time horizon of two to three years, and 
the issues were to be discussed at a general level, to give more flexibility to NROs and 
international coordinators. This notion of flexibility was an important component of the 
Strategic Plan, and implied the design of an organization that is neither centralized nor 
decentralized, but rather builds on the strengths of NROs and GPI (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, 
p. 19-20):  
“With less of a resource base in Amsterdam, the structure will flatten, resulting 
in less hierarchy and bureaucracy. In order to encourage NROs to maximize their 
capability to support and co-operate with each other (particularly via the 
transnational ‘buddy system’) and thereby eliminate the need for building up a 
large centralized infrastructure internationally, there will be central strategic 
directions that are implemented locally.” 
 
While there was wide agreement for the Strategic Plan, its implementation implied further 
layoffs, which increased the tensions between NROs and GPI. As a response to these 
tensions, the Board of Directors decided to fire Paul Gilding in 1994 on the grounds that his 
actions were detrimental to the organization. Following this decision, the Board of Directors 
                                                        
21
 ‘On-going campaigns’ are similar to what was called ‘issue campaigns’, although these may have a lower 
profile compared to campaigns with prioritized targets. These are to be managed by specialist campaigners, with 
permanent staff, long-term objectives that fit in with the long-term goals of Greenpeace as set out in the 
Statement of Purpose, with all the elements of an action-oriented, public campaign. 
22 'Opportunistic campaigns' are described as purely ‘reactive’; responding to an unexpected event like 
an oil spill or a nuclear accident. In certain cases, an opportunistic campaign may develop into an 
ongoing or prioritized campaign. In other cases, it would be a short-term hit. 
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lost a vote of confidence and was to be replaced, resulting in greater instability in 
Greenpeace's leadership. The search for a new executive director and new board then began, 
with a specific focus on finding a leadership team that could lead the organization towards 
‘One Greenpeace’. Meanwhile, a new document, ‘Making the Global Bargain Work’, was 
produced and circulated. The Global Bargain was designed to provide a starting point for the 
restructuration and highlights four key principles that are non-negotiable (Paper submitted to 
the SGC AGM, 22-23 April 1994, by the Board and Executive Committee, p. 1):  
“We aim to function as ‘One Greenpeace’; We all work together to make 
strategic decisions about organizational direction and then reinforce them with 
resource decisions which reinforce that direction and enable it to be 
implemented; We work to overcome artificial barriers of ‘national and 
international’ which divide our campaign and programme resources and get in 
the way of our work; Once we have agreed priorities and allocated resources, 
supervision and implementation of our programme is carried out largely by 
national offices.” 
 
The Global Bargain set up the basis for collaboration between the NORs to focus on 
what united them rather than what differentiated them to make the organization more 
effective. The NROs had already agreed on putting all their resources on the table for 
discussion; on the need to become more strategically focused through selecting priorities; to 
give more weight to the Resource Allocation Committee (RESAC) to help overcome the 
difficult obstacles for making priorities operational and effective; the need to simplify and 
clarify budgeting, planning, and the management systems; on the crucial role of GPI of 
monitoring and holding accountable of NROs; and, on the understanding that GPI “cannot 
and should not control everything that is “international”, and that decentralized, locally 
grounded implementation is critical to the success of our work”. As a result of these 
discussions, Japan was selected as a test case for the implementation of the Global Bargain. 
However, it is only after the hiring of a new Executive Director that the Global Bargain and 
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the Strategic Plan will have an opportunity to be fully implemented, putting an end to a 
period of confusion and instability. 
By the end of the period, the most important restructuration efforts had taken place.  
The organization was perceived as leaner23, more focused, and increasingly flexible: 
“Although the process is not yet complete, we have now passed some of the 
worst corners in this exercise. Even the creation of Greenpeace International in 
1978, and the formalisation of the original political control structure in 1983, do 
not compare to the current process in terms of the concerted effort that has been 
made on all levels of the organization. Much remains to be done, and we should 
have no illusions about the future. But Greenpeace is emerging as a leaner and 
assuredly tougher organization, prepared for the challenges ahead. We will 
campaign on fewer issues, and we are more aware of the limits of our resources 
and the need to acutely focus our work. In addition, our new structure will give 
us greater flexibility than was possible before. (Report by the Board to Council, 
1994, Annex 1, p. 2)” 
 
The flexibility of the organization was to come in part from the allocation of resources which, 
within Greenpeace, could be said to be revolutionary. Organizational members were not, 
however, willing to go that far at that point in time, as illustrated by the discussions that took 
place at one of the board meetings in 1994: 
“The proposal for the 'flexible fund', which meant that campaign objectives, 
strategies and tactics were not matched at this point, in any meaningful way 
with resource allocation, and would not be until some point in the undefined 
future. Although the Board appreciated the intent to give increased flexibility 
to the campaigns, the Board found it impossible to agree to this proposal, 
which was, in effect, the establishment of a $4,000,000 contingency fund 
which was unconnected to the activities recommended in the proposals, and 
which was to be agreed without any criteria for how the funds would be 
applied, no framework within which this would take place, nor any strategy 
as to how it would be distributed among international campaigns and national 
and regional offices.” (GC Board Meeting Minutes, September 10-12, 1994, p. 
4) 
 
                                                        
23
 110 staff positions had been eliminated for the budget year 1994 alone. Among those positions, 90 were 
coming from the pool of 140 international campaigners (15 of those 90 positions would later be “picked up” by 
NROs) (CG Board Meeting Minutes, September 10-12, 1994, p.4).   
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 This perspective would change with the nomination of Thilo Bolde as International 
Executive Director, and the actions surrounding the Brent Spar campaign. 
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Graph 12: Resource Allocation 1992 
 
  85
Graph 13: Resource Allocation 1993 
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Graph 14: Resource Allocation 1994 
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4.4 Period 4 (1995-2001): Becoming ‘One Greenpeace’, a globally responsive 
organization 
The period from 1995 to 2001 focused on becoming a globally responsive organization. The 
period was in continuity with the previous one in the sense that it was dedicated to ‘One 
Greenpeace’, but differs from it as it was more stable and focused on the implementation of 
“One Greenpeace” rather than its design. The transition occurred in early 1995 with two 
important events: Thilo Bolde was named Executive Director of GPI, and Greenpeace UK 
launched a campaign against Shell for its disposal of the Brent Spar oilrig. The hiring of 
Thilo Bolde was particularly important as he was explicitly hired for his vision for the 
implementation of the Strategic Plan.24 Greenpeace UK initiative, on the other hand, proved 
to be highly successful and provided a template for future work.  
The most important component of Thilo Bolde’s initiatives was the Programme of 
Reforms, a restructuration plan that provided guidelines to create the context required for 
Greenpeace to be successful. As stated in the report, the “lack of clarity in authority between 
Council, Board, and Executive Director distracted leadership from the primary tasks of 
creating vision, focusing our objectives, and finding ways to work effectively internationally” 
(SGC 1996 AGM Minutes, Annex 7: The Programme of Reform, p. 2). The new system 
redefined the Board of Directors’ role as ‘Arm’s Length’, removed from management 
decisions, and gives the International Executive Director clearer and greater authority vis-a-
vis NROs through the Organizational Development Plans (ODP), its role in hiring executive 
directors, intervention powers, and other structures. The Programme of Reforms also 
                                                        
24
 Thilo Bolde came from the German office, and had been actively involved in making sense of the crisis and 
developing a new direction for the organization. The Board of Directors, at the time, was concerned with 
finding the right person for the position, to avoid a similar situation as the one they encountered with Paul 
Gilding, who had been unable to lead the organization towards the implementation of the Strategic Plan. Before 
he was officially promoted to the position of Executive Director, Thilo Bolde was invited to share his vision for 
the implementation of the plan with the Board of Directors, a process that occurred over a few months. 
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includes new Articles of Association that maintain Council's role as ultimate supervisory 
authority: to elect and dismiss the Board of Directors, to set the budget ceiling (by weighted 
vote), and to play a key role in the shaping of the long term strategy and objectives. The 
Programme of Reforms also includes new rules of procedure that involve NROs’ Executive 
Directors for input into budget and campaign prioritization and policy development, roles 
that were previously under the responsibility of Council. The Programme of Reform also 
acknowledges that the regional system had failed to fully enfranchise smaller NROs, and the 
new vote determination system grants an equal vote to all NROs meeting certain minimum 
performance criteria appropriate to the country in which they operate (see Figure 2 on voting 
rights). In 1995 and 1996, the Programme of Reform quickly becomes an organizational 
priority, with four employees dedicated to its implementation.  
Meanwhile, the events surrounding the sinking of the Brent Spar oilrig led to an 
important mobilization within the organization and contributed to renew interest for 
Greenpeace's actions in the media. Greenpeace's actions against Shell, contrary to 
Greenpeace's approach until then, did not originate from centralized planning held at GPI and 
pre-approved by Council, but through an initiative held by Greenpeace UK. The Brent Spar 
events challenged the dominant assumption that priorities had to be set up through a top-
down approach. Beside the sampling error,25 Brent Spar was a success with respect to 
Greenpeace being able to seize the opportunity created by the visibility they obtained to push 
their agenda. From this point on, issue areas became less important. Instead, general 
guidelines prioritizing a number of items were set, and key opportunities that had the 
potential to become major successes were nurtured and tracked. Once a project demonstrated 
                                                        
25
 Greenpeace had made a sampling error on the quantity of pollutants on the oilrig. The sampling proved to be 
inaccurate, and Shell later filed a lawsuit against Greenpeace, negatively impacting Greenpeace's reputation and 
relationship with the media (Dale, 1996).  
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its potential, it was scaled up and diffused throughout the organization.26 For this strategy to 
be successful, it required greater collaboration across functions. To facilitate cross 
campaigning, all issues and opportunities were discussed within the Joint Campaign Meeting 
(JCM), the Executive Director Meeting (EDM), and the Senior Management Team (SMT), 
committees created to favor greater integration in Greenpeace activities.  
The role of GPI, under this new template, was to create a context that favored the most 
successful projects to rise through the ranks (SGC 1998 AGM, p. 16). As part of creating this 
‘context’ – and in light of the improvements that had occurred since the implementation of 
the Programme of Reforms –,27 ‘One Greenpeace’ came back as a desirable focus for 
Greenpeace as an organization (SGC 1997 AGM, Board Report to Council, p. 5). One major 
issue with ‘One Greenpeace’ was in its definition: it was considered as a vague idea that was 
best described as what it was not rather than what it was. It built on a healthy tension between 
decentralization and centralization to allow Greenpeace to maximize its impact, with a 
specific role for GPI that was not in establishing priorities but in creating the right context for 
the organization and ensuring that NROs are effective in fulfilling their mission:  
“Although this tension between decentralization and centralization remains to a 
certain extent, Greenpeace International has a central role in conducting and 
coordinating international campaigns, monitoring national and regional 
Greenpeace offices, representing Greenpeace worldwide, organizing fundraising, 
and organizing the overall strategic debate in Greenpeace.”28  
 
The commitment to ‘One Greenpeace’ slowly became more explicit, with the Blue Sky 
                                                        
26
 This practice, implicit in Greenpeace actions at first, becomes explicit as of 1998, with the creation of lists of 
key opportunities to be discussed within Greenpeace governance and operational channels, which can count as 
many as 20 projects that have the potential to become ‘Big Hits’.  
27
 Greenpeace was in a much-improved position: communications between GPI and NROs was greatly 
improved compared to the period 1991-1995; the OECD NROs were also self-sufficient, and several 
strategically important offices (Brazil and Argentina) were moving rapidly towards self-sufficiency; GPI also 
experienced a surplus for the first time in six years; greater collaboration between NROs is also reported. 
28
 Greenpeace (1998) “Prioritizing the Core Functions of Greenpeace International” extracted from the 1998 
Long Term Strategic Plan as agreed at the March 1998 Executive Directors Meeting and submitted by the 
Strategic Management Team to the Stitching Greenpeace Council Annual General Meeting and agreed by 
Council. 
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discussions that aimed to improve the organization’s effectiveness and which led to a number 
of outcomes: the creation of Global Teams; the creation of Centers of Excellence, whereby 
global tasks will be delegated to the location where they can be most effectively performed; 
the creation of the Campaign Council and the Executive Council to improve NRO/GPI 
communication and decision-making. These initiatives soon demonstrated their effectiveness, 
and the successes obtained through this approach further inform where Greenpeace should 
focus its time and efforts.  
Overall, the period from 1995 to 2001, the last observed in this study, was one where 
the organization was moving towards becoming a globally integrated enterprise. It was one 
where senior management was increasingly concerned with learning from past events,29 and 
where they were determined to achieve more with fewer resources. Strategic planning 
became an ongoing process, with GPI in charge of establishing general guidelines for NROs, 
monitoring NROs with regards to their own ODP, and creating a context that encourages 
collaboration between NROs as well as the development of creative solutions. 
4.5 Greenpeace context from 1979 to 2001 in review 
Overall, Greenpeace changed significantly from 1979 to 2001. Table 4 provides a 
comparison of the key information surrounding governance channels, as well as the process 
for resource allocations. Figures 3 to 6 provide visual representations for the relationships 
between NROs and GPI.  
In the first period (1979-1985), GPI acted as a forum for discussions and NROs 
enjoyed significant autonomy in their activities. Governance channels were blurred, but 
simple, as the organization was very limited in scope. The process for resource allocation 
                                                        
29
 Examples of these can be found in internal reports in 1996 and 1997 that aimed to learn from successful 
campaigns that had occurred in the past 15 years and attempts as well as from the crisis from the early 90s’ 
(EDMM 1997a p. 9/3).  
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was in the making, with projects being considered on a one-on-one basis for funding through 
a pool of money provided by NROs in parallel to their own pool of resources they could use 
at their discretion.  
In the second period (1985-1991), GPI asserted its authority over NROs by 
centralizing key functions. Governance channels were improved, with the Board of Directors 
providing recommendations to Council, including on priorities. GPI was in charge of 
overseeing the execution of the policies and the coordination of projects across the different 
NROs. The process for resource allocation was closely managed, with a clear screening 
process in place.  
In the third period (1991-1995), GPI and NROs negotiated a new agreement to 
enhance the effectiveness of the organization. This new agreement was conceptualized as 
“One Greenpeace”. Governance channels were modified for the sake of greater effectiveness 
in the management of the organization. The process for resource allocation was also 
reviewed, with several committees being formed to seek how this process should be managed.  
In the fourth period (1995-2001), GPI and NROs shared responsibilities to work as 
“One Greenpeace”. Governance channels were well established, with clear responsibilities 
for Council, the Board of Directors, and the Executive Committee. Nearly all NROs enjoyed 
voting rights, with one office equaling one vote. The process for resource allocation was also 
better defined, with GPI providing guidelines to NROs on priorities, and NROs working 
within these guidelines.  
The periods presented in this chapter were intended to provide background material to 
the subsequent analysis. In the next section, I revisit these periods, this time with the 
intention to make interpretations as to what contributed to Greenpeace's successes (failures) 
in engaging with the future. 
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Table 6: Greenpeace Context over time 
Period 1 (1979-1985) Period 2 (1985-1991) Period 3 (1991-1995) Period 4 (1995-2001) 
Governance Channels Governance Channels Governance Channels Governance Channels 
• All financial and operational decisions 
are made in Council and by the Board 
of Directors for GPI; 
• NROs are assigned with voting rights, 
and Council is formed of one 
representative from each NRO; 
• NROs that contributed significantly in 
terms of visibility and funding for 
Greenpeace are granted voting rights. 
• All major policies are voted in 
Council following recommendations 
made by the Board of Directors; 
• GPI oversees the execution of the 
policies and the coordination of 
projects across the different NROs; 
• NROs voting rights tied with pledges 
to GPI, but the rule is loosely 
applied.  
• All major policies are voted in 
Council following recommendations 
made by the Board of Directors; 
• GPI oversees the execution of the 
policies and the coordination of 
projects across the different NROs; 
• NROs voting rights tied with 
pledges to GPI, and different 
categories are used to describe 
offices; 
• NROs are affiliated with a region, 
and the region has a voting right on 
its own that counts as an additional 
voice. 
• Policies are approved in Council 
following recommendations from 
committees; 
• Board of Directors in charge of 
overseeing legal and financial matters; 
• Campaign-related discussions held by 
the Joint Campaign Committee 
composed of international 
coordinators, fundraisers, and the 
senior management team; 
• All issues concerning the management 
of NROs discussed during Executive 
Directors Committee; 
• Voting rights tied with NROs 
autonomy: nearly all offices have 
voting rights during this period. 
 
Process for Resource Allocation Process for Resource Allocation Process for Resource Allocation Process for Resource Allocation 
• NROs propose their projects for 
international funding (i.e. expenses 
covered by a shared pool of money and 
considered as ‘international priorities’);  
• Lack of agreement about what 
represents an international issue, 
leading to the adoption of a formal 
definition in 1982; 
• Projects are considered on a one-on-one 
basis until the adoption of issue areas in 
1983 to facilitate the process. 
 
• Proposals are prepared by 
international coordinators working 
for GPI, are circulated to the Board 
of Directors ahead of Council, to be 
officially approved in council 
• NROs projects must be reviewed for 
approval by GPI 
• All submitted proposals fall under an 
issue area and are managed under 
that same issue area. 
• Under review, with various working 
groups to discuss what should be 
Greenpeace orientations; 
• Recognition that neither 
centralization nor decentralization 
work. 
• GPI is expected to provide guidelines 
on ‘what’ issues Greenpeace work on 
without telling ‘how’; 
• NROs are expected to collaborate with 
one another and to develop innovative 
solutions based on GPI guidelines in 
terms of what matters; 
• Priorities, or ‘flagship’ campaigns, are 
circulated across the organization 
before a commitment is made. 
Dominant Perspective Dominant Perspective Dominant Perspective Dominant Perspective 
Bottom-up Top-down Unclear Top-down for guidelines Bottom-up for projects 
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Figure 3: Greenpeace Structure Period 1 (1979-1985) 
 
GPI acts as a forum for discussions and NROs enjoy significant autonomy 
 
Figure 4: Greenpeace Structure Period 2 (1985-1991) 
 
GPI asserts its authority over NROs by centralizing key functions 
Figure 5: Greenpeace Structure Period 3 (1991-1995) 
 
GPI and NROs negotiate a new agreement for ‘One Greenpeace’ 
 
Figure 6: Greenpeace Structure Period 4 (1995-2001) 
 
GPI and NROs share responsibilities to work as ‘One Greenpeace’ 
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Chapter 5 
5. Rationality, Plasticity, and Shaping Ability across 
periods 
In this section, I revisit the different periods of Greenpeace using the analytic constructs of 
“rationality”, “plasticity”, and “shaping ability”. Analytic construct – common in 
historiography (Ingram et al., 2012; Rowlinson et al., 2014) – was used to facilitate the 
comparison of the periods to derive insights as to which properties contributed to 
Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future. For each period, I looked at Greenpeace's 
beliefs with regards to the future, its ability to identify opportunities aligned with these 
beliefs (“rationality”), its ability to pursue the identified opportunities (“plasticity”), and its 
ability to create residuum of change through the identified opportunities (“shaping ability”). 
 Greenpeace's beliefs were identified through the discourse within the organization 
with regards to the future of the planet and Greenpeace's role in enacting that future. These 
beliefs evolved over time, moving from implicit beliefs expressed through the actions 
undertaken by organizational members to explicit beliefs institutionalized within the mission 
statement of the organization and its explicit objectives. The discussions held within the 
governance and operational channels of the organization provide evidence for this shift over 
time.   
Greenpeace's focus in terms of priorities captures its ability to identify opportunities. 
Over the years, the focus of the organization shifts from unequivocal and unambiguous issues 
towards more ambitious objectives. This later set of issues was based on projections of the 
future to determine which ones were the ones that needed to be addressed now in order to 
offer a better future to the next generations. This change in focus is illustrated through 
Figures 7 and 8, which provide a map of the issues prioritized by the organization over time. 
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Supporting data from internal discussions held within the governance and operational 
channels of the organization provide additional information on the process, as well as 
evidence for my interpretation of the rationality of the organization.  
Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities is partially linked to the identification of 
opportunities. With that regard, Figure 7 and 8 provide some information on the opportunities 
that came up to be pursued by the organization over time (these priorities had to be approved 
through the AGM, which is a condition to pursue an opportunity). The ability of the 
organization to pursue opportunities is also interpreted based on the discussions held within 
the governance and operational channels of the organization, as not all opportunities that 
came to be prioritized turned out to be pursued by organizational members. Evidence 
supporting my interpretation of Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities is provided 
throughout the narrative.  
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape is illustrated through the residuum of 
changes created by the organization. Residuum of changes is exhibited through “victories” 
(see Graph 15), which provides information on tangible results obtained by Greenpeace 
organizational members in shaping the landscape. These victories include the adoption of 
pieces of legislation at formal institutions and changes in the global practices of multinational 
corporations, which both have a direct impact on a variety of actors in the environment.  
Below, I describe the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability for each period and 
provide an explanation for the difficulties encountered/successes obtained by the 
organization with regards to each dimension. This explanation is presented for each period 
with supporting data (both quotes and factual data), with an explanation for my 
interpretations of the dimension, and why Greenpeace was doing well, or not so well, during 
each period with regards to the identified dimensions. This section concludes with a 
presentation of the key insights derived from the comparison of the different periods.  
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Figure 7: Greenpeace priorities (1980-1991)  
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Figure 8: Greenpeace priorities (1992-2003) 
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5.1 Period 1 (1979-1985): Muddling through an unorganized, decentralized 
organization  
As described in Chapter 4, the first years of Greenpeace as a formal international 
organization were dedicated to the establishment of a set of structures and practices to 
coordinate the work of the different NROs. This first period was characterized by the 
absence of an explicit vision for the future, which led to frequent discussions about 
Greenpeace’s role. This was particularly true when long-term projects were discussed 
internally. This situation prevailed throughout the period, although implicit beliefs 
about the future can be observed through Greenpeace’s actions, which entailed that 
logic of shaping the landscape.   
A salient example for the absence of an explicit belief about the organization’s 
role can be found in the internal discussions that took place about some projects that 
were more long-term oriented and/or slightly different in terms of objectives than more 
conventional projects. The discussion on a project involving Multilateral Development 
Banks illustrates this point:  
 “Netherlands also supported the idea, and felt that it would be a long-term 
project that would take us into other areas, including the energy policy 
area […].  
Germany stated that it strongly opposed the proposal. They are afraid that 
Greenpeace would be put into the corner of being against everything – a 
sort of radical left-wing position. Greenpeace takes direct action and gains 
public support because of these actions. We are not known for being 
political or intellectual heavyweights. Our message is simple, and that is 
why we are successful. Germany doubts whether Greenpeace could 
communicate the MOB information, and doubts also whether it is 
necessary to research any more energy issues. The Greenpeace role is not 
to dictate, but rather to save the world by showing what is going on 
[emphasis added]. They don’t believe we should write up banking policies, 
nor that our task is to influence the banks.” (SGC 1984 AGM, p. 17) 
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 As we can see from this excerpt, even if the notion of shaping the landscape was 
implicit in Greenpeace’s actions, the focus was on the present. Most of the issues the 
organization was working on were specific problems that could easily be observed (see 
Figure 7), defined, and communicated to a large audience through simple images, and 
Greenpeace’s role was to expose these problems. There were a few mentions of a focus 
on the future as part of Greenpeace’s mission, but attempts to engage into long-term 
planning and long-term projects outside of what they were already doing raised 
concerns and questions from members about what Greenpeace was about. This absence 
of explicit beliefs about the future and what was Greenpeace’s role with regards to the 
future had an important impact on Greenpeace’s rationality, plasticity, and shaping 
ability, which are discussed below.  
5.1.1 Rationality 
In the absence of an explicit vision for the future, organizational members could not 
agree on a process to identify and select opportunities to pursue. The difficulties 
encountered in identifying opportunities were a matter of understanding what represents 
an opportunity for Greenpeace as an international organization and how to process 
information to evaluate opportunities. This was explained, in part, by a lack of a shared 
frame of reference to categorize issues and a shared understanding of what represents 
an international issue. In this context, discussions on the priorities of the organization 
were done on a piece-by-piece basis based on the submission made by NROs. The list 
of priorities shown in Figure 7 for the years 1980 and 1981 is illustrative of this point, 
whereas less than 5 priorities identified as “international” led to an agreement by 
organizational members in terms of whether or not they represent opportunities for the 
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organization, despite the submission of more than 12 proposals for each of these two 
years.30 
 In terms of defining what represents an international opportunity, there was an 
obvious lack of a shared frame of reference to discuss potential opportunities. In fact, it 
was common at the time to find projects that had an international dimension and were 
shared by more than one office, but because of a lack of understanding on these 
definitions and/or because of personal conflicts, organizational members were unable to 
properly discuss opportunities. The most salient example of these situations can be 
found in a discussion on Arctic Pilots, a project proposed by the Danish office and that 
was intended to put a halt on the transportation of oil and natural gas by large tankers in 
the Arctic region. Originally proposed in 1979 and rejected on the basis that it was not 
international enough for Greenpeace, the project was modified and submitted again for 
approval in 1981. This time, however, the Danish office changed the location of its 
action to make it more “international”. Upon the submission of the Danish proposal, the 
following discussion took place: 
“Proposal: to campaign against the transportation of natural gas. The 
major concern is wildlife disturbance. It takes place in Northern Canada.  
Discussion: It is not a priority for Greenpeace Canada (Pat – Canada). 
Is there any way you can address the issue closer to Denmark (Pete – UK). 
Conclusion: that Denmark reconsiders its proposal and will come back 
with a new proposal at the next Council meeting. Janus will also report to 
Council within the next 6 months concerning this proposal and any plan for 
direct action.  
Suggestion: Contact Greenpeace Canada to see how much involvement 
there could be (Pete – UK).” (AGM 1981, December 12th p. 25) 
 
                                                        
30
 Because the map was intended to show the continuity over time, many issues from that era have been 
not been included in the figure. These issues include Haitian refugees, overpopulation, deforestation, as 
well as other issues aligned with what would become the focus of Greenpeace in the following years, but 
were addressed by only 1 or 2 NROs at the time. They were brought to the AGM agenda on the floor, and 
had not been screened by the Board or the International Chairman ahead of time.   
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The comment from Greenpeace Canada is interesting because the issue that was being 
discussed was actually in line with some of Greenpeace Canada’s priorities. In fact, it 
was very similar to the Supertankers issue the Canada office had been proposing as an 
issue of interest to council since 1979. It was also in accordance with a joint proposal 
between Greenpeace Canada and Greenpeace USA submitted to the 1980 AGM. The 
same situation prevailed in 1981 where, once again, both NROs were unable to 
recognize that the problems they were facing were part of the same issue: the 
transportation of oil and gas by supertankers in fragile ecosystems.31 Later on during 
the 1981 meeting, it was time to discuss the proposal from Greenpeace Canada, which 
led to further discussions about what represents an international campaign: 
“Proposal: to stop supertanker traffic occurring and increasing in 
critical natural habitats. 
Discussion: on national versus international 
I see no involvement/commitment of the European offices in this. It will 
receive much support; it offsets some bad relations and it is one of the 
few international issues which is favorable to fishermen. (Pat – Canada) 
AGREED BY MOST TRUSTEES: 
There is still no clear understanding on how to deal with the differences 
between national and International campaigns. This is seen as a national 
campaign. There is no involvement of the European offices. (AGM 1981, 
December 12th p. 37).” 
 
Hence, despite the similarities between the proposals, Greenpeace Canada and 
Greenpeace Denmark refused to see their issues as part of the same problem, and both 
projects were denied funding. Nevertheless, these discussions opened up a conversation 
about what represents an international opportunity for Greenpeace. Meanwhile, most 
projects and opportunities pursued by Greenpeace remained carried by NROs, falling 
under their sole responsibility. These projects, while having the potential to shape the 
                                                        
31
 The proposals were focusing on different locations (Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean), but were 
nevertheless addressing the same issue: the transport of oil and gas in fragile ecosystems.  
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landscape in their respective countries, could not be identified as superior opportunities, 
or at least, superior opportunities for an international organization like Greenpeace (i.e. 
opportunities to shape the global landscape with regards to the identified issues as 
opposed to the local landscape for several issues that had a more limited impact).  
 The situation highlighted above changed with the involvement of Greenpeace in 
the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling. At that time, commercial 
whaling was an issue of concern for all NROs. Furthermore, the issue was associated 
with the practices of a specific industry and this industry was regulated by the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC), a formal international institution that 
established quotas on the number of catches each country was authorized per year. By 
having all NROs involved in the pursuit of this opportunity, it was believed that 
Greenpeace could effectively put an end to commercial whaling on a worldwide basis 
through the adoption of a ban on commercial whaling at the IWC, something that no 
other international organization was in a position to achieve.32 McTaggart, in his 
memoirs, made the following remark regarding the pursuit of this opportunity and how 
it differed from what Greenpeace had done up until then:  
“Ramming up all our various national offices together into Greenpeace 
International was more an instinct than a plan. But now that there’s a 
project that needs a truly international organization, well, we’ve got one. 
[…]” (McTaggart, 2002: p. 157) 
 
                                                        
32
 Evidence of this is provided by a conversation that occurred in 1980 between David McTaggart, 
Chairman of Greenpeace International, and Peter Scott, founder of World Wild Fund for Nature, where 
both discussed what could be achieved to favor the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling by 
the IWC. During the conversation, which has been reported by both McTaggart (2002: chapter 15) and 
Scott (Huxsley, p. 297) in their respective memoirs, Greenpeace was the only organization in a position 
to coordinate actions and behind-the-scenes strategies on a worldwide basis. By leveraging Greenpeace's 
international position, they could convince other countries to join the IWC in favor of the whales, to force 
the adoption of a moratorium.  
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This was made possible by the organizational design of Greenpeace that was 
significantly different from other organizations pursuing similar endeavors (i.e. 
international NGOs), with a governance structure that permitted the execution of a 
coherent international strategy through its NROs. The opportunity identified at that 
specific point in time was the one with the most potential because organizational 
members already had knowledge of the issue, could conceptualize the landscape (i.e. a 
formal institution where policies were debated and adopted), and believed they could 
solve the issue through the adoption of a specific piece of legislation (i.e. moratorium 
on commercial whaling).33  
 In light of the successes obtained with the commercial whaling opportunity, it 
became obvious to organizational members that focusing on a limited set of 
international priorities could help them enhance their shaping ability. It is for this 
reason that, as of 1983, categories were used to limit the focus of the organization and 
to facilitate the evaluation of opportunities (see Figure 7), as only projects falling within 
these categories could be discussed in Council for evaluation. Subsequent 
environmental problems falling within these categories could then be proposed by 
organizational members as potential opportunities for worldwide change and discussed 
on a common basis.  
 Nevertheless, and although the ability to identify opportunities was improving, 
the organization was still struggling due to the lack of effective processes for decision-
making. The case in point is the Gulf campaign, which was perceived as a missed 
opportunity by some organizational members:  
 “A lot of people have worked hard and long to make Greenpeace what it is 
                                                        
33
 The same reasoning applied for nuclear waste dumping at sea, although this opportunity was more 
limited in space, being mostly contained within Europe and the North Sea.   
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today – an international organisation which has a reputation unequalled in its 
ability and willingness to take on campaigns and win them. These people 
work for Greenpeace in the belief that we are building an organisation capable 
and eager of taking on those environmental issues which will directly 
influence and change the areas of crucial eco-political decision making. To 
this objective, in the battle for people’s hearts and minds, we enable the 
spotlight of international publicity to be directed on to the problems with 
which we are directly linked. The Gulf campaign fitted this role exactly. […] 
It would have brought us in contact with Middle Eastern powers for the first 
time in our history and offered us a chance to expand in a way which may 
have had a lasting and beneficial effect on Greenpeace and on its credibility. 
In short, it was an opportunity this board should have seized with both hands 
as it was a ready-made campaign for an organisation which has its 
philosophical roots in internationalism and spontaneity.” (Letter from the 
Chairman, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, November 25th 1983, 
Appendix 1 p. 1)  
 
Although there were only six individuals to discuss the opportunity, they could not 
agree. This led the Chairman of the Board to question why situations like that occurred, 
and to invite other Board members to reflect on the situation: 
 “[…] The way in which this board of directors handled the Gulf campaign 
raises serious questions as to the nature of our decision making process, 
and suggests to me that there is something fundamentally wrong in the 
structure under which we work. To carry on our business without 
addressing ourselves to this basic problem would be irresponsible. We 
must, as a matter of utmost urgency, turn our attention to our constitution 
and ask ourselves why we cannot decide, quickly and positively, to act on 
global environmental issues in the way in which this board was established 
to do.” (Letter from the Chairman, Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, 
November 25th 1983, Appendix 1 p. 1) 
 
Despite these failures, the situation that prevailed at the end of the period 
with regards to the ability of the organization to identify opportunities was 
greatly improved compared to the one at the beginning of the period, as we can 
see from Figure 7. Greenpeace’s focus was on issues that were current and 
observable, with very limited ambiguity and equivocality about their cause and 
what had to be done to solve the problems, but they remained international in 
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scope which, for an organization like Greenpeace, could be defined as superior 
opportunities.  
5.1.2 Plasticity 
The ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities was closely linked with its ability to 
identify opportunities, as both were linked with one another during those years. As a 
newly formed organization, the decentralization of activities was a clear impediment to 
both the identification and the pursuit of opportunities, and the problems encountered 
with regards to both abilities had similar roots.  
 In terms of structures and processes that could facilitate the pursuit of 
opportunities, effective governance and operational channels were still in the making. 
When the Council could identify specific opportunities to pursue, they could not 
necessarily pursue these opportunities effectively. This was particularly true in the early 
years, when NROs were not used to working with one another and were not accustomed 
to superseding their authority to GPI. The following excerpt where the Chairman of 
Greenpeace International complains to the Council about the absence of collaboration 
with regards to how to pursue opportunities illustrates this later problem: 
“First the pooling of funds for the international campaigns that I 
introduced in November is not working. Netherlands is the only country to 
have contributed so far. I'm getting bloody tired of asking for funds - 
which everyone immediately thinks is 'for our overhead which is low': And 
I’m also very tired of -everyone calling the Council a money tree 
expecting to pluck-another few grand from it but when asked to participate. 
I therefore propose the following in place of the pooling method. Each 
country when proposing an international-campaign submit the usual 
studies, plans, objective, etc. with a detailed budget, then the proposing 
country says 'how much they will pay towards this campaign, at which 
time there is a vote on whether to proceed or not.” (SGC AGM 1980, p. 5) 
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Once the process for deciding on opportunities to pursue was clarified and how 
the different NROs were to contribute to the identified opportunities, however, a course 
of action could quickly be decided. Because the problems addressed were relatively 
simple to grasp (i.e. issues could easily be grasped through simple images: whaling, 
nuclear waste dumping, seal hunt, etc.) with a well-defined opportunity space (i.e. the 
landscape could easily be conceptualized and identified), bringing organizational 
members on par with the task to be performed could be achieved despite a form of 
organizing that lacked formal authority. There was only a need for minimal 
coordination to pursue these opportunities. It was basically a shift in objectives, moving 
from local and independent initiatives conducted in parallel towards actions coordinated 
by GPI that leveraged the work of each NRO to target formal international institutions.  
Despite this, situations occurred when agreed plans could not be pursued because 
of a lack of trust and coordination among NROs. This lack of trust and coordination can 
be illustrated through the disarmament campaign, which involved actions in France and 
the USA. The USA failed to move forward with the agreed plans, resulting in France 
not carrying out its own part of the agreed plan, which France justified through a letter 
to Council: 
“The board of France wished to recall that: at the December 1980 meeting 
of the Greenpeace Council the campaign in Mururoa against French 
Nuclear tests was approved on the condition that a campaign against US 
tests in Nevada would be carried out before the Mururoa campaign. Within 
a year little constructive work has been carried out apparently to make this 
campaign in Nevada happen. […] A campaign directed only at French 
nuclear tests is more than questionable politically. […] Because the same 
commitment stated twice within a year has not been respected, and 
because we believe in the Greenpeace philosophy which is going against 
environmental abuse without discrimination of nationality, and to go after 
the worst, we will not accept the proposal of the Rainbow Warrior going to 
Mururoa before a real Greenpeace campaign has been carried out in 
Nevada; in addition should there be a real Nevada campaign, we cannot 
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support a campaign against French tests alone.” (Letter from Rémi 
Parmentier, SGC AGM 1981, p. 57) 
 
 Once again, the work conducted by Greenpeace to facilitate the adoption of a 
moratorium on commercial whaling provided an opportunity to learn how to pursue 
opportunities that were international in scope. The following excerpt from the 1980 
AGM is illustrative of the consensus regarding the whaling opportunity and how to 
pursue that opportunity based on the failures of previous actions: 
“Everyone agreed that scientifically it was fairly organized but the 
lobbying and relationship between the NGO's was not organized at all and 
we were more than responsible. There would have to be some large 
changes next year and a much better plan, especially in the use of our 
offices worldwide. For example Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
Denmark (into Scandinavia), contacts in the Spanish block; France, 
Holland, and to some extent Denmark by their excellent conservation 
attitude proved that by working within the country year round and lobbying 
in their own language pays off.” (SGC AGM July 30th, 1980, p. 33) 
 
“Am disappointed with this year's preparation for IWC, especially 
lobbying delegates, relationship NGO's, elitist attitude; need to delegate 
responsibilities and all work together. Must start preparing now for next 
year moratorium – sperm anyway should be highest priority on our list. We 
are getting too spread out - must move now before losing our momentum. 
Must work worldwide, only group capable of this, our strength and noting 
it. Each person, office, must have specific and planned responsibilities with 
emphasis on whaling block.” (Greenpeace Chairman, SGC AGM July 30th 
1980, p. 34) 
 
To facilitate the pursuit of opportunities (and learning from the commercial 
whaling opportunity), GPI and the NROs agreed to create a new position: international 
coordinators. International coordinators were individuals associated with a specific 
issue; they were in charge of coordinating the activities conducted by the different 
NROs involved with a given issue. The creation of this new position within the 
organization was sufficient to develop the plasticity required to seize the identified 
opportunities: the coordinator facilitated communications between NROs, and the 
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coordination of actions. Besides the creation of this new position, the standardization of 
practices also helped, as it allowed the organization to focus on opportunities instead of  
on discussing processes and practices.  
Nevertheless, failures to pursue opportunities still occurred. The Gulf campaign, 
discussed above, was one of these failures, which highlighted the need for faster 
decision-making with regards to the pursuit of opportunities:  
“The problems of the Gulf campaign were only a symptom of the real 
underlying problem:- the lack of an international outlook by what 
professes to be an international body. We need a board which is balanced 
and looks at each issue from an international perspective. Looking to the 
future, I would ask you to consider the election of a higher body - a 
cabinet - in which the trustees from all countries invest the decision 
making power. This would allow for quick decision making, would give 
the organisation a less nationalistic focus and would remove the barrier 
preventing the admittance of new nations. It is your organisation and your 
decision, and before we discuss it, I want you all to keep in mind that we 
have within us the capability to take this organisation, its impact and its 
effectiveness, still further than we have done already. I believe this can 
only happen if we are honest in our wish for international cooperation.” 
(Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, November 25th 1983, Appendix 1 p. 
1)  
 
These failures became less frequent, however, thanks to the implementation of 
clear procedures for managing international campaigns, which included, among other 
things, the establishment of a reporting system, the design of the double-veto principle, 
and the set-up of a Council Campaign Committee.  
5.1.3 Shaping ability 
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape during this first period was initially modest. 
Although the organization was creating a residual of changes in the form of media 
coverage and change in public opinion, many of its actions were failing to force other 
actors to adapt. This situation changed, however, when Greenpeace played a key role in 
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the adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling at the IWC in 1982 (see Graph 
15). This moratorium was obtained by Greenpeace after the organization realized it had 
to change its approach if it wanted to have an impact on the issue it was targeting 
(Huxley, 1993; McTaggart, 2002). This new approach involved the introduction of 
lobbying to influence the IWC from the inside, and the coordination of actors internal 
as well as external to Greenpeace, to speak with one voice. Because the IWC was one 
institution with identifiable actors and explicit rules about its functioning and how to 
change the rule of the games with regards to the practice of commercial whaling, it was 
possible for Greenpeace to create the change necessary to change the future with 
regards to the hunting of whales.34  
 Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape using a diversity of approaches that 
included lobbying in addition to non-violent direct actions and protests, and through the 
coordination of the activities conducted by its various NROs, was confirmed in 1983. 
Using a similar approach as the one used to obtain a moratorium on commercial 
whaling, the organization obtained a ban on the dumping of nuclear waste at sea at the 
London Dumping Convention. A diversity of approaches subsequently became a core 
tenet of the organization. 
 Beside the residuum of changes observed at formal international institutions, the 
ability of Greenpeace to legitimize new ideas can also be observed in the level of 
support it received from independent donors during this period, on the rise from this 
point forward (see Graph 4). The support received from donors was important, as it 
contributed to provide greater legitimacy to Greenpeace actions. It can thus be seen as 
                                                        
34
 A detailed account of the events at the IWC and their subsequent impact on Greenpeace activities has 
been presented to the European Group of Organization Studies (EGOS) in July 2014 and to different 
audiences at the Ivey School of Business (October 2013), HEC Montréal (November 2013), the John 
Molson School of Business (JMSB) (November 2013), and the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) 
(December 2013). A working paper of this account is available upon request.  
  111
both a manifestation of Greenpeace's shaping ability, and a component of what 
contributed to Greenpeace's ability to shape its landscape. Furthermore, besides the 
changes at formal international institutions, Greenpeace NROs also experienced 
numerous victories in their respective countries.35  
5.2 Period 2 (1985-1991): Centralizing to engage into long jumps 
Period 2 was initiated following an unpredictable event: the bombing of the Rainbow 
Warrior. The event led to a significant increase in donations (see Graph 4). It also put 
the organization under greater scrutiny. Because the organization’s profile was 
becoming more prominent, the senior leadership engaged into a discussion on the future 
of the planet, as well as the future of Greenpeace, in an attempt to position Greenpeace 
for the long-term. This reflexivity about Greenpeace's goals and role in society occurred 
over the course of two years. It entailed discussions about what were Greenpeace's 
goals, what should be its priorities, and how the organization could reach its objectives. 
It was during this period that the goal of Greenpeace to shape the future of the planet 
became explicit: 
“The goal of Greenpeace is difficult to explain in one sentence. We are 
against war, pollution, and depletion of species. We want to save the 
planet and its inhabitants from any form of mass destruction. We are in 
favor of ecological healthy economic activities. We support peaceful 
revolution to conflict. We want to preserve the environment. However, we 
are realists. We recognize that people have an impact on their 
environment.” (Long Term Plan on the role of Greenpeace in Society, 
1988, p. 3) 
 
 By clarifying its goal, Greenpeace made it clear that it was operating with the 
perspective that the future could be shaped, which corresponds to an understanding of 
                                                        
35
 These victories are excluded from the data presentation because the key focus is on opportunities that 
can be defined as “superior” which, given Greenpeace's position, are international in nature.  
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the future as a future of desire (van der Heijden, 2004). They also made it explicit that 
they were not the only ones impacting the landscape, and that they had to be cognizant 
of this fact.   
 Besides the organization’s goal and its understanding that the future can be 
shaped, Greenpeace's senior leadership also made the means to achieve the 
organization’s goal explicit: influencing formal and informal institutions, including 
governments and corporations. The following quote from the Long-Term Plan provides 
evidence for this point: 
“Greenpeace causes people to change the activities of institutions. 
Greenpeace can stop environmental destruction for short periods through 
direct action. However, only institutions such as governments and 
corporations can make major changes. If Greenpeace wants to stop war 
and pollution, then it must influence people with the power to make 
institutions change their behavior. To achieve this on a global scale, 
Greenpeace Council should agree on a wide range of issues, including: 
which are the most important global environmental problems; which ones 
Greenpeace can deal with; which institutions can make the required 
changes; which ones Greenpeace should concentrate on; and how 
Greenpeace can best influence them.” (1988, Long Term Plan on 
Greenpeace methods, p. 3) 
 
These explicit beliefs about the future, Greenpeace's goals, and the means to achieve 
these goals influenced the criteria’s used to identify and select opportunities to pursue. 
To a minor extent, it also influenced the development of structures, processes, and 
practices to pursue opportunities and conduct actions that had the potential to influence 
external audiences that were aligned with the organization’s objectives.   
5.2.1 Rationality 
In terms of ability to identify opportunities, there was a clear intention on positioning 
Greenpeace as an international organization that has a global impact. This positioning 
was clear from the very beginning of the period and was no longer controversial within 
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the organization. For instance, in referring to the involvement of multinational 
corporations and multilateral banks in their “attempts to ‘carve up’ the world” (SGC 
1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to Council, p. 2) – a project that was highly 
controversial two years earlier –, the Executive Director could directly relate to the 
positioning of Greenpeace as one of a few organizations in a position to pursue these 
opportunities to justify the organization’s commitment:  
“This increasingly complex global environment is where Greenpeace must 
act and react, and make its specific contribution to the shaping of a world 
in peace and ecological balance. It is essential that we pool our resources 
to this end. In the international arena today there are really only two truly 
international non-governmental organizations: Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International.” (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to 
Council, p. 2) 
 
 This positioning was clear and influenced subsequent discussions with regards 
to opportunities. On that point, the challenge for Greenpeace was not identifying 
opportunities as much as selecting which opportunities should be pursued and how. 
This task was difficult because Greenpeace's newly acquired visibility made several 
individuals contact the organization concerning issues they were facing (i.e. the 
Executive Director was frequently contacted to provide tangible support from 
Greenpeace on a number of environmental and social issues). To make sense of what 
should be the opportunities the organization should pursue, the senior leadership 
initiated a strategic planning exercise:  
“I want to strongly emphasize that I do not anticipate that Greenpeace will 
be able to address all the major issues that we may be able to define 
through such an exercise. I do believe, however, that it would be extremely 
beneficial for us, both internally and in our external contacts, to be able to 
demonstrate that we do have a clear and well-defined perception of what is 
going on in the world today. By demonstrating our perception of the 
complexity of the global situation we can also make clear why we have 
chosen to work on some specific issues that we believe are the most 
crucial ones and those, which we expect to be successful in tackling in our 
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own unique way.” (SGC 1986 AGM, Communication of McTaggart to 
Council, p. 4) 
 
This exercise, which was limited to the senior leadership, was seen as a way to 
identify the opportunities that could maximize Greenpeace's impact. One outcome of 
this exercise was a list of issues in order of priorities. Some of these issues were more 
complex, as they were not issues that could be grasped easily through simple images. 
For instance, issues like the depletion of the ozone layer and climate change could not 
be physically seen. Furthermore, some of these issues were highly equivocal: contrary 
to issues like whaling where human action could clearly and unambiguously be 
associated with the depletion of whale stocks, issues on the list (e.g. global warming, 
depletion of the ozone layer, depletion of the genetic pool leading to a loss of 
biodiversity) encompassed a range of problems which, taken together, were 
symptomatic of more significant issues. As a result of this exercise, issues were put in 
order of priority based on (1) the urgency to act on them, and (2) the potential for 
Greenpeace to have an impact on them. The following quote from a Trustee from 
Germany illustrates how these two criteria were explicitly discussed by NROs as 
relevant for the organization:  
“Greenpeace should not aim at sorting out the most important 
environmental problems as targets for its campaign, but rather 
concentrate its efforts on areas, where it has the greatest impact on the 
public thinking. Greenpeace can contribute to and trigger change, not 
more and not less.” (Comment from the Trustee from Germany, SGC 
AGM 1987, p. 271) 
 
 
Meanwhile, in parallel to the discussions surrounding the Long-Term Plan, 
conversations were taking place on an annual basis to allocate resources. In order to 
facilitate discussions and process information to manage the resource allocation process, 
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senior leadership kept on building on issue areas which were representative of 
Greenpeace main orientations (see Figure 7 and 8). They also kept on discussing 
specific problems within these issue areas, as illustrated by the Graphs on resource 
allocations over time included in the previous sections. A major determinant for the 
approval of the pursuit of an opportunity was the proposal, which had to clearly define 
the objectives of a campaign, the timeline, and the expected outcome. The international 
coordinators, in collaboration with the senior leadership and NROs, were responsible 
for carrying this task. The way the process had been developed inherently favored 
opportunities that were related to what the organization was known for or was already 
involved with (i.e. water-based actions related to simple issues). Issues that could be 
easily identified, with a well-defined opportunity space that fit with the organization’s 
main orientations, continued to be favored throughout this process over more salient 
issues, or issues that were perhaps more detrimental to the future of the planet, and 
identified through the Long-Term Plan. 
5.2.2 Plasticity 
Greenpeace's ability to pursue opportunities was closely tied with the implementation 
of structures, practices, and processes that helped its decision-makers discuss 
opportunities across the organization and allocate resources to pursue them. Thanks to 
the centralization of activities that occurred during this period, the coordination of the 
work conducted by the different NROs facilitated the pursuit of opportunities that were 
global in scope. It also provided GPI greater control over the message and greater 
influence in the allocation of resources to specific issues/campaigns. The increase in 
donations that occurred following the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior (see Graph 4) 
also facilitated the funding of a number of new activities carried on by international 
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headquarters. All these resources proved to be effective when addressing issues that 
were relatively simple and falling well within Greenpeace's historical mandate, as we 
can see from the map representing the organization’s priorities over time (Figure 7 and 
8).  
In addition to the centralization of activities that enabled Greenpeace's ability to 
pursue opportunities, the organization started to develop greater flexibility in the way it 
conceptualized problems. This helped the organization develop projects to address 
issues that were localized (i.e. contained in a specific ecosystem) but not necessarily 
visible or that were more difficult to “sell”. They achieved this by playing between 
specific problems (e.g. emission of pollutants by specific industries) and ecosystems 
(e.g. the overall protection of a lake, sea, or land area). For instance, issues related to 
biocides and pesticides could be addressed by focusing on ecosystems, such as inland 
waters and the Great Lakes. By switching between ecosystems and specific problems, 
Greenpeace was able to think about problems in different ways and able to pursue 
“small wins” aligned with priorities (e.g. protection of the atmosphere, depletion of 
biodiversity, etc.) that might have been otherwise abandoned.  
Still, while Greenpeace was able to pursue opportunities already falling within 
established issue areas, the organization was struggling to pursue more complex issues, 
such as climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer. These two issues had been 
identified as priorities as early as 1986. Nevertheless, various attempts to introduce 
these issues within Greenpeace's portfolio failed to receive support or to be enacted. 
The following excerpt from the Long-Term Plan illustrates this point: 
“When the list of Greenpeace campaigns is compared to a list of the 
generally accepted major global problems it is clear that several problems 
are not addressed by us. None of the issues below are being addressed by 
Greenpeace in a substantial way: warming of the planet’s surface, 
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depletion of underground fresh water resources, mass destruction of 
vegetation and soil, depletion and manipulation of genetic resources via 
genetic engineering and economic control, non nuclear militarization. 
These topics give a broad indication that Greenpeace is still not dealing 
with some of the world’s most serious environmental problems” (Long-
Term Plan 1988, p. 22). 
 
Although opportunities had been identified, the organization kept on focusing 
on issues contained within a well-defined opportunity space (i.e. international 
institutions or a specific ecosystem with clear boundaries), and the opportunities tackled 
by the organization remained simple problems that could be grasped through simple 
images, despite the organizational foresight on the most salient issues threatening the 
planet. This situation prevailed until the end of the period, despite the allocation of 
resources to projects targeting issues identified though the Long-Term Plan. The 
allocation of resources for a potential campaign on Rainforest, for instance, was still 
opposed by certain offices, including Greenpeace Denmark (see SGC AGM 1989, p. 
15). In fact, it is only after a few years that a campaign to protect rainforests would 
receive a significant portion of the organization’s budget through the “Amazon” 
campaign as of 1997. The same goes for Genetic Engineering, which received formal 
approval for further investigations on the topic (see SGC AGM 1989, p. 16), but did not 
receive approval for a formal commitment by the organization until many years later. It 
is only in 1990 that these issues started to gain more traction within the organization, 
but even then, the level of commitment remained low with many NROs preferring to 
stay away from these issues in favor of more traditional issues.  
The reasons for the inability of the organization to pursue more complex 
opportunities are manifold. Some organizational members were skeptical about 
Greenpeace’s role with regards to these issues and the need to adopt explicit goals. This 
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required  international campaigners to consistently come back to Council to persuade 
organizational members of the importance of these issues for Greenpeace. For instance, 
climate change had been identified as crucial for the future of the planet, but it was still 
necessary to emphasize the role of Greenpeace in these issues:  
“Following on from his introduction, the Coordinator reiterated that the 
conclusions of the UN scientific process on climate change, agreed by 
governments, provided a valuable baseline for the campaign. The 
conclusions equated effectively to the elimination of fossil fuels as energy 
sources. Demonstrating this as being possible was Greenpeace's role - no 
other organization was likely to.” (SGC AGM 1990, p. 32) 
 
When a campaign against an oil producer was discussed internally, a year later, one 
member responded with the following: “Are we seriously discussing taking over an oil 
company? Are we out of our mind?” (Internal communication through Greenlink in 
relation with a proposal to conduct a campaign against an oil company, September 27th, 
1991). 
In addition, the process for the allocation of resources was considered deficient 
for the new directions to be favored by the organization: 
“The Board recognised the problems of annual resource allocation, both 
personnel and monetary, between the different marine animal projects and 
recommended that the Executive Director combine the current Greenpeace 
campaigns to protect whales, small cetaceans, and turtles into one larger unit. 
It is the Board's opinion that the marine animal/species issues could be 
better handled as a unified campaign. This would allow campaigners to be 
assigned to specific species projects based upon talent and programme need. 
The Board hoped that such a regrouping would give the organisation the 
flexibility it needs to deal with the changing emphases and priorities of 
these issues” (Board Meeting Minutes, August 28-30 1990, p. 2)  
 
This lack of flexibility came along with  the perception that Greenpeace had to 
find ways to better manage its internal diversity, which had to come through the voting 
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rights of NROs and the implementation of structures, processes, and practices that 
would foster the attention of NROs towards global concerns:  
“Every national office should be represented at Council’s, and that a 
practical structure, and not a voting structure, what was more important. UK 
suggested that the following questions were essential to the debate: "What 
resources are available to open national offices? What resources can be used 
to better understand different cultures? And what resources are available to 
support further expansion?" The UK would agree to expanding into regions 
where Greenpeace did not already have a presence on the basis of 
fundamental environmental problems.” (SGC AGM 1990, p. 10) 
 
“The USA stated that "reasonable representation" should bring about 
structures and processes which give voice to regional perspectives. USA 
said that all national offices unavoidably functioned nationally throughout 
the year, but that it was important they acted in a manner which reflected 
global rather than national concerns - even if it's only during the council 
Meeting. They suggested that a foundation for practical steps be drawn up.” 
(SGC AGM 1990, p. 10)  
 
 All in all, and despite the centralization of key functions at GPI, Greenpeace 
was struggling as an organization to pursue the opportunities identified through the 
Long-Term Plan.  
5.2.3 Shaping ability 
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape appeared to be enhanced compared to the 
previous period. Evidence of this can be found in the victories obtained at formal 
international institutions and through a combination of lobbying, campaigning, and 
non-violent direct actions (Graph 15): a worldwide ban on incinerating organochlorine 
waste at sea in 1988, a moratorium on high-seas large-scale driftnets in 1989, and the 
signing of a Treaty for a 50-year prohibition of all mineral exploitation in the Antarctic 
region in 1991. These victories occurred in parallel to a growing membership (Graph 4), 
which was considered as instrumental to Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape, 
providing additional legitimacy to Greenpeace’s actions.   
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If Greenpeace was able to shape the landscape for issues that were relatively 
simple, this was not the case for more complex issues, such as climate change and 
transportation. The organization was struggling with finding a way to legitimize new 
courses of actions with regards to these opportunities. This struggle can be explained by 
internal as well as external factors. Internally, organizational members were struggling 
to find projects that would be relevant to NROs (see section above on plasticity). 
Externally, organizational members were unable to influence governments to adopt 
pieces of legislations related to these issues. Part of the problem with that regard was 
that the landscape for these opportunities was part of a global common (Ansari, Wijen, 
& Gray, 2013) being constructed by a variety of actors. These actors included 
governments and corporations, a fact that was recognized by the senior leadership (see 
quote on beliefs from the Long-Term Plan on p. 117 and 118). This was a sharp 
contrast with other opportunities pursued by the organization where formal 
international institutions could be clearly identified. For instance, commercial whaling 
was governed by the International Whaling Commission; the depletion of specific 
species could be addressed through CITES; ecosystems like the North Sea or the 
Mediterranean sea could be protected by persuading a limited number of countries to 
adopt specific pieces of legislation. For issues like climate change or the depletion of 
ozone layer, there were no formal international institutions that could effectively impact 
the landscape as a whole. To impact the landscape with regards to these more complex 
opportunities, the organization had to identify potential small wins.  
Even though the organization kept on focusing on formal institutions, some 
individuals were cognizant of this weakness in Greenpeace's approach. In commenting 
on the Long-Term Plan, one trustee made the following remark: 
  121
“Greenpeace should not restrict itself to change the policies of governments. 
In modern societies government policies in many cases are short-term and 
reactive in the sense that they take up movements from the society and react 
to public pressure and special interest groups. It is certainly true, that 
corporations have more of a long-term plan, and we should try to influence 
their policies more than in the past. Again, we must not forget the general 
public and other constituents of society” (SGC AGM 1987, p. 275). 
 
One possible path was through the global practices of corporations, yet, 
Greenpeace had limited influence over these actors. The organization was also 
perceived anti-business. These two conditions did not help the organization in 
persuading businesses to change their practices. The organization thus kept on focusing 
on governments and international institutions until the end of the period when the 
organization obtained its first major “victory” when the publishing industry decided to 
adopt more sustainable practices. It is also around that time the Board of Directors 
requested the consideration of a number of alternatives by campaigners and executive 
directors to be more effective at influencing external audiences on environmental issues. 
The following requests from the Board provide evidence for the consensus that was 
starting to build around the need to broaden the different means used by the 
organization as well as its targets:   
“IV.3. Investigative television reports: The Board requested that the 
Communications Division General Manager should, when hired, analyse the 
costs and benefits of developing a series of Greenpeace investigative 
television reports. The Board requested the Executive Director and his 
Deputy to further develop this proposal. 
IV.4. Education: The Board requested the Executive Director and his Deputy 
to seek, with the relative campaigners, new approaches to education and 
educational projects taking into account the advantages and versatility of 
computer networks, for possible inclusion in the 1992 proposals. 
IV.5. Religion: The Board supported study of possibilities of influencing the 
major world religions to utilise their networks for environmental change.  
IV.6. Comic Books: The Board requested the Executive Director to further 
develop with the books division the idea of presenting comic book versions 
of all Greenpeace's campaigns.” (Board Meeting Minutes, February 1991, p. 
5) 
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Many of these ideas will eventually be explored, but not until signs of decline in 
membership and income would start to show (see next section).   
5.3 Period 3 (1991-1995): Solving the crisis and imagining “One Greenpeace” 
Period 3 was one of crisis. Membership and income were in decline (see Graph 4); the 
organization had also become more expensive to operate over the years (see Graph 11). 
These two conditions led to important financial difficulties for the organization. This 
translated into numerous requests to review Greenpeace's priorities, to revisit the 
principles behind Greenpeace's actions, as well as the way activities were organized. 
The most important initiative to solve the crisis was the Strategic Plan, officially 
initiated in October 1991: 
“The Board intends to define with the Executive Director clear international 
organisational priorities to increase the organisation's effectiveness in 
tackling global environmental challenges and to enhance internal consensus 
on the organisation's role. Both the 1987 Long Term Plan and the Survival 
Agenda Project provided useful work for the current direction. We will build 
upon this work through the development of a strategic plan. It is then the 
Board's intention to lay out a strategic direction for the organisation utilising 
fora for interaction with the organisation ie Council, Trustee, campaign and 
International Board meetings.” (October 24-25 Board of Directors 1991)  
 
The process concluded with the publication of the Strategic Plan, which included a 
formal mission statement and description of Greenpeace's role in society: 
“Greenpeace is a movement made up of people of many races and places, of 
diverse beliefs and lifestyles: people prepared to stand up for life in all its 
diversity, actively protecting the environment to ensure the vital functioning 
of natural systems in our lifetimes and beyond.” (Strategic Plan, 1993, p. 1) 
 
Besides providing Greenpeace with a formal identity and mission statement, the 
Strategic Planning exercise comprised a review of all Greenpeace's activities, including 
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its ability to identify opportunities, its ability to pursue them, and its ability to undertake 
actions that are successful at shaping the landscape.   
5.3.1 Rationality 
During the period of crisis, the ability (or inability) of Greenpeace to identify 
opportunities was pointed to as a reason for the difficulties encountered by the 
organization. This led to the creation of a number of working groups and roundtables 
falling under the Strategic Planning exercise to reflect on the main orientations of the 
organization, and the Global Issue Working Group to identify the “opportunities to be 
pursued” by the organization. The conclusion from the numerous groups was that the 
best positioning for Greenpeace was the one initiated in the previous years: to focus on 
global issues such as climate change, genetic engineering, and deforestation, organized 
according to orientations. The main challenge, from organizational members' 
perspective, was to obtain small wins that could serve the work of Greenpeace in 
persuading external actors to act on the aforementioned environmental problems.  
The first signs of difficulties were brought to the attention of the senior 
leadership in 1991 by Greenpeace Germany, which raised its concerns about the 
difficulties to engage with the orientations initiated following the Long-Term Plan. 
These concerns were mostly ignored, and Greenpeace Germany came back in 1992 
with a request to review priorities and opportunities. The purpose of the meeting was to 
try and clarify some misunderstandings on a number of issues resulting from recent, as 
well as ongoing, debates within the organization. In particular, these focused on the 
subject of the extent to which they were facing a world that deals with the question of 
the environment in new and more complex ways and how it affected their work. The 
conclusions from the group can be read as follow: 
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 “The fears expressed by GP Germany, GP Netherlands and GP UK, that 
the organization is moving away from environmental issues into other 
priorities, were largely removed. What is stated here are affirmations of 
common understandings about basic Greenpeace principles (particularly 
our independence) and ways of working which the group feels are shared 
by most if not all of the organization. However, there was concern 
expressed by the three offices that some recent debates questioned these 
agreed principles.” (Informal meeting held by Executive Directors in July 
1992) 
 
 In parallel to the discussions held by regional trustees and executive directors, 
the decrease in financial resources forced the organization to limit activities to a number 
of opportunities aligned with the main orientations of the organization. The 
campaigners submitted their own list of 16 priorities (tropical forests, ozone, global 
warming, chlorine, directed kills, nuclear industry, ocean ecosystems integrity, 
disarmament/militarization, agriculture, hazardous waste trade, paper-production cycle, 
fisheries, biotech, free trade and finance, Antarctica, dirty industry transfer)36 to be 
matched with 9 areas of work (ocean ecosystems, disarmament, nuclear industry, Heip, 
forests, agriculture, chlorine industry, global warming, ozone). The regional trustees 
then discussed these priorities, in addition to the board of directors. Again, the key 
questions were more about how to categorize issues and prioritize them rather than 
whether or not they were opportunities worth pursuing, as there was a clear consensus 
on the importance of these issues and how they were aligned with the objectives of the 
organization:  
 “Most of the issues identified address more than one of the goals, and 
some of them address all of the goals. As we tried to squeeze the issues 
under the goals, we found that the following 'fit’, more or less: To Protect 
Biodiversity (Ocean Ecosystems and Forests); To Protect the Atmosphere 
(Global Warming; Ozone); To Stop Toxic Pollution (Chlorine; HEIP); To 
Stop the Nuclear Threat (Civil Nuclear). Disarmament, whether or not it is 
                                                        
36
 Population was also raised as an issue of concern, but it was decided to not discuss this topic 
(confidential campaign team meeting minutes, May 18, 1992, p. 25) 
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restricted to nuclear testing, fits very uneasily under the Nuclear umbrella; 
and Agriculture could fit equally well under Taxies, where it has 
traditionally been categorized, or under Biodiversity.” (Extraordinary 
Board Meeting Minutes, May 1992, Annex 1 on priorities) 
 
“The Board thanks the International staff for the expeditious delivery of 
the Issues Papers. The Board reiterates its continued concern for the need 
to focus the organization, and to take into account the reduced resources. 
The organization must create a clear profile and avoid spreading resources 
too thinly over too great a number of issues.” (Board Meeting Minutes, 
June 19, 1992, p. 3) 
 
While the need to focus the organization on a more limited set of issues was clear, the 
way of identifying opportunities remained very much aligned with what had been done 
in the past. Meanwhile, if not all organizational members could agree on what 
Greenpeace should do, there was an agreement that Greenpeace's role was to undertake 
long-term projects, as illustrated by the following discussion from the 1992 AGM (p. 
5): 
“One of the main, if not the primary constant of Greenpeace's identity and 
success as an organisation over the past 20 years has been its dogged, 
long-term (generally 5-15 years) pursuit of key campaign goals, which 
engaged all of much of the organisation over a period of years in pursuit 
of agreed strategy: the Commercial Whaling Moratorium; an end to the 
large vessel based commercial harp seal hunt; LDC Radwaste Ban; the 
Ocean Incineration Ban; 50-year protection for Antarctica; the Basel Ban; 
etc.” (SGC 1992 AGM minutes, p. 5) 
 
As the financial difficulties encountered by the organization continued, it became 
clear that a broader discussion about the process to identify and select opportunities to 
pursue had to be revised. The discussion involving a number of organizational leaders 
on the national-international relations illustrates the consensus that emerged over the 
need to review this process: 
“There is a risk of longer term prioritization process: It could undermine our 
ability to react spontaneously to unforeseen events. Too much detailed 
forward planning doesn’t fit into matrix approach, it will have negative 
  126
effect on flexibility. Hard to make realistic long-term campaign plans, 
reality change constantly” (National international relations, June 7th1993, p. 
7, consensus reach upon a discussion led by Stephanie Mills that 
encompassed a number of strategic leaders from various departments and 
NROs) 
 
 This idea of seizing opportunities arising from unforeseen events continued to 
spread out across the organization and found its niche in the Strategic Plan report 
published in October of 1993. Within this report, there was an explicit recognition that 
the parameters that allowed Greenpeace to succeed in identifying opportunities in the 
past had changed, and they had to adapt accordingly:  
“We must observe and analyze our situation, then make judgements, but 
we should recognize that there will be much confusion along the way. 
Strategy and analysis must be fast, fluid, adaptive, and creative. In the 
hurricane of our chaos driven world, we certainly need the strategic 
clarity of our goals and objectives. Beyond that though, planning is 
largely a moment to moment series of good decisions that adapt to the 
chaos around us: what we grab, what we let go of, what we duck, what 
we throw, which way we jump.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, 
p. 2) 
 
 On how to work with opportunities to achieve organizational objectives, and the 
need to develop these objectives, it was proposed to favor simplicity in the definition of 
Greenpeace orientations, as well as greater flexibility for national organizations, to 
allow them to identify and seize opportunities for small wins:  
“A basis for clear and consistent messages to our opponents, supporters, 
fellow campaigners elsewhere, media and decision-makers. The 
Greenpeace mission – and its implications – should underpin every 
document we produce and every press conference we give. International 
and national campaign staff cooperate in the process of developing 
campaign proposals, defining policies and formulating goals, strategies, 
objectives and tactics. The basis of the relationship is the reality that the 
former are in the best position to judge what will contribute positively 
internationally to the global Greenpeace mission, while the latter are in the 
best position to judge what will or will not be effective in their respective 
countries.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 36) 
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Overall, with regards to Greenpeace's ability to identify opportunities, there was 
a recognition that it was not possible to predict or anticipate all possible courses of 
actions that could allow the organization to effectively shape the landscape. Many 
potential opportunities aligned with the organization’s objectives were to remain 
unforeseen until to occur, hence the need for greater flexibility. It was also believed that 
the organization had to become more focused, and that the number of campaigns should 
be reduced and prioritized, to favor the ecologically most relevant issues. 
5.3.2 Plasticity 
In line with the reflection that took place for the identification of opportunities, the 
ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities was also put under scrutiny. Based on the 
discussions held within the governance and the operational channels of Greenpeace, 
this ability can be described as weak. In fact, many issues identified as priorities were 
not being followed by NROs. Two issues reflect the inability of the organization to 
pursue opportunities in a coherent way: the use of fossil energy, which was contributing 
to climate change, and the development of genetically modified organisms (GMO), 
which was presumed to represent a danger for biodiversity. The following discussions 
held by the board and the campaign team in 1991 and 1992 illustrate this point that 
although opportunities could be identified, there was incapacity to follow the priorities 
established within the governance channels of the organization: 
“The Board found the alternative proposal from Greenpeace Switzerland, 
Belgium, Austria and the UK on Genetic Engineering well argued. 
However, the Board and Council agreed last year that Genetic Engineering 
would become a specific policy direction rather than a campaign. […] The 
Board does, however, agree that Genetic Engineering in itself is a very 
important issue. Greenpeace should continue to reflect on the priority and 
the level of resources it wishes to devote to this area given the financial 
situation.” (Board Meeting Minutes October 24-25, 1991, p. 3) 
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 “There is no clear oil campaign work being proposed by national offices, 
except for the ecosystem approach. There is no acceptance from some 
offices that the toxics campaign no longer exists. A lot of national offices 
are not reflecting international priorities” (Campaign Team Meeting, 
September 7, 1992) 
 
These difficulties continued throughout the period as the different boards and 
committees were concerned about finding a way to be more effective at pursuing and 
seizing opportunities. The structure of Greenpeace, in particular, was pointed to as a 
reason for the difficulties experienced by the organization: 
“There was agreement that the present organizational structure is not 
working. Not only is it non-representational of campaigns but it is also 
making the decision-making process erratic and difficult. Political 
Division and Comms are presently merged as a higher priority than 
Campaigns and there is no clear delineation of the Service Divisions' 
responsibilities. Their function and mandate need clarification.”(Campaign 
Team Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 1) 
 
And later on, building on a recent example where the structure prevented the diffusion 
of information, it was suggested that greater integration between the campaign and 
service division could enhance the effectiveness of Greenpeace at addressing emerging 
issues that could undermine the organization’s legitimacy: 
“Service Divisions should help convey the campaigns' messages but 
should not make these message themselves. Kelly raised her experience of 
an article in GP USAs magazine as an example of the potential negative 
impact of isolation of campaigns from service divisions such as comms 
and political division. In this example the magazine had published an 
article on Dupont which was also carried by the Swiss magazine. The 
editor of the Swiss magazine received a letter from Dupont disputing the 
facts the article presents. Kelly only found out about the article and the 
subsequent response from Dupont nearly two weeks after it had happened. 
The potential legal implications in this case are obvious.”  (Campaign 
Team Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 2) 
 
It was believed that greater integration could improve communications between units; it 
was also believed that it could help sustain a clear focus over time to engage 
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organizational members regardless of their organizational affiliation, both in terms of 
service division and location:  
“In terms of the planning process, establishing priority is about how much 
money we give to a project or campaign. However, this should not be the 
only criterion. It helps to provide a focus for the activities of the 
organisation over a period of time which would attempt to include drawing 
in high level of support from Service Divisions and also attempt to focus the 
priorities of national offices in a supportive way.”(Campaign Team Meeting 
Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 3) 
 
“As the organisation is addressing a wider range of issues the possibility 
for overlaps between campaigns is increasing. By exchanging and 
comparing the campaign policies, these areas can be more easily identified. 
The same policy format should be used in order to facilitate comparisons. 
It was agreed that having a policy is helpful in order to define the 
parameters of the debate.” (Campaign Team Meeting Confidential Minutes, 
March 25 1992, p. 2) 
 
In addition to Greenpeace's ineffective structures, the way the organization had grown 
made organizational members discuss more about processes than the actual issues that 
needed to be addressed, creating distractions that prevented them from focusing on their 
primary mission: 
“The reality is that the simple answers are not there. We are a complex 
organization in a complex world. Centralized planning does not work. […] 
Our growth and increased complexity has led to increasing bureaucracy and 
complexity of management and systems. Distracted by debates over 
ideology, preoccupied with planning and other processes divided by internal 
rifts over dogma and resource commitments, we debate endlessly.” (A 
Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3) 
 
Along with the need for greater integration across units, an enduring element often 
mentioned by organizational members as an explanation for Greenpeace's difficulties 
was the lack of flexibility. This came from the recognition that they did not have the 
ability to act on opportunities. For instance, some NROs were able to identify 
opportunities in line with the most salient issues threatening the planet, but NROs could 
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not effectively pursue these opportunities because they were not able to allocate 
resources to these opportunities quickly enough. The flexibility discussed by 
organizational members was associated with the allocation of operational and financial 
resources. It was perceived as necessary to be able to seize opportunities arising from 
unexpected events, as well as to promote initiatives by NROs.  
For operations, this flexibility was expected to come from the possibility of 
having individuals work on different campaigns, as opposed to the way where 
campaigners worked solely on their area of expertise: 
“It was felt that when a situation arises and campaigners need to work on a 
campaign other than their own, it may be preferable for them to remain 
within their campaign and highlight the other. Switching a campaigner 
from one campaign to another requires more planning.” (Campaign Team 
Meeting Confidential Minutes, March 25 1992, p. 2) 
 
Financial flexibility, on the other hand, concerned the funding of projects and the 
possibility to release funds on a quick notice. Although there was an agreement for the 
importance of flexibility, the question was how to enable it in practice and how to 
establish processes to release these funds when needed:  
“The Board acknowledges the organisation's positive response to the 
suggestion to establish a flexibility fund. Although, through the contingency 
fund, a certain amount of flexibility was ensured in the past, the Board 
recognises that the present campaigning climate demands the establishment 
of a definitive process to allow resources to be accessed quickly. The Board 
requests the ED as part of the proposal process to present clear guidelines 
for the use of the flexibility fund. It was noted that the guidelines should, in 
addition to establishing criteria, explain the process by which the funds can 
be accessed and outline a mechanism by which the use of these funds can be 
evaluated. The Board further advises the ED to ensure that financial and 
resource related flexibility should be built into all areas of the organisation's 
activities during the proposal process.” (Extraordinary Board of Directors 
Meeting Minutes, May 1992, p. 12) 
 
This flexibility was also called for in the way there was a mutual understanding that the 
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organizational structure had to be more flexible and that practices had to be clarified in 
order to make it practical for the organization:  
“Flexibility is needed both in the planning and practice of the organization’s 
structure. The lack of clarity that exists regarding the organization’s current 
working practices clearly shows that basing the organization on a 
hierarchical system of line management, and fitting our work into clearly 
defined boxes, does not work well, and especially not when management 
takes place over great distances.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 19-20) 
 
 “Flexibility is regarded as a key element for future campaigning. A pool of 
people with flexible roles will be needed; people who can be utilized where 
they are most effective. The timeframe for priority campaigns will range 
from one or two months, to one or two years, depending on the goals. It was 
also pointed out that part of the rationale for introducing the matrix 
approach to campaigning last year had been to enable the organization to 
mobilize considerable resources at short notice in order to address specific 
campaign goals not foreseen in campaign proposals. There is therefore a 
basis to work on ‘priority’ and ‘opportunistic’ campaigns within the existing 
structure, which should be further developed.” (SGC 1993 AGM Minutes, p. 
19-20) 
 
To develop greater flexibility, the strategic plan suggested the creation of rapid 
response teams – to seize opportunities created by unpredictable events –, the creation 
of area advisors – to identify lower-level opportunities –-, and the adoption of an 
explicit mission statement – to make sure the goals were clear to all organizational 
members. The most important measure, however, is the transformation of the resource 
allocation process to categorize opportunities according to three different types: 
ongoing, opportunistic, and priorities. By separating opportunities according to these 
three categories, the senior leadership wanted to be able to seize opportunities arising 
from unexpected events while simultaneously being able to continuously track issues as 
part of an ongoing process, to be able to develop projects that could contribute to 
reshape the environment, and allocate more resources to the ones gaining momentum.  
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Along with flexibility, stability was another dimension that had been identified 
as critical to Greenpeace's success. This stability concerned the structure of the 
organization to ensure that individuals had the opportunity to refine their understanding 
of the challenges faced in the implementation of a campaign:  
“As it relates to this discussion, there are three key points, which need to 
be accepted as requirements for co-ordinators (or whoever is responsible) 
to successfully pursue these goals over time: stability or constancy of staff 
over time; coordinators must have the authority and the support to keep 
the campaign focused on a clear internationally agreed objective, while at 
the same time recognising that decentralised, locally grounded 
implementation is critical to the success of our work; A focused, 
translatable global strategy: co-ordinators must be held accountable for 
establishing, pursuing, and ultimately implementing a clear international 
strategy, which both serves the international objectives of the campaign 
AND which is sufficiently grounded in national realities (through national 
staff) to make it work; and ultimately for achieving the objective of the 
campaign.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, p. 8) 
 
 
The form of stability discussed then also implied some form of continuity in the 
priorities of the organization, which had been changed almost on a yearly basis 
throughout the period, as we can see from Figure 8.   
 Finally, diversity was perceived both as a strength and a weakness of the 
organization. It was perceived as a strength because it was considered a key to shape 
the future of the planet, a motto that was explicitly included in the Strategic Plan:   
“We need to learn a lesson from the ecosystems we defend: our diversity is 
the key to our survival. Campaign diversity, cultural diversity, political 
diversity, and economic diversity: we need to focus the strength of our 
differences on shaping the future of the world, not let it divide us and 
threaten the future of Greenpeace. Say that they need to change more on 
diversity as well.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3) 
 
While a strength, it was also a weakness as Greenpeace had been unable to capture its 
benefits. This is a concern that could be observed through the numerous conflicts 
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between individuals from different NROs; it was also a concern that was openly 
discussed during the sessions that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of Greenpeace:  
“Nationalism plus nationalism plus nationalism does not equal 
internationalism. We should not be a federation. We need office 
exchanges - more substantial and longer term recruitment - not just 
people from different countries/regions. Also people who have diverse 
experience/perspective challenge ourselves to do away with stereotyping. 
GP needs to make fundamental commitment to being a global citizen 
with global principles (mission statement) change planning process so 
there is ONE GP plan, not a series of national and international plans. 
There should be pressure on key international GP decision-makers to 
learn/experience outside of their home country, with international 
presence on national boards.” (Team Campaign Meetings, 19930607 – 
National international relations, p. 6, consensus reached upon a 
discussion led by Stephanie Mills) 
 
Managing the diversity was also a question of practical concerns, as it was creating 
difficulties when it was time to develop coherent strategies:  
“NROs are developing strategic plans on their own, timing of international 
process is such that it is difficult to know what international plans are so they 
can be incorporated in national strategy. There is a need for more (detailed) 
planning in an integrated way between offices. National campaign 
coordinators and international coordinators should jointly develop proposals” 
(Campaign Team meeting on national international relations, June 7th 1993, p. 
7, consensus reached upon a discussion led by Stephanie Mills) 
 
 
Integration, along with the adoption of internationalism as a value, was seen as a way to 
build bridges across the different cultures, and to take advantage of this diversity. 
Internationalism, in particular, emphasized the global over the local and the notion that 
borders do not exist; it was seen as a philosophy that had to become central to 
Greenpeace's culture and identity: 
“True internationalism is about seeing ourselves in this way, as parts of the 
Greenpeace whole. If we wish to tackle global environmental problems, and 
ask nations to set aside short term self interest for the greater good, then we 
must be prepared to do the same.” (A Strategic Plan for Greenpeace, 1993, 
p. 12) 
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Despite having a vision as to what would allow the organization to identify, 
pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future, attempts to 
implement the plan proved to be largely unsuccessful. At the exception of a few 
initiatives, most of them created additional tensions and instability. As a result, acting 
on new opportunities was coming second to the reorganization, and the organization 
was still struggling to engage with more complex issues, such as genetic engineering, 
climate change, and global warming, despite a significant increase in the resources 
allocated to these issues (see previous Graphs on resource allocation). 
5.3.3 Shaping ability 
During this period, Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape was mixed. On one 
hand, the organization was still able to influence the adoption of agreements at formal 
international institutions (6, as shown on Graph 15). On the other hand, the organization 
had to recognize that its influence was fading and was struggling in having the impact it 
was aiming for. Reflecting on Greenpeace's decline in performance and inability to win 
campaigns, and the changes in the external parameters, the Executive Director 
summarized the difficulties encountered by Greenpeace this way:  
“The parameters of the external debate had changed, our issue became 
mainstream, our campaigning didn't adapt, we lost our confidence. We 
were attacked, and we were weak, off balance, preoccupied and divided. 
The biggest loser in all this struggle has been the effectiveness and 
efficiency of Greenpeace as a campaign organization.” (A Strategic Plan 
for Greenpeace, 1993, p. 3) 
 
These impressions on Greenpeace's fading influence were supported through a 
significant decline in membership and income that occurred between the years 1991 
and 1995 (see Graph 4).  
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 The diagnosis as to what was affecting Greenpeace's ability to shape the 
landscape relates to a number of factors. In referring to the pessimism regarding the 
declining influence of Greenpeace, both internally and externally, the Executive 
Director from Germany wrote the following comment in September 1991 to Steve 
Sawyer, International Executive Director: 
“This very negative sounding description coincides with what in our view 
is very successful work, especially in the last few months. […] In 
describing the situation it must be said that these successes have not been 
sufficiently noted, or have been preferred not to be noted, by the press, 
media and public. Our image consists in the main of the inflatable dinghy 
image. This is positive and important for us, but it is not sufficiently 
known, over and above this, that we carry out background work as well as 
actions, and that we are also involved in countless positive projects and 
attempts at solutions. This incomplete picture has not been able to 
reconcile our financial power, on the one hand, with the inflatable dinghy 
image on the other. The consequence must drawn from this - that we must 
present ourselves differently in public in the future. A further consequence 
is that a campaign's work with the press, media and public constitutes a 
central challenge per se; that is, such work has a value in itself, since it 
publicizes the organization and its activities and ultimately produces the 
public pressure we need in order to bring about changes. We believe that 
the notion that a campaign can be content with a specialist public must be 
critically scrutinized. We only achieved what we achieved in the paper 
campaign through bilateral talks with the industry and publishers because 
there is great respect for us publically. But we can only keep this respect 
for any length of time when we also make our work publicly credible.” 
(September 21st, 1991 – communication from Thilo Bolde to Steve Sawyer, 
reproduced in Top Management Team meeting, p. 39) 
 
Along with this diagnosis on Greenpeace's situation, the Executive Director for 
Germany made a number of recommendations, including a greater focus on solutions as 
a means to provide tangible evidence that the problems of concern for Greenpeace were 
not impossible to solve. In his communication to the International Executive Director, 
he continues: 
“The demand, made on us from the outside, that it is now time to provide 
solutions since environmental awareness already exists, is in our view 
double-edged. It is double-edged because solutions, at least partial ones, do 
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exist to a lot of problems. But these solutions are not put into practice on 
account of the political and economic balance of power. In the energy 
campaign, for example, we know what is necessary, that is, a decentralised 
energy supply, the increased use of alternative energy sources and the 
efficient use of energy. This does not come about because the economic 
circumstances do not allow it. We also know what is required to solve the 
problem of the destruction of the ozone layer, that is, stopping the 
production of chlorofluorocarbons and their substitutes. And we know too 
what is necessary in order to manufacture at least chlorine-free paper. This 
means that one of GP's primary tasks is to show that solutions already exist, 
and to gain acceptance of these solutions with political pressure.” 
(September 21st, 1991 – communication from Thilo Bolde to Steve Sawyer) 
 
This call came to be heard by organizational members, and a number of NROs started 
to work on potential solutions as an additional way to influence actors to engage with 
the path proposed by Greenpeace. The focus on solutions appeared to start paying off in 
the following year with the release of Greenfreeze, a technology that aimed to reduce 
the use of CFC in refrigerators and freezers, a gas that had been known to contribute to 
the destruction of the ozone layer. Commenting on the organization’s performance, a 
report from the board refers to this success: 
“Despite the turmoil we have succeeded in moving forward in our 
campaigns, and have achieved high media visibility and successes 
throughout the year: From Moruroa to Rio to Novaya Zemlya, to new 
concepts such as the CFC-free fridge, Greenpeace has continued to be at 
the forefront of the environmental movement throughout 1992.” (Report 
by the Board to Council, October 23rd 1992, Annex 1, p. 2-3) 
 
This reflection on the development of solutions as part of Greenpeace's portfolio of 
action alternatives came along with a call for a greater focus on multinational 
corporations. Globalization was a major trend in the world. If the organization was to 
succeed at shaping the landscape, influencing multinational corporations had to be 
central to Greenpeace's actions.  
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In addition to a greater focus on multinational corporations as an actor of 
influence, there was an agreement that they had to take advantage of every opportunity 
falling in line with their long-term objectives. This included opportunities generated by 
unpredictable events because these events enjoy significant visibility without the 
organization ‘pushing’ the issue in the media. Hence, the unpredictable events 
represented windows that could serve the organization by providing opportunities to 
connect causes and effects in people’s minds.  
Overall, Greenpeace was still influential during this period, but had to be more 
creative and active if it was to succeed in the long term. The organization attempted to 
diversify its targets as well as the different means it used to persuade external actors to 
change their behaviors. This led to some successes in shaping the landscape, but these 
successes did not necessarily correspond to high-impact successes. Instead, they can be 
described as small victories.  
5.4 Period 4 (1995-2001): Becoming ‘One Greenpeace’, a globally responsive 
organization 
The fourth period was one where Greenpeace's rationality, plasticity, and shaping 
ability were finally aligned, allowing the organization to create residuum of changes in 
the landscape. This period, the last one observed in this study, corresponds to a period 
where Greenpeace had developed enough flexibility to seize opportunities that were 
aligned with the higher order opportunities identified by the organization. This 
flexibility allowed Greenpeace to influence both formal institutions and global 
organizations, contributing to the enactment of the organization’s vision for the future.  
During Period 4, Greenpeace renewed with greater stability in its structure and 
processes through the program of reforms. The focus on engaging with the future was 
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explicit in the beliefs of the organization, and the vision behind the development of a 
new structure as well as the implementations of new rules were aligned with what was 
perceived as necessary changes if the organization was to be successful at shaping the 
landscape. The beliefs of the organization with regards to its role and mission are well 
illustrated in the following excerpt from the Global Presence Report:  
“Our self-understanding as [Greenpeace] as well as the public perception of 
[Greenpeace] is that of a global campaigning organization, which is 
worldwide present. We act (or at least try to act) as a catalyst for change in 
an internationally coordinated approach as "One [Greenpeace]", i.e. 
speaking with one voice, based on mutually agreed positions on a broad 
spectrum of issues which are adapted to different regions and countries in 
the world. These positions are the result of an intensive international 
discussion process with broad input from the [Greenpeace] presence's that 
form the global organization.”  (Greenpeace Global Presence report, 1998, p. 
2) 
 
The orientations of the organization with regards to the future of the planet had not 
changed at that point: the objectives were still the same. What had changed, however, is 
that the organization was actively seeking opportunities to reflect on changes in their 
environment, and how these changes had to be taken into consideration in Greenpeace's 
approach. Such discussions had become part of internal ongoing discussions, contrary 
to previous periods where such discussions were definite in time. The following 
discussion, held in 2000, is representative of these discussions and how they had 
become institutionalized within the organization’s processes:  
“The key changes we need to respond to have been the decline in the 
importance of national boundaries socially and politically, the rise of the 
Internet and new forms of communication, the networking of economies and 
the growth in the power and scope of transnational corporations. [Despite 
these changes] The vision and mission remained the same as they had 
always been. The vision is to have a clean, green and peaceful planet. The 
mission is the type of organization that Greenpeace is: one driven by spirit 
and strategy, confronting violence with peace and, above all, acting as a 
catalyst for bringing about profound environmental change. Greenpeace's 
role must change: it must become a truly global organization. Not 
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international, but transnational. If we can reach agreement on the role within 
the organization it will guide and encourage the necessary process of 
change.” (SGC January 2000 Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, p. 6) 
 
This new mindset was reflected in all spheres of Greenpeace's activities, as well as 
organizational members were constantly discussing how to improve their effectiveness 
as an organization with regards to all phases of engaging with the future: to identify 
potential opportunities aligned with the organization’s objectives, to pursue the 
identified opportunities, and to persuade actors in the environment to address the issues 
the organization was targeting.   
5.4.1 Rationality 
The ability of the organization to identify opportunities aligned with its vision for the 
future was characterized during this period by an explicit understanding that it was not 
possible for GPI to predict which courses of actions were more likely to succeed at 
shaping the landscape. The Brent Spar campaign, a campaign that went beyond any 
expectations, and that was not planned by GPI but by a NRO, played a major role in 
this recognition: 
“The [Brent Spar] campaign did not arise from a single 'issue box'. It is a 
positive factor that it was able to take place despite this. Of course no one 
in [Greenpeace] realized the full potential of the [Brent Spar] campaign in 
advance. At the time it was the powerful symbolic qualities of the target 
that attracted internal interest, together with its amenability to 
[Greenpeace] campaign methods, especially actions, and because it was 
expressive of [Greenpeace] core values - marine based, value led, etc. 
Because [Greenpeace] was sufficiently flexible to allow this campaign to 
go ahead it has opened up a whole new era, in my view, in our 
campaigning. Its redirective potential externally and for [Greenpeace] is 
huge and positive. It would have been a serious indictment if it had been 
planned because it did not fit in an issue box.” (SGC 1996 EDM Minutes, 
Brent Spar Evaluation, p. 5) 
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Hence, it was recognized by Greenpeace's senior leadership that although they 
could identify projects that had the potential to succeed, they could not predict which 
ones would succeed and through which course of action. This recognition translated 
into a different approach to identify potential opportunities. This started with the 
abandonment of a rigid template where the environment was defined in terms of issues:   
“Aside from what rigidly sticking to issue boxes would say about 
[Greenpeace], there are more general reasons why defining the 
environment in terms of issues is problematic and would result in missed 
opportunities - more so than ever post Brent Spar. Issues are seen as 
problems, which are contested. Science discovers and defines these 
problems and the diplomats and politicians then take over. Policy is 
developed – measures, and then targets and timetables are agreed. On the 
surface these processes look smooth and logical.” (SGC 1996 EDM 
Minutes, Brent Spar Evaluation, p. 6) 
 
The abandonment of rigid frames to define issues in the environment came along 
a call for greater flexibility in the process, as illustrated through the following 
quote taking from Council: “It was generally agreed that the campaign priorities 
were a good starting point but greater flexibility is needed to enable further 
refinements” (SGC AGM, 1997, p. 20). The case in point was that many 
opportunities were still unforeseen and required to be explored, more so than 
issues prioritized in the past. In referring to the list of issues being prioritized by 
the organization (which included climate change and the loss of biodiversity in 
forests as the top two priorities, as well as the protection of the global commons 
of the oceans, whales, the threat generated by genetic engineering, and the 
damages caused by persistent organic pollutants), the supporting documentation 
granted increased flexibility in terms of more specific objectives, as well as in 
the actions to be undertaken by the organization: 
“There will be a thorough debate about the future direction of what are 
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the broad goals and objectives. Questions such as how we take our work 
on new oil exploration beyond Northern Europe and North America, and 
how we might address the emerging objectives of the Amazon Forest 
campaign, outside the scope of the Long Term Strategic Plan this year 
and that will be developed through the normal planning process.” (SGC 
1997 AGM Annex 7 p. 5) 
 
The new approach consisted of establishing guidelines on what was important to 
the organization, and letting NROs work on projects that they believed had the potential 
to succeed. These guidelines were taking the form of broad issues, as exemplified in 
Figure 8, with an overall pool of resources for the whole organization. Then, they 
started to track projects that had the potential to succeed, to evaluate them and favor 
their diffusion to other countries once they proved to be successful (see note on Figure 
8). The objective of this approach was to focus on testing actions that could serve their 
objectives, as opposed to discussing what had the potential to work:  
“As part of the process of looking at hot issues, a series of discussions to 
identify long term or overarching goals for Greenpeace had been held by a 
small working group in the spring. The conclusion had been that this was 
not a productive way forward and that Greenpeace should focus more on 
doing and setting up mechanisms to encourage strategic innovation than 
through theoretical discussions.” (SGC 1998 AGM, p. 16) 
 
This latter point was associated with the ability to pursue opportunities as well as 
actions that were driving discussions on what had the potential to succeed, and vice-
versa. The role of GPI in the identification of opportunities was then to focus on broad 
priorities – to provide guidelines to NROs – and to track down projects that had the 
potential to contribute to the enactment of the vision of the organization for the future.  
5.4.2 Plasticity 
In line with the changes that took place in the way Greenpeace was identifying 
opportunities, the organization modified its structures, processes, and practices to 
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facilitate the pursuit of opportunities. Many of the changes were based on the Strategic 
Plan, but the changes were also based on several discussions that aimed to learn from 
successful campaigns. The Brent Spar campaign was particularly insightful because it 
occurred at a time when most campaigns were failing to attract attention in the media.  
 Central to the initiatives adopted throughout this period was the Program of 
Reforms which placed greater emphasis on stability in structures, to allow the 
organization to focus on its priorities:  
“The attempt to construct an appropriate and effective governance system 
that would resolve areas of conflict and ambiguity, had created extreme 
difficulties for the organisation over the past years. For the first time the 
organisation went beyond words, and had unanimously agreed the 
mechanisms to form a unified organisation through a reform programme 
that provided for strong international leadership and clear strategic decision-
making and direction organisation wide. It was widely agreed that the 
organisation should give itself the opportunity to work with the governance 
structure over the course of a few years, in order to be able to realistically 
evaluate its practical value. […] This approach would constructively 
contribute to the essential tasks of continuing and strengthening the 
emerging consolidation of the organisation, and free the organisation to 
concentrate on its international campaigns” (SGC AGM 1996, p. 5) 
 
The measures promoted to enhance Greenpeace's ability to seize opportunities 
included the adoption of simple goals to grant NROs sufficient autonomy to design 
projects that had the potential to succeed, and to test them they were also intended to 
facilitate the move of resources around the organization more quickly in order to seize 
emerging opportunities. A new resource allocation process was adopted that 
emphasized contingency as well as a ‘war fund of 10%’, and greater integration among 
the different units. This later point became central to the new organizational design as it 
was intended to foster greater collaboration between the different units without the 
involvement of GPI, and to facilitate the diffusion of information within the 
organization.   
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The adoption of these measures facilitated the work of NROs, permitting them 
to allocate time and efforts on different projects. These projects could later be replicated 
if they proved to be successful. A salient example of this greater capacity to pursue 
opportunities is the GMO campaign on soya beans. The GMO campaign was the result 
of close to 10 years of discussions on the issue. Many organizational members were 
skeptical of the value of focusing on the issue despite the fact that it was an issue of 
concern for Greenpeace. This led to numerous failures to engage with the issue despite 
a significant portion of the budget dedicated to the issue. It is only in 1997 that an 
initiative conducted by a NRO proved to be successful. Because of the new structure, it 
was possible to quickly take advantage of this win to pursue this opportunity in other 
locations. If it wasn’t for the new structure, the project might have never been approved.   
This newly acquired flexibility thus facilitated the work of NROs in pursuing 
novel opportunities. In light of the successes obtained, the organization went a few 
steps further by adopting a real option-reasoning approach to the tracking of projects:  
“For the purpose of maximizing the opportunities for creating successful 
campaigns, a range of Key Opportunities have been identified which have 
the potential to "go global". These projects will initially be modestly funded, 
while a large contingency is held available to provide the required funding 
for those that achieve global breakthrough.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 6) 
 
“ The responsibility for defining the criteria for key opportunities lies with 
the national and international executive and the campaigns- the Board's 
role is to create the conditions to ensure that great campaigns can happen. 
A small amount of initial funding is available to the agreed key 
opportunities in order to see how each will develop. If things go well, a 
large contingency fund is available to ensure adequate funding thereafter.” 
(SGC AGM 2000, p. 11) 
 
The senior leadership could later track down these different projects to allocate 
additional resources to the ones that proved to be successful. These developments 
came along with “Increased emphasis on developing and funding new ways of 
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campaigning and public engagement” and “Developing new ways of working and 
allocating our resources” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 6).  
Throughout the period, and despite the changes that had taken place, diversity 
remained central to what was perceived as central to Greenpeace's ability to identify 
and pursue opportunities:  
“We need to be able to campaign in different ways in different countries. 
While core beliefs remain the same, the characteristics of our campaigning 
style may vary. Currently the organisation tends to measure success against 
traditional Greenpeace methods, and we therefore have to broaden our 
understanding of different cultures and conditions and evaluate effectiveness 
within the local context. Diversity is a strength of the organisation. However, 
diversification of the Greenpeace presence world-wide must be considered 
within a social and political context and not be based on value-judgements. 
Kristen explained that what is meant by diversification in Greenpeace terms 
is 'the expectation’ of a common set of principles and ethos whilst 
acknowledging the different methods of putting these principles into 
practice'.” (SGC AGM September 1997, p. 20-21) 
 
“[…] The organisation needs to be more effective globally, requiring more 
co-ordinated action and resource allocation. The sentence 'We are not a 
federation nor a collection of nationally-based grassroots organisations' 
needs to be balanced by a statement that Greenpeace is committed to 
safeguard national and regional differences within the organisation and to 
reflect those existing in the real world, thereby recognising and reflecting 
the social tensions present in society today.” (AGM 1998 p. 15 when 
discussing about areas for improvement) 
 
The value given to diversity came along with a desire to implement a culture of 
continuous improvements, whereas organizational members were aiming for greater 
effectiveness and efficiency in the way the organization was run: 
“The only fixed points are the organisation's values and its mission: 
anything else can be changed, and everything should be tried. Cornelia said 
that the recent experience of attempting to establish the Global Campaign 
Budget illustrated the problems of introducing change; in this case to 
effectively apply funds to agreed strategic priorities world-wide. The fact 
that there is no agreement yet on a Global Campaign Budget is as much due 
to structural (governance) problems, as it is a communications problem and 
a lack of will.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 5). 
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“Other outcomes so far from the Blue Sky discussions include: the creation 
of Global Teams; the creation of Centres of Excellence, whereby global 
tasks will be delegated to the location where they can be most effectively 
performed; the creation of the Campaign Council and the Executive Council 
to improve NRO/GPI communication and decision making. 
Peter concluded by saying that it is important that while we talk and 
experiment with various approaches to improve our global campaign 
performance, we also attempt to become "One Greenpeace", even before the 
required changes to the rules and structure have been determined. We must 
strive to become globally-minded, rather than nationally-minded and 
attempt to the best of our ability to act as One Greenpeace.” (SGC AGM 
2000, p. 5) 
 
Overall, the ability of Greenpeace to pursue opportunities could be described as 
improved compared to the previous period. This is supported by the results obtained by 
the organization despite relatively stable resources available to organizational members.  
5.4.3 Shaping ability 
Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape proved to be greatly improved during this 
period. Evidence of this can be found in the support they received from supporters, with 
increases in income and membership from 1998 to 2002 (see Graph 4), but also in the 
increase in the number of international agreements addressing issues of concerns at 
international institutions (15 between 1996 and 2002 for an average of 2.5 a year – see 
Graph 15) and in the number of changes in the global practices of MNEs that could 
directly be attributed to Greenpeace's actions (6 between 1996 and 2002; and later on, 
20 between 2003 and 200637).  
Early signs that the organization’s shaping ability was improving were obtained 
through surveys conducted on their behalf. Reports from Opinion Leader Research 
from 1996 show a net increase from 1994 in the perception influential leaders had of 
                                                        
37
 Greenpeace International archives do not cover the years following 2004; furthermore, very little 
documentation is available after the year 2002. Thilo Bode resigned in 2001, but many of the current 
structures are part of his legacy. This suggests that the philosophy that was in place from 2003 to 2006 
remained very similar to the one that carried the organization over following 1995.  
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Greenpeace's ability to influence governments and businesses and the effectiveness of 
Greenpeace's lobbyist in their communications (internal report from Opinion Leader 
Research, 1996). These surveys showed that Greenpeace was increasingly perceived as 
a legitimate actor in the landscape and that the people that had been in communication 
with organizational members were more receptive to their message.  
The successes obtained by Greenpeace were largely attributed to the 
implementation of “One Greenpeace”, which permitted greater flexibility but also 
greater consistency and integration across the organization. Reflecting on the GMO 
campaign to learn from the successes obtained with the issue, the executive director of 
Greenpeace provided the following explanation:  
“The capacity of [Greenpeace International] to conduct effective 
international campaigns has significantly increased under the leadership of 
Elaine and Kelly, who have made progress with the problems of joint 
campaign funding and extra territorial activities. Examples of campaign 
achievements include the GMO campaign, which, despite having the 
smallest campaign budget, has had the largest public impact. It was a well-
run campaign, using a global campaign team approach, and helped force 
large agro-chemical companies in Europe to rethink their strategies.” (SGC 
1999 AGM Minutes, p. 7)  
 
The GMO campaign was one that was highly controversial within Greenpeace 
for many years. If it was not for “One Greenpeace”, which favored greater flexibility in 
the allocation of resources, the project might have never materialized. Through greater 
flexibility in the way tasks were handled internally, resources shifted from one 
opportunity to another and opportunities nested into meta-issues were scaled up across 
the organization once they proved to be successful, Greenpeace was able to seize new 
opportunities as they arose. Based on evidence that the organization had been able to 
legitimize new opportunities in a specific location, it could then build on its experience 
to replicate its actions to other locations. With that regard, the list of successes obtained 
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throughout 1999 provide evidence of the changes that had taken place in the recent 
years and that contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the future:  
“The toxic campaign was particularly successful in Japan in 1999. This 
was the result of a concerted effort on behalf of Greenpeace offices 
worldwide. The Campaign was also successful in Europe with the 
emergency ban on PVC toys in the EU.  
The Tokairnora nuclear accident in Japan contributed to raising the issue 
of the safety of nuclear power. The Japanese office is to be congratulated 
for its excellent work on nuclear issues in recent months and its quick 
reaction following the incident.  
The GMO campaign made great strides last year. It has been extremely 
successful, both in Western Europe and in certain sectors of US society. 
One of the measures of this was the drop in the price of Monsanto shares. 
However, industry is still committed to further development in this area. 
The challenge for Greenpeace is to offer an alternative, organic vision for 
the future while not underrating the problems caused by hunger in the 
developing world.” (SGC AGM 2000, p. 14-15) 
 
Nevertheless, it was believed that the ability to shape the landscape could still be 
improved, as it was perceived that Greenpeace was not having the impact it should:  
“One of the areas in which Greenpeace needs considerable improvement is 
in media and communication. I feel the outside world exaggerates our 
ability to communicate, because it underestimates the reality that the 
actions of Greenpeace, (at least the really successful actions which inspire 
people,) embody the message itself. Nowadays, we have much more to say. 
It is surprising that less than five percent of the German population is 
aware that Greenfreeze was developed and pushed onto the market by 
Greenpeace. Recognition of Greenpeace's name in the US is widespread, 
but knowledge of anything we've done beyond saving whales and seals in 
the 70s and 80s is shockingly low. We rely too much on hard news, are not 
sufficiently using the potential of new media and images. It is also a 
significant shortcoming that Greenpeace does not yet have an international 
and organisation-wide media monitoring and analysis system. If one of the 
most important campaign goals is to create a public debate, it is hard to 
believe that we do not have a good international system of monitoring the 
impact of our campaigns in the media and in the wider public.” (Board 
Report to Council, AGM 2000, p. 15) 
 
Overall, Greenpeace's shaping ability was ramping up during this period: the 
organization had been able to influence important actors in the landscape, to adopt 
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practices more in line with the vision of Greenpeace with regards to the future; it had 
obtained some successes in influencing the adoption of agreements at international 
institutions; it had also been able to increase its profile in the media. These successes 
were in large part attributable to the changes initiated in the previous period following 
the publication of the Strategic Plan, and the new mindset adopted following the arrival 
of Thilo Bolde.   
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Table 7: Rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability across periods 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 
Rationality Rationality Rationality Rationality 
The senior leadership decides to focus 
on a limited number of issues. These 
issues are relatively simple and 
unambiguous. They are international in 
scope and fall, for the most part, under 
the regulation of international 
institutions. Issue areas are used to 
facilitate discussions, and the issues 
that reach a consensus are the ones 
being prioritized. 
The senior leadership builds on 
Greenpeace's notoriety to engage into 
distant foresight on the most salient 
issues threatening the planet. Through 
this exercise, a list of issues to be 
addressed by the organization is 
established based on the importance of 
the issue and the impact the 
organization can have. Most of these 
issues are more complex than the ones 
that had been undertaken by the 
organization until then. 
 
The senior leadership reflects on what 
Greenpeace is about and what made 
Greenpeace successful in the past. After 
discussions, the list of priorities 
established in the previous period is 
carried over. There is recognition, 
however, that tackling these issues 
cannot be achieved through detailed 
planning, but requires seizing 
opportunities that emerge as a result of 
unforeseen events. 
 
Learning from an important victory, the 
senior leadership recognizes that they 
can identify potential opportunities for 
small wins, but that they can’t identify 
which ones will succeed and through 
which course of actions. They modify 
their approach by providing guidelines 
to NROs, and grant them the mandate 
to identify opportunities and develop 
solutions falling under these guidelines. 
 
Plasticity Plasticity Plasticity Plasticity 
The ability of Greenpeace to act on the 
identified opportunities required greater 
coordination between the different 
NROs under the leadership of GPI, 
responsible for unifying the different 
groups, set the plan, and execute the 
pre-defined strategy on the issue with 
the collaboration of NROs. Because the 
opportunity was unequivocal, the 
landscape well defined, and the 
organization still at a nascent stage, 
simple communication processes were 
sufficient to engage with the 
opportunity. 
The ability of Greenpeace to act on the 
identified opportunities was believed to 
be dependent on a greater centralization 
of activities, with GPI acting as the 
‘conductor’, and exercising greater 
control over the different activities of 
the organization. This mode of 
operations was successful for some 
opportunities, but proved to be less 
effective for more complex issues 
whereas more flexibility was deemed 
important.   
The ability of Greenpeace to act on 
opportunities was believed to be 
associated with ‘One Greenpeace’, a 
single organization working towards 
the same goals. It was also believed that 
greater flexibility was required to seize 
opportunities arising from unforeseen 
events. Instability, however, made it 
difficult to pursue opportunities. 
The ability of Greenpeace to act on 
opportunities was believed to be 
associated with greater integration and 
flexibility. The role of GPI was to 
develop a common ground for NROs to 
operate, and to give them general 
guidelines to develop projects that 
would allow the organization to move 
towards its overarching goals.  
 
Shaping Ability Shaping Ability Shaping Ability Shaping Ability 
The organization proved to be able to 
shape the landscape for an issue 
contained within a well-defined 
opportunity space with identifiable 
actors, which contributed to the 
reputation of the organization. 
The organization enhanced its ability to 
shape the landscape for issues 
contained within a well-defined 
opportunity space, but encountered 
difficulties for more complex issues. 
The shaping ability of the organization 
is showing signs of decline as it 
struggles to impact the landscape for 
what is seen as the role of Greenpeace 
for the future. 
The shaping ability of the organization 
is ramping up, as it has been able to 
influence important actors in the 
landscape to adopt practices more in 
line with the vision of Greenpeace with 
regards to the future. 
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5.5 Rationality, plasticity and shaping ability across periods 
The comparison of rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability across the different periods of 
Greenpeace is summarized in Table 5. The comparison of these different periods with regards 
to the aforementioned abilities highlights the importance of three properties: flexibility, 
diversity, and stability. The importance of these three properties was highlighted through the 
period of crisis (Period 3), when Greenpeace experienced a decline in income and a 
stagnation of its influence. This led to reflexivity on what the organization was about, what 
made the organization successful in the past, what explained its difficulties, and how it should 
do things in the future to become more effective at shaping the future. The subsequent 
successes obtained during the “One Greenpeace” period (Period 4), following the 
institutionalization of structures, processes, and practices that permitted to enable greater 
flexibility and stability, and to benefit from Greenpeace diversity, provided additional support 
for the importance of these properties in engaging with the future.  
Flexibility was explicitly mentioned by organizational members at different times 
throughout Greenpeace history, and became an explicit aspiration for the organization during 
Period 3. The absence of flexibility with regards to the planning process, the processing of 
information, and the allocation of resources were identified as reasons for the difficulties 
encountered by the organization in identifying, pursuing, and seizing opportunities. Before 
the crisis, some organizational members attempted to warn the senior leadership for the need 
to develop greater flexibility. The discussions that aimed to identify the challenges faced by 
Greenpeace during the period of crisis reiterated this point. The subsequent period, when a 
variety of measures had been implemented to become more flexible, provides support for the 
importance of flexibility and how it could be achieved.  
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Stability was explicitly mentioned by organizational members as a reason for the 
difficulties in moving forward with the Strategic Plan during Period 3; it could also be 
observed through the changes in structures, processes, and priorities that occurred during that 
same period. Instability undermined Greenpeace's ability to shape the landscape, especially 
when the organization attempted to focus on more complex problems. Complex problems 
required deeper knowledge about issues and greater persistence when it came to communicate 
them to external audiences: instability in focus created confusion; instability in structures and 
processes created distractions. These undermined the ability of Greenpeace to identify and 
pursue opportunities. The arrival of Thilo Bolde contributed to implement greater stability 
throughout Period 4. Greater stability allowed the organization to keep its focus on a limited 
set of issues and to dedicate its attention to the pursuit of opportunities instead of on 
organizational issues related to the structuration of the work conducted by organizational 
members. It also contributed to improve structures and processes through incremental 
changes as opposed to radical change that momentarily worsen the ability of the organization 
to engage with the future.  
Diversity could also be observed though the data, being identified by organizational 
members as both a strength and a weakness. Diversity could first be observed in the portfolio 
of action alternatives that was expanded during Period 1, and re-emphasized during Period 2, 
3, and 4, as it had become part of the philosophy of the organization to persuade external 
audiences to adopt more sustainable behaviors. Diversity was also institutional and structural, 
especially following the events surrounding the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior: Greenpeace 
became more culturally and professionally diverse and the senior leadership aimed for greater 
diversity; they also aimed to build on the different organizational affiliations (e.g. science unit, 
media and communications, by region and country) to maximize the organization’s impact. 
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Contrary to properties of flexibility and stability, however, diversity represented a challenge 
on its own that had to be thought of by organizational members, especially during Period 3. 
Diversity can create barriers among individuals which, if not addressed, can undermine the 
ability of the organization to pursue a coherent strategy. The period of crisis highlighted this 
point and forced organizational members to find ways to benefit from their diversity.  
Overall, flexibility, stability, and diversity contributed to enhance the ability of 
Greenpeace to engage with the future. Flexibility allowed the organization to identify, pursue, 
and seize opportunities arising from unforeseen events, and to test and experiment different 
ways to engage with external audiences. Stability allowed organizational members to focus 
on issues, as opposed to discussions over structure and processes. Diversity contributed to 
approach problems in different ways and to develop creative ways to engage with external 
audiences. These properties allowed the organization to enhance its ability to shape the 
landscape by facilitating the identification of opportunities that could contribute to enact its 
vision for the future, by facilitating the allocation of resources to work on projects that had 
the potential to make the pursuit of these opportunities successful, and by enhancing the 
ability of the organization to create the residuum of changes necessary to shape the landscape. 
In the next section, I elaborate further on the specific dimensions of these properties that 
contributed to Greenpeace's successes, why and how they mattered, as well as what 
Greenpeace did to enable them in practice.  
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Chapter 6 
6. Flexibility, stability, and diversity, and their Impact on 
engaging with the future 
Flexibility, stability, and diversity contributed to making Greenpeace more effective at 
engaging with the future. Over the years, they became institutionalized within the 
organization structures, processes, and practices. They were also interconnected with one 
another. In this section, I provide a description of what these properties are, an explanation as 
to why they matter and how they can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the 
future, and how they were enabled within the Greenpeace context. I conclude with a brief 
discussion on the interrelatedness of these properties.  
6.1 Flexibility 
The first dimension highlighted by the case of Greenpeace is the importance of flexibility. 
While flexibility is not a guarantee of success, the absence of flexibility can undermine an 
organization’s ability to think creatively about problems and their ability to pursue and seize 
opportunities that are time sensitive. Aligned with this observation, I move forward the 
following baseline proposition: 
Proposition 1: Flexibility enhances the ability of an organization to identify, 
pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future. 
 
There are three forms of flexibility that can contribute to enhance an organization’s ability to 
engage with the future: cognitive flexibility, operational flexibility, and financial flexibility. 
The three forms are interrelated, but not mutually exclusive. Below, I detail why these 
  154
dimensions of flexibility matter, how they manifested in the case of Greenpeace, and what 
the organization did to enable these properties in practice.  
6.1.1 Cognitive flexibility 
Cognitive flexibility corresponds to the ability to look at problems from different angles and 
to process information without the constraint of rigid frames of reference. It is enabled 
primarily within the governance and operational channels of the organization.  
 The frames of reference I refer to correspond to those used by organizational 
members to process information and allocate resources. They take the form of issue areas. 
Cognitive frames contributed to guide actions and focused organizational members’ attention 
on a specific set of issues. Cognitive frames were adopted in the early years of the 
organization to facilitate decision-making across NROs. These cognitive frames were 
developed initially around two criterions: the scope of an issue (international or not) and the 
type of issue (oceans, nuclear, wildlife, etc.). This categorization was deemed necessary to 
facilitate the discussions held within the governance channels of the organization to help 
decision-makers reach an agreement over what mattered for the organization and where 
resources should be allocated. As illustrated in the previous chapter with regards to periods 1 
and 2, these frames contributed to the effective functioning of the organization by providing a 
map of the landscape that could be used by organizational members, and by creating 
boundaries in terms of what to look for in the environment. Opportunities falling outside 
those frames were more difficult to process.  
Cognitive frames can be flexible to allow organizational members to look at the 
problems from different angles, to find ways to effectively communicate the message with 
external audiences. First evidence of this form of flexibility can be found when the 
organization started to operate by using both specific problems and ecosystems to describe 
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issues within issue areas (see Year 1984 in Figure 7). This move between specific problems 
and ecosystems proved particularly useful for issues that were more equivocal and/or less 
visible, such as the release of pollutants in the environment by industries and the causes 
leading to climate change and depletion of the ozone layer. The issues themselves were not 
necessarily visible, but because the ecosystem was, it made it possible for organizational 
members to persuade external actors of the importance of an issue. It thus expanded the 
portfolio of alternatives available to organizational members. It also allowed organizational 
members to test different ways of influencing external actors and to adjust how the landscape 
was conceptualized to make it fit with specific objectives. For instance, the protection of an 
ecosystem could pass by the protection of a specie (e.g. sea turtles or seals), and the depletion 
of the atmosphere could pass by the protection of a rare ecosystem (e.g. Antarctica). This 
first form of flexibility in the way to frame problems is related to the ability to identify 
opportunities and to pursue them successfully.  
Cognitive frames, once institutionalized, can negatively affect the ability of an 
organization to pursue new opportunities. At the turn of the 90s, issue areas provided 
Greenpeace members a detailed list of specific problems the organization was focusing on. 
Within these issue areas, there was some flexibility in terms of the conceptualization of 
problems. There was no flexibility, however, in terms of the need for an issue to fall within 
an issue area if the opportunity was to be pursued by the organization. This prevented 
organizational members from engaging with more ambiguous opportunities or opportunities 
that did not fit squarely into the issue areas used to identify opportunities and coordinate 
projects associated with these opportunities. This lack of cognitive flexibility translated into 
missed opportunities due to the incapacity of organizational members to make these 
opportunities fit into the agreed templates, and through the inability of the organization to 
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process information related to these opportunities. To overcome this limitation, Greenpeace 
had to enhance its cognitive flexibility.  
Cognitive flexibility is thus expected to enhance an organization’s ability to engage 
with the future through its effect on the ability of an organization to identify and pursue 
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Building on the Greenpeace case, 
I thus propose the following: 
Proposition 1a: Cognitive flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
Cognitive flexibility was developed through greater integration across functions and 
issue areas with the adoption of simple rules that could be used to guide actions. By favoring 
simple rules rather than focusing on specific problems addressed through issue areas, the 
organization was able to enhance its effectiveness. Through the use of simple guidelines 
about what the organization is about instead of developing detailed plans to be rolled out 
across the organization, it provided NROs with sufficient flexibility to identify opportunities 
nested into these guidelines and seize windows of opportunities; it also facilitated 
coordination between NROs, favoring discussions about opportunities to communicate issues 
to the public and to create residuum of changes in the environment instead of discussions 
about structures and processes.  
6.1.2 Operational flexibility 
Operational flexibility corresponds to the ability of an organization to shift resources around, 
to refocus the attention of the organization on the most salient opportunities at a specific 
point in time. This flexibility can be geared towards projects that are gaining momentum, 
towards windows of opportunity that arose from unforeseen events, or to opportunities that 
require further organizational commitment in the short term.  
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 In the context of Greenpeace, operational flexibility was important to move fast and 
to be able to pursue opportunities that were time sensitive. It became particularly important 
when the organization shifted from a focus on simple, easy-to-grasp problems to more 
complex and ambiguous issues. These more complex opportunities were crossing several 
issue areas and, sometimes, the opportunities associated with these meta-issues were not even 
associated with existing areas of expertise. When competing internally with more traditional 
issues for resources, or issues that could more easily be captured (either because they could 
be explained through simple images or because there was no causal ambiguity), complex 
issues were at a disadvantage because organizational members could not necessarily make 
sense of how to frame them or how to position these issues, to seize opportunities that would 
bring the organization closer to its objectives with regards to these meta-issues. The lack of 
operational flexibility made it close to impossible to shift resources towards these issues to 
explore new action alternatives that could permit the enactment of Greenpeace’s vision. 
 Operational flexibility contributed to enhance Greenpeace's ability to engage with the 
future by letting NROs decide as to how to allocate their time and efforts within the agreed 
templates. This facilitated the development of solutions to problems that were the core of the 
organization’s mission and to shift resources around for opportunities that were time 
sensitive. Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following:   
Proposition 1b: Operational flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability 
to pursue and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
Operational flexibility was enabled by keeping planning to a minimum. While the 
initial planning process included defined objectives, scripted strategies, and short, medium 
and long-term course of actions, the new planning process was based on a mix of detailed 
plans and general guidelines as to how time and resources should be allocated. These 
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measures were combined with the development of rapid response teams to deal with 
unpredictable events that opened windows of opportunity.  
Greater integration across functions and NROs allowed the organization to benefit 
from greater operational flexibility. Integration favored information sharing, making it easier 
to engage the resources of the organization when the right opportunity came up. Integration 
also had a complementary effect: it reduced politics in favor of the development of a more 
united voice, and added to the cognitive flexibility of the organization by forcing 
organizational members to think outside of their focal point of reference within the 
organization (i.e. their functional division, NRO, or issue area). Integration of activities was 
obtained through group meetings, direct contact between organizational members of different 
functions and units, and the creation of area advisors acting as boundary spanners.  
In addition to changes in the planning process and greater integration, the adoption of 
an internationalist approach to problems contributed to foster the benefits of operational 
flexibility. By ignoring borders between countries, organizational members could more easily 
identify with the global goals of the organization and seek opportunities in their home 
country that were aligned with the main objectives of the organization.  
6.1.3 Financial flexibility 
Financial flexibility corresponds to the ability to allocate financial resources to a project on 
short notice. It implies maintaining resources for projects that have a high probability of 
success when they come along. For example, funding several projects at an early stage, and 
increasing or limiting the allocation of further resources to these projects at later stages of the 
innovation process, can affect innovation performance by spreading an organization’s bets on 
unproven innovative endeavors. This way of approaching financial resource allocation is 
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based on the recognition that it is not possible to predict which projects will prove to be 
successful when it comes to pursuing opportunities.  
Financial flexibility is important because it gives one organization the means to seize 
opportunities whenever they emerge, and goes hand-in-hand with operational flexibility. 
Having the flexibility to free funds on a quick notice can help seize opportunities that require 
fast decision-making and to fund projects that are gaining momentum. Financial flexibility 
became an issue for Greenpeace early on as close to all of its resources were allocated to 
specific projects. In the first two periods, Greenpeace had a tendency to allocate close to all 
of its financial resources to specific projects through the budgeting process, a process that 
was utterly hierarchical and controlled by the upper echelons of the organization. Later on, 
however, financial flexibility became part of the strategy of the organization, especially when 
small wins were necessary to persuade external actors on issues of interest for the 
organization.  
Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following: 
Proposition 1c: Financial flexibility will enhance an organization’s ability to 
pursue and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
In the case of Greenpeace, financial flexibility was enabled through the allocation of a 
significant portion of their budget to contingencies and flexible funds. These funds were used 
to finance operations associated with unexpected events occurring in the environment and to 
provide funding for the diffusion of projects that proved more successful than expected. 
Contingencies were not subject to discussions held within the governance channels: these 
were funds available on short notice and managed within the operational channels of the 
organization.  
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6.2 Stability 
The second dimension highlighted by the Greenpeace data is the importance of stability. 
Stability, in the case under investigation, should be thought in terms of relative stability as 
opposed to rigidity, as the organization was always on the move and could not be considered 
static at any point in time. Stability can contribute to enhance an organization’s ability to 
capture signals in its environment, to develop a set of processes that allow organizational 
members to focus on the organization’s goals and objectives, and to understand their role 
with regards to these objectives. While stability is not a guarantee of success, instability can 
undermine an organization’s ability to engage with the future by altering its capacity to 
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its objectives. In line with this observation, I 
move forward the following baseline proposition: 
Proposition 2: Stability will enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the 
future.  
 
Building on the narrative from Chapter 6, I focus on three forms of stability: 
attentional stability, structural stability, and stability in processes. When Greenpeace 
presented these three forms of stability, it was easier for the organization to focus on the 
identification of opportunities and on the development of creative ways to communicate its 
vision for the future. I discuss below these three forms of stability in relation with flexibility.  
6.2.1 Attentional stability 
Attentional stability corresponds to how sustained is the focus of the organization on a set of 
key issues and can enhance an organization’s ability to capture cues signaling problems, 
threats, and opportunities in its environment. In the case of Greenpeace, the focus of the 
organization was conveyed through priorities and issue areas. Evidence for the importance of 
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attentional stability in engaging with the future can be observed across the different periods 
of Greenpeace history.  
Attentional stability favors the identification of opportunities. This is particularly true 
when the issues of concern are difficult to communicate to external audiences. Through 
attentional stability, it is possible to keep focusing on a given problem, to “see” different 
ways to frame an issue. Attentional stability also contributes to foster organizational 
engagement through a clear direction for the organization by signaling what is important to 
organizational employees and stakeholders. This can increase the odds of attracting 
information concerning potential opportunities that might have been otherwise missed. In the 
case of Greenpeace, attentional stability was not always necessary or obvious, but it proved 
to be more important once the organization started to tackle increasingly complex issues. 
When the organization was focusing on relatively simple issues, this was not problematic: 
opportunities could still be identified without stability as individuals could grasp the issues 
quickly and identify opportunities in a straightforward manner.  Complex issues, such as 
genetic engineering for instance, on the other hand, had to wait close to a decade before 
tangible opportunities leading to success could be identified. Without sustained attention to 
the issue and the landscape, however, a solution to the problem might not have been found 
out as opportunities might not have been identified, or organizational members would have 
been unable to capture cues that could be exploited by the organization.  
 In addition to its effect on the ability to identify opportunities, attentional stability is 
important for the pursuit of opportunities. Engaging with the future is expected to occur over 
long periods of time and is also expected to elicit resistance. With that regard, Greenpeace 
has always been controversial, experiencing several drawbacks before tangible successes 
could be obtained. In the absence of a clear focus that is sustained over time, an organization 
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is at risk of losing direction by reducing organizational members’ engagement towards the 
direction the organization is aiming for. In some instances, the benefits of attentional stability 
could only be observed years later. Complex issues, such as genetic engineering, for instance, 
had to wait close to a decade before tangible opportunities leading to success could be 
identified. Yet, these successes opened up new possibilities as they contributed to make sense 
of how to enact a particular vision of the future. Without sustained attention to the issue and 
the landscape, however, a solution to the problem might not have been found out as 
opportunities might not have been identified or organizational members might not have been 
able to capture cues to be exploited. 
 Attentional stability is thus expected to enhance an organization’s ability to engage 
with the future through its effect on the ability of an organization to identify and pursue 
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape. Building on the case of 
Greenpeace, I thus propose the following: 
Proposition 2a: Attentional stability will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
 In the case of Greenpeace, attentional stability was enabled through the designation of 
a set of key issues as central concerns for the organization. By 1988, the senior leadership 
had already identified a number of key issues they wanted the organization to focus on in the 
long term. As the data shows, the organization reduced the number of key issues it was 
tracking in the subsequent years when resources became more scarce, but maintained its 
focus across the subsequent periods. By sustaining its focus on a limited set of key issues, it 
allowed the organization to capture cues signaling potential opportunities and to identify 
ways to simplify problems.  
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Attentional stability was also enabled in combination with cognitive flexibility by 
using different labels for the key concerns of the organization, discriminating between 
“priority” (i.e. issue/campaign prioritized at a given point in time) and “ongoing” (i.e. issues 
that are long-term priorities for the organization) issues/campaigns. By labeling issues and 
campaigns as “ongoing”, the senior leadership was able to keep the issues alive within the 
organization, maintaining them in sight without necessarily putting them at the center of the 
organization’s activities all of the time.38 This granted the organization greater flexibility: it 
allowed for faster decision-making to avoid discussions about whether or not a given issue 
should lead to action by the organization; it also provided NROs some guidance for issues 
that are deemed important by the organization but for which there is no immediate solutions 
or actions that have the potential to influence external actors. To ensure the key issues of 
concern for the organization were well entrenched into organizational members’ and 
volunteers’ minds, they made them part of the identity of the organization (i.e. “What we 
are”), through the adoption of a clear definition for the organization’s mission. They also 
ensured that this mission statement was included in all of Greenpeace's communications.  
6.2.2 Structural stability 
Structural stability corresponds to the extent to which the formal and informal governance 
and operational channels are sustained over time.39 With regards to the ability of an 
organization to engage with the future, instability can undermine the ability of the 
organization to identify and seize opportunities. In the case of Greenpeace, instability 
                                                        
38
 This later move allowed the organization to combine attentional stability with cognitive flexibility, to favor 
the identification of opportunities and the development of solutions aligned with the long-term objectives of the 
organization.  
39
 This does not negate the need, in some circumstances, to undertake major restructuration. This is to 
emphasize the benefits of stability for the identification and the pursuit of opportunities aligned with the vision 
of the organization.   
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manifested through the major restructuration efforts that took place to shape current 
governance and operational structures of Greenpeace.  
Structural stability is important because instability in structures can create distractions, 
which in turn can affect attentional stability. Greenpeace experienced such distraction when 
important structural changes occurred. These reorganizations ‘distracted’ the organization 
from its primary mission, as internal documents demonstrate. As more stable structures 
became implemented, organizational members could once again focus on the identification 
and pursuit of these opportunities. Organizational members could then build on these stable 
structures to improve the functioning of the organization and focus on efficiencies and 
effectiveness using the stable elements as an anchoring point for organizational members to 
diffuse information and discuss organizational and environmental issues. 
In addition to the distractions associated with reorganizations, instability in structures 
proved to greatly inhibit Greenpeace's ability to identify and pursue opportunities. It created 
“holes” within the organization in terms of roles and responsibilities. These “holes” created 
confusion internally and externally. Internally, organizational members did not know to 
whom they should pass important information with regards to a specific portfolio. Externally, 
stakeholders were confused as to who they should communicate information to that could 
lead to the identification of new opportunities to pursue. Building on the case of Greenpeace, 
I thus propose the following:  
Proposition 2b: Structural stability will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify and pursue opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
In the context of Greenpeace, structural stability was enabled through reflexivity 
about Greenpeace's identity, to understand what are the enduring principles behind 
Greenpeace's actions. It is thus the period of structural instability that led to greater structural 
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stability. Structural stability included the establishment of formal committees to favor greater 
collaboration across levels,  to clarify the lines of authority, and to facilitate the work 
between the NROs. This included the adoption of clear formal and informal principles of 
action and the development of a culture of collaboration with internationalism as one of the 
core values of the organization. Following the major restructuration, however, it is the 
conduct of ongoing discussions about structures that contributed to foster stability. These 
ongoing discussions were part of a ‘continuous improvement’ philosophy to make the 
structures more stable, to avoid the need of major changes.  
6.2.3 Stability in processes 
Stability in processes corresponds to the extent to which processes are sustained over time 
and can be thought of in terms of two dimensions: whether or not processes are maintained 
over time and whether or not the processes are finite in time (e.g. process begins with a 
starting point and an outcome), or continuous (e.g. the process is an ongoing process and the 
outcome cannot be said to be finite). In the case of Greenpeace, the key processes of concern 
were those related to the strategy of the organization, the identification and selection of 
opportunities, and the ones that allow an organization to act on opportunities.   
Stability in processes can enhance the ability of an organization to identify and seize 
opportunities aligned with its vision for the future. This dimension of stability is important 
because instability in processes can prevent organizational members from discussing 
priorities, as discussions over processes can supersede discussions over opportunities and 
means to seize these opportunities. Instability in processes can also create confusion among 
organizational members. This can impact the efficiency of the organization in processing 
information and making fast decisions, altering its capacity to capture cues in its environment, 
and to act based on these cues. In the case of Greenpeace, instability in processes occurred at 
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two different instances, but it manifested in different ways. Instability in the early years when 
processes were yet to be implemented was one instance. This first phase of instability, 
discussed at length in the previous chapter, was caused by the absence of established 
processes to identify and discuss opportunities. Instability also occurred during the period of 
transition. In this second instance, it was caused by a desire to seek greater effectiveness in 
the way Greenpeace was identifying and pursuing opportunities.  
Stability in processes affects the ability of an organization to engage with the future. 
It contributes to maintaining organizational members engagement with a focus on 
effectiveness and efficiency. It also fosters stability in structure by favoring incremental 
changes as opposed to major restructuration. Finally, it fosters attentional stability by 
reducing the distractions generated by organizational restructuration. All in all, stability in 
processes contributes to enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the future by letting 
organizational members focus on the identification and the pursuit of opportunities. Building 
on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following: 
Proposition 2c: Stability in processes will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify and pursue opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
  
In the case of Greenpeace, making the processes of the organization an ongoing 
commitment enabled stability in processes. This can be illustrated through three strategic 
planning exercises. The first one was conducted by the senior leadership to give direction to 
the organization. The publication of the Long-Term Plan meant the end of the strategic 
planning exercise. The second exercise involved the whole organization and, once again, the 
publication of the report, the Strategic Plan, meant the end of the process. The third exercise, 
however, was a continuous process, where vision and implementation were part of this 
exercise, effectively making the process an ongoing commitment. By making strategy an 
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ongoing process as opposed as to a periodic event, Greenpeace leadership had been able to 
make effectiveness and efficiencies an entire part of the process. The same approach was 
adopted for the identification of priorities, shifting from a finite process and ending with the 
allocation of funds to specific opportunities, to the categorization of opportunities between 
ongoing, opportunistic and priority campaigns. In this case, the establishment of procedures 
for flexible funds contributed to make the decision-making process an ongoing process as 
opposed to a process limited to certain windows within the year, and the ongoing campaigns 
were continuous as opposed to periodic, allowing organizational members to keep their 
engagement with the issues.  
6.3 Diversity 
Diversity corresponds to the extent to which a particular dimension of the organization can 
be described as heterogeneous or homogeneous. Diversity can enhance an organization’s 
ability to engage with the future by allowing one organization to approach problems from 
different angles, to gather more information that can be used to understand problems and 
make sense of issues, and to enhance its capacity to communicate with external audiences. In 
the case of Greenpeace, creativity appeared to become more important as the organization 
started to deal with issues that were more complex and difficult to communicate to external 
audiences. By leveraging diversity, Greenpeace's organizational members were able to work 
on more projects simultaneously and increase their likelihood of developing innovative 
solutions to the problems they were encountering. Aligned with these observations, I build on 
the following proposition as a basis for this section:  
Proposition 3: Diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to engage with 
the future.  
 
Diversity can be looked at from a variety of angles. I focus on three different 
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dimensions of diversity highlighted by the Greenpeace case: institutional diversity (which 
encompasses a range of dimensions, including cultural, political and economic diversity), 
structural diversity (which refers to the diversity within Greenpeace's internal structures), and 
diversity in the portfolio of action alternatives (which Greenpeace organizational members 
refer to as campaign diversity). I also provide details as to what Greenpeace organizational 
members did to mitigate the risk of seeing diversity undermine their efforts at shaping the 
landscape.  
6.3.1 Institutional diversity 
Institutional diversity corresponds to diversity in value systems. Sources of institutional 
diversity include organizational cultures, national cultures, and professional background. In 
the case under investigation, the sources of institutional diversity were coming primarily 
from the national cultures from the countries in which Greenpeace was operating, and from 
the professional background of Greenpeace members.  
Institutional diversity can enhance the possibilities of the organization in terms of 
identification of opportunities. The differences in value systems allow for looking at 
problems from different angles based on an individual’s cultural and professional background. 
Within Greenpeace, institutional diversity led to the adoption of the precautionary principle, 
favored by European countries, as an explicit value of the organization. This changed the 
approach of the organization in terms of how to look at issues. It also increased the number 
of potential opportunities by virtue of what was valued by individuals in different countries. 
The expansion in different countries could inform about issues in these countries, some of 
them being salient issues that found their ramifications in other countries. This provided 
opportunities to connect issues that at first seemed unrelated, but were nevertheless 
interconnected. For instance, the description of the Amazon found its roots in the demand for 
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wood products by northern countries. The institutional diversity of Greenpeace permitted to 
make this link, leading to the identification of an important opportunity for the organization.    
Institutional diversity can also enhance the organization’s ability to seize 
opportunities by providing additional ways to communicate with external audiences. This 
occurs in multiple ways, first because institutional diversity provides greater legitimacy when 
it comes to engage with actors in the landscape. This is especially true when the message has 
to cross boundaries because the problem to address is universal. Communicating with 
someone who shares a similar background can contribute to make the communication more 
effective, increasing the odds that the message will be well received. This is something that 
has helped Greenpeace in numerous instances, starting with its first major victory, the 
moratorium on commercial whaling. Second, institutional diversity can also enhance the 
organization’s ability to seize opportunities by providing opportunities to test and experiment 
actions in different locations and with different audiences. While successful actions can then 
be diffused across the organization, unsuccessful actions can provide information as to how 
to improve the organization’s actions with a given type of opportunity. Third, institutional 
diversity can enhance the creativity of the organization, which can help innovate when it 
comes to diffuse a message in different ways. Hence, institutional diversity increases the 
potential to expand the pool of action alternatives available to organizational members. 
Overall, institutional diversity can enhance the ability of an organization to engage 
with the future through the identification of opportunities and the actions that can be taken to 
communicate with external audiences. Building on the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the 
following: 
Proposition 3a: Institutional diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
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While institutional diversity can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with the 
future, it can also lead to conflicts and prevent organizational members from leveraging this 
diversity to their benefit. These conflicts can be particularly detrimental when it comes to 
pursue opportunities, as organizational members can diverge in their understanding of what 
should be prioritized and how. Greenpeace being born as a global organization, institutional 
diversity was a de facto characteristic of the organization. Yet, it is only after a few years that 
the organization was able to cope with this diversity, to explicitly build on it to enhance its 
ability to shape the landscape.  
Institutional diversity was first managed by developing common goals, establishing 
clear processes, and by providing definitions for what was to be discussed. Then, it was 
enabled by seeking more diversity and developing a culture where organizational members 
valued diversity. First, the senior leadership aimed for greater diversity by favoring the 
organization’s expansion into regions of the world where they were not present (e.g. Latin 
America, Asia, Africa). Second, they internalized this diversity by granting voting rights to 
all NROs. This sent the signal that all countries mattered in deciding on the main orientations 
of the organization. It also signaled that all countries could be a source of solution to the 
problems the organization was trying to address. Third, organizational members adopted 
“internationalism” as an explicit value of the organization. All in all, these measures 
contributed to foster organizational members' engagement toward the organization’s goals 
and to make explicit that diversity was important if the organization was to succeed in its 
mission.  
6.3.2 Structural diversity 
Structural diversity corresponds to diversity in organizational affiliations. Organizational 
affiliations can include national versus international affiliation, functional unit, or service line.  
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A structurally diverse group is one where members differ in their organizational affiliations, 
roles, and positions. In the case of Greenpeace, structural diversity was found in the 
development of centers of excellence (R&D, science, politics, economy, media, direct actions, 
etc.), in the different national and regional affiliations, and in the affiliation of certain 
organizational members with specific issues (e.g. marine ecosystems, biodiversity, etc.).  
Structural diversity can enhance the ability to identify potential opportunities. This 
structural diversity allows the organization to draw from different knowledge sources. By 
virtue of their organizational affiliation (service line, geography, etc.), individuals can make 
bridges with external actors to obtain new information that can potentially lead to new 
opportunities. Within Greenpeace, the development of centers of excellence contributed to 
develop specialized knowledge and to build bridges with other organizations. For instance, a 
TV panel in the UK invited a representative of Greenpeace with expertise in agriculture and 
affiliated with the science unit to speak. This member, because of his affiliation with the 
scientific community, was presented with an opportunity to enter into a discussion on GMOs 
before GMOs were even commercialized. This discussion later led to an invitation to visit the 
facilities of a major player in the field. This opportunity would not have presented itself if 
Greenpeace did not have a separation between the developments of specific knowledge with 
regards to issues through centers of excellence and the conduct of actions. 
Differences in organizational affiliations can also increase the possibilities in terms of 
identification of opportunities. A structurally diverse group allows for searches in multiple 
landscapes. This allows for the identification of more potential opportunities and to favor the 
selection of the ones that have the most potential in terms of shaping the landscape. In the 
case of Greenpeace, it permitted the organization to build from both local searches, as well as 
global searches, when it came to identify opportunities that had the potential to succeed at 
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enacting a particular vision of the future. It also permitted to pursue several opportunities 
simultaneously, to track them and build on the ones that proved to be more successful.  
The benefits of structural diversity are not limited to the identification and the pursuit 
of opportunities through multiple landscapes all at the same time. Structural diversity can 
also enhance the ability of the organization to pursue opportunities through the identification 
of best practices that improve the efficiency of the organization. If several units within the 
same organization experiment in different ways to manage their operations, their practices 
can be assessed and compared facilitating the identification and the diffusion of the ones that 
are deemed superior. In the case of Greenpeace, the differences in the way NROs were 
managed contributed to enrich the set of “best practices” by building on the varied 
experiences of the NROs. It is because of the different organizational affiliations that these 
practices developed. Without diversity in structures, different sets of practices would not 
necessarily have developed, limiting the possibilities in terms of developing internally best 
practices.  
Finally, structural diversity can contribute to enhance and expand the portfolio of 
action alternatives. Through a variety of affiliations within the same organization, it is 
possible to make these affiliations in competition to innovate; it is also expected that different 
units will approach problems in different ways. This later effect has been well 
institutionalized within Greenpeace and has contributed to the successes experienced by the 
organization over the years.   
Overall, institutional diversity can enhance the ability of an organization to engage 
with the future through the identification and the pursuit of opportunities and the 
development of actions that have the potential to create residuum of changes. Building on the 
case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following: 
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Proposition 3b: Structural diversity will enhance an organization’s ability to 
identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
 
Similar to institutional diversity, structural diversity can only enhance an 
organization’s ability to engage with the future if mechanisms are in place to benefit from it. 
In the case of Greenpeace, the benefits of structural diversity were enabled through greater 
integration. It is through the different joint committee meetings that structural diversity 
enabled creativity and contributed to enhance the organization’s ability to engage with the 
future. The joint committees provided open forums where all groups could expose their 
opinions on issues and share their understanding of what was important for the future. This is 
also where they could develop knowledge as to who they should pass information to if 
knowledge was gained and they thought it could be beneficial to other units within 
Greenpeace. 
6.3.3 Diversity of action alternatives 
Action alternatives include proposals, routines, programs, and procedures. Action alternatives 
are used to seize opportunities that can serve the enactment of a vision for the future. 
Diversity in action alternatives implies that the organization can build from a variety of 
alternatives when it comes to undertake actions that have the potential to enact the 
environment. In the case of Greenpeace, diversity in actions meant carrying a portfolio of 
alternatives that included direct actions, protests, lobbying, as well as a focus on highlighting 
the problems and providing solutions that addressed those problems. These actions targeted a 
variety of actors in the environment. 
Drawing from a diverse set of action alternatives can enhance the flexibility of the 
organization when it comes to identify and seize opportunities. It provides different ways to 
shape the landscape by focusing on different opportunity spaces and different constituents of 
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the landscape. It also reduces the time to action when it comes to seize opportunities that are 
time sensitive, such as the ones generated by unforeseen events or the ones dictated by 
windows of opportunity. Building from the case of Greenpeace, I thus propose the following: 
Proposition 3c: Diversity in action alternatives will enhance an organization’s 
ability to identify, pursue, and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the 
future.  
 
For Greenpeace, diversity in action alternatives became part of a core tenet of the 
organization. This recognition came from reflexivity on what had made the organization 
successful in the past. It was nurtured by making the means to end part of the mission 
statement of the organization. It was favored through the allocation of a budget dedicated 
specifically to innovation, to expand this portfolio of action alternatives. It was planned 
within their campaigns by combining different action alternatives to their long-term strategies 
to attempt to shape the landscape through different opportunity spaces. 
6.4 Flexibility, stability and diversity in review 
In this section, I presented flexibility, stability and diversity as three properties that can 
enhance an organization's ability to engage with the future. Each of these properties and 
associate dimensions play a role in the identification and the pursuit of opportunities, as well 
as the conduct of actions that have the potential to enact the environment. Figure 9 provides 
an illustration for the overall propositions that have been brought forward in this chapter. 
It is important to emphasize that although the properties were presented separately, 
they can be considered as complementary. Cognitive flexibility and attentional stability, for 
instance, go hand-in-hand when it comes to focus on problems and to think creatively about 
them. The same goes for flexibility and diversity, whereas diversity aims to enrich the 
different ways the organization approaches problems and whereas flexibility allows for 
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redirecting resources quickly on the solutions that will have proved to be more successful. 
Hence, although each dimension has an effect in and of itself on either the ability of the 
organization to identify, pursue, and/or seize opportunities aligned with its vision of the 
future, it is through their joint effect that they are expected to have the most impact on the 
ability of the organization to engage with the future. 
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Figure 9: Flexibility, Stability, and Diversity in Review 
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Chapter 7 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
My dissertation has aimed to shed light on how an organization can enhance its ability to 
engage with the future. It built on the case of Greenpeace – an organization that explicitly 
dedicates its actions to the enactment of a particular vision of the future – to develop insights 
on the properties that can help an organization identify and seize opportunities aligned with 
its vision for the future. This allowed me to reconstruct the intentions, structures, processes, 
and practices of Greenpeace, to better understand what contributed to the organization’s 
successes and how. What my research showed is that if an organization is to engage with the 
future with the goal to enact a particular vision of the future, the organization will benefit 
from flexibility, stability and diversity. 
 In this section, I first discuss flexibility, stability and diversity in relation with the 
literature. I then discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice, focusing 
on the implications for organization theory, strategic management, and international 
management. I conclude with a discussion on the limitations and boundary conditions, the 
transferability of the insights, and the implications for future research directions.  
7.1 Flexibility, stability, and diversity in organizations 
The properties identified in this dissertation are not new. In fact, they relate to a variety of 
literatures concerned with the effectiveness and the efficiency of organizations. Most 
research looked at these properties in the perspective of organizations adapting to a changing 
environment. I looked at these from the perspective of an organization that aims to shape the 
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future by conducting actions that force individuals to change their behavior. Here, I discuss 
my findings in relation with previous literature. 
7.1.1 Cognitive, financial and operational flexibility 
Flexibility is the first property that was discussed in this dissertation. It is also a property that 
has been the object of many contributions in the management literature. It has previously 
been identified as key to superior performance (e.g. Eisenhardt et al., 2010; Okhuysen & 
Eisenhardt, 2002). It has also been identified as a specific feature of firms navigating towards 
the future (e.g. Narayanan & Fahey, 2004). Because these organizations need to adjust to 
feedback from their actions with regards to the way they are engaged with the future, 
strategic, technical, and operational flexibility had previously been identified as central to 
their ability to survive in a changing environment (Narayanan & Fahey, 2004). In the case 
under investigation, three dimensions of flexibility were identified: cognitive flexibility, 
financial flexibility, and operational flexibility.  
The first dimension, cognitive flexibility, corresponds to the ability to look at 
problems from different angles. It is closely linked with the notion of cognitive frames and 
mental maps that help individuals make sense of a complex world (Walsh, 1995). At the 
organizational level, cognitive frames are used to create and share understanding (Lyles & 
Mitroff, 1980; Morgan, 1980). They articulate what is important and unimportant depending 
on underlying values, shared interests, and common understandings (Kiesler & Sproull, 
1982). They constitute the frameworks behind organizational belief systems and rationalities, 
on which formal analyses, policies, and procedures are based. They are constructed over time 
through the shared experiences of organizational members and have long been known to 
influence actions and performance in organizations (Huff, 1990; Porac & Thomas, 2002). 
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Cognitive flexibility, as discussed here, has been presented as central to Greenpeace's 
ability to identify and seize opportunities. Cognitive flexibility was obtained by adopting 
simple rules that could be followed by all organizational members in terms of which issues 
were deemed important for the organization. This approach contributed to enhance 
Greenpeace's shaping ability. These findings are in line with previous literature that found 
simple rules do positively affect performance (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt et al., 
2010). This is explained by the fact that it can facilitate coordination and accelerate decision-
making, allowing the organization to seize windows of opportunities (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2011); it can also allow for greater structure in unpredictable environments (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). In that, my study provides additional insights that are 
grounded in an empirical case.  
The two other dimensions of flexibility, financial flexibility and operational flexibility, 
are closely tied with one another. Financial flexibility was related to the allocation of 
resources. Financial resources are typically allocated through the resource allocation process. 
Operational flexibility, on the other hand, was related to the possibility to deploy and move 
resources around on a quick basis. Both relate to resource allocation processes, which have 
long been known to impact organizations (Bower, 1970; Levinthal, 2005). They can explain 
the development of strategy in organizations (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
Noda & Bower, 1996), and impact organizational performance depending on how this 
process is managed (Burgelman, 1991; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014).  
Over the years, Greenpeace came to adopt a real option-reasoning approach, keeping 
both financial and operational resources on hold with their time, to ensure that when a time-
sensitive opportunity or a project gaining momentum would appear, the organization would 
have the resources to quickly seize these opportunities. This is, in essence, an approach that 
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has been proposed in previous literature (Allen & Pantzalis, 1996; Barnett, 2008; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2014). A key distinction, however, was in the aims pursued by the organization.  
While flexibility has been identified as crucial for the identification and the pursuit of 
opportunities aligned with one’s vision for the future, it also emphasized the important role of 
integration in enabling flexibility. Integration was identified as important to ensure that 
information and knowledge is shared among organizational members. This provides 
additional support for the value of integration in fostering the quality of attention to 
opportunities in the environment. Joseph and Ocasio (2012), for instance, emphasized the 
importance of integration in the architecture of the firm to favor a greater capacity to adapt to 
a changing environment. Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) emphasized the importance of 
knowledge integration at the group level to enable flexibility and performance. The case in 
point here is that integration was intended to make the organization faster at making 
decisions with regards to opportunities arising from unpredictable events. These events 
represented opportunities to enact a particular vision of the future, but were relatively short in 
time. Similarly, projects that were gaining momentum faced a similar challenge: seizing the 
opportunity now before the momentum vanishes. Integration contributed to put aside internal 
politics for the sake of greater effectiveness through greater communications between the 
different units.  
7.1.2 Attentional stability, structural stability, and stability in processes 
Stability is the second property that was identified as important when it comes to engaging 
with the future. Stability was defined based on its opposite: instability. While instability is 
inherent to the future (Prigogine, 1989), stability is said to be the matter of organizing (Weick, 
1979). With regards to the phenomenon under investigation, stability can contribute to 
enhance an organization’s ability to capture signals in its environment, to develop a set of 
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processes that allow organizational members to focus on the organization’s goals and 
objectives, and to understand their role with regards to these objectives. While stability is not 
a guarantee of success, instability can create confusion, which can undermine an 
organization’s ability to identify and seize opportunities. 
The first dimension of stability, attentional stability, was associated with a sustained 
focus on a set of key issues. It was presented as important to identify and pursue 
opportunities that have the potential to shape the landscape, especially when issues were 
deemed complex. This finding was aligned with previous literature that identified attentional 
stability as a feature that enhances the ability of an organization to capture weak cues (Rerup, 
2009). While previous literature looked at it from the perspective of high-reliability 
organizations, which look retrospectively to their environment focusing on cues that match 
known patterns that are likely to emerge, I looked at it from the perspective of organizations 
looking prospectively at their environment, attempting to find ways that will allow them to 
enact their environment. This highlights additional benefits to the value of attentional 
stability, which might be further explored in subsequent research. The means to achieve 
attentional stability also appear to be similar: the institutionalization of priorities through the 
structures and processes of the organization, and a culture and identity that entails these 
priorities.  
The second dimension of stability, stability in structures, implies that structures 
endure over time through incremental changes as opposed to radical changes. Stability in 
structures is important to maintain channels of communications, to facilitate decision-making 
and the diffusion of information, and limit the distractions caused by major restructurations.    
In the case discussed here, structures concerned mainly the governance and operational 
channels of the organization. They were not presented as constraints in actions that can 
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restrict flexibility (Davis et al., 2009; Eisenhardt et al., 2010). Instead, they were seen as way 
to allow for improved communications, which could enable flexibility and attentional 
stability in practice. 
The third dimension of stability, stability in processes, was presented as the extent to 
which processes are sustained over time. It includes maintaining processes continuous in time. 
In the literature, stability in processes is often perceived as a way to make these processes 
improve and evolve (e.g. Felin, Foss, Heimericks, & Madsen, 2012; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Here, stability in processes stemmed from practical concerns over the distractions and the 
confusion instability in processes can generate. This can distract the organization from its 
focus on issues and diminish its ability to identify and pursue opportunities that aligned with 
its vision for the future. In that regard, my study aligned with evidence (e.g. Rerup, 2009) 
that organizational distractions caused by major changes in processes and structure can 
escalate into a crisis if its restructuration efforts fill the attention of organizational members 
at the expense of the primary mission of the organization.  
Overall, it must be said that the type of stability discussed here is not incompatible 
with change. In fact, if stability and change are often seen as a paradox, we are talking here 
about a duality as opposed to dualism (Farjoun, 2010). As Farjoun (2010, p. 203) emphasizes, 
stability and change are interdependent – both contradictory and complementary, and it 
certainly relates with what could be observed in the case of Greenpeace. This implies that 
stability in structure and processes should not be associated with the absence of change, as 
change is conceived here as a normal condition of organizations (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
Instead, it should be seen as a way to let organizational members focus on finding ways to 
engage with external audiences to shape the landscape.   
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7.1.3 Institutional diversity, structural diversity, and diversity in action alternatives 
Diversity was presented as the extent to which a particular dimension of the organization can 
be described as heterogeneous. Diversity is usually looked at from the perspective of 
diversity in the workplace. In this dissertation, diversity was presented as a concept that 
entailed three dimensions: institutional, structural, and in the action alternatives.   
The first dimension of diversity, institutional diversity, was referred to as differences 
in value-systems, which can find their source in organizational cultures, national cultures, 
and professional background. In the literature, institutional diversity (or its various 
declinations) are understood to be an important source of advantages: diversity can contribute 
to enhance an organization’s creativity (Fiol, 1994); it can enhance sensemaking, as 
institutions impact the interpretation individuals make of issues (Barr & Glynn, 2004; 
Schneider & De Meyer, 1991); it can also impact scanning behaviors, providing an 
organization with a broader focus when it comes to capture cues in the environment (Elenkov, 
1997). Institutional diversity can also help an organization develop creative solutions to 
problems (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013) and enhance its portfolio of action 
alternatives by applying the value-system that best fits the specific task at hand (Pache & 
Santos, 2013).  
 My research provides additional insights on many of these advantages. It emphasized 
the important role diversity played when communicating with different audiences. It also 
emphasized the role of diversity in identifying potential opportunities and in developing 
creative solutions when it comes to finding ways to persuade external audiences to follow a 
path that aligns with a particular vision of the future. With that regard, my research put 
additional emphasis on the role played by institutional diversity when it comes to collective 
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actions conducted by individuals; it thus reinforces previous findings from the literature, and 
brought new insights as to how the advantages of diversity can be enabled in practice.  
The second dimension of diversity, structural diversity, corresponds to diversity in 
organizational affiliations. In the literature, structural diversity had been to positively impact 
the ability of a group to identify and seize opportunities. For instance, Hung (2005) found 
that a plurality of institutional embeddedness (which presumes diversity in internal 
organizational affiliations) enhances the identification of opportunities in foreign countries. 
Cummings (2004) found that a structurally diverse group can contribute to engage with 
external actors. These findings align with the proposition of Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 
1007) that “actors who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-relational 
contexts can develop greater capacities for creative and critical intervention.” 
All in all, the propositions derived from my research are in line with these findings. In 
addition, my study highlighted the role of integration in enabling the benefits of structural 
diversity. Integration can facilitate communications between units, allowing for faster 
decision-making and a greater understanding of what are the informational needs of different 
actors within the organization. It can also, along with institutional diversity, lead to the 
development of creative solutions to address issues. This later finding is in line with the 
findings of Joseph and Ocasio (2012) discussed earlier with the difference that, in the case 
discussed in this dissertation, the focus is in a perspective of shaping the landscape. The 
effect, however, remains similar in that integration can favor the capture of cues in the 
environment and the development of solutions to problems by virtue of improved 
communications between individuals from different groups within the organization.  
 Finally, the third dimension of diversity, diversity of action alternatives, refers to the 
different action alternatives used to enact the environment. In previous literature, Ocasio 
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(1997) emphasized the importance of action alternatives in the process of allocating attention 
to different issues in the environment. He proposed that attention is partly tied with the 
repertoire of action alternatives available to decision-makers at a given point in time. 
Looking at the perspective of organizations attempting to engage with the future, my findings 
suggest that a diversity of action alternatives can enhance the possibilities of the organization 
to address issues; it can also enhance the ability of the organization to shape the landscape by 
allowing the organization to engage with individuals occupying varying positions in the 
landscape. This can help the organization shape the landscape through different opportunity 
spaces and through different audiences.  
7.1.4 Remarks on the complementarity of flexibility and stability 
A final remark is shared here on the complementarity of the different properties discussed in 
this dissertation. Stability and flexibility, in particular, could be perceived as in opposition to 
one another. Farjoun (2010), in particular, discussed this point at length, emphasizing that 
stability and flexibility mirror one another. Building on previous work, he argues that 
stability presupposes flexibility and change (Bateson, 1972), that implementing limits that 
take the form of stable elements can be liberating (Dewey, 1922) and are central to 
innovation (Dougherty & Takacs, 2004). This complementarity of stability and flexibility is 
supported by the analysis of the Greenpeace case. While stability was deemed important, 
organizational members also emphasized the importance of flexibility in order to experiment 
actions that had the potential to enact the future, exploit the projects that proved to be 
successful, and seize windows of opportunities. Hence, the organization needed both stability 
and flexibility in order to reach its goals. My study thus provides evidence for the 
complementarity of stability and flexibility, and how it can be enabled in practice.  
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7.2 Implications for theory and practice 
Because of the nature of the phenomenon I investigated in this dissertation (i.e. engaging 
with the future) and because of the type of organization (i.e. Greenpeace as a multinational 
organization) that was the focus of my investigations, my research has implications for three 
theoretical streams: (1) organization theory; (2) strategic management; and (3) international 
management.  
7.2.1 Implications for organization theory 
My research contributes to organization theory by focusing on an organization whose actions 
are dedicated to shape the future. It built on notions of foresight and enactment to 
conceptualize the process of engaging with the future. The conceptualization of this process 
served as an anchor for the analysis of the data, but the insights generated by my study carry 
a number of implications for organization theory.  
My research answers a call made by a number of researchers to focus on how 
organizations deal with the future (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Lord et al., 2014). The future, 
from a temporal perspective, corresponds to what has not happened yet. It is in the realm of 
imagination, meaning that there is not one future but many possible futures (March, 1995). 
The future contains issues to be and issues in the making: problems that will have to be 
solved, threats to be avoided or mitigated, and opportunities to be seized. Some of the issues 
that are to be encountered in the future can be predicted, but many of them are unknown and 
are to remain unforeseen until they occur (Lord et al., 2014). 
Previous research concerned with understanding how organizations deal with the 
future has been concerned with questions such as how organizations develop foresight on the 
future (e.g. Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Sarpong & Maclean, 2014), how individuals within 
organizations make sense of the future (e.g. Kaplan, 2008b; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012), or on 
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how organizations mitigate the uncertainties associated with the future (Eisenhardt et al., 
2010; Greve, 2013; Kiss & Barr, 2014). Some of this research is looked at it from the 
perspective of developing a “fit” with its environment (Gavetti, 2012; Levinthal, 1997; 
Siggelkow, 2001, 2002), or in terms of the ability to adapt to a changing environment (Gaba 
& Joseph, 2013; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). 
In contrast, my research focused on an organization attempting to shape the future. 
Organizations that engage with the future live with the understanding that the future can be 
altered based on a specific set of desires (van der Heijden, 2004). Organizations that engage 
with the future with the intent to change it are the ones that create the rules for others, making 
them at the forefront of the changes within their environment. Adapting to a changing 
environment is certainly important, but it reflects a conceptualization of the future as an 
unalterable path (van der Heijden, 2004). The future can be changed, and projections of the 
future can inform actions (Lord et al., 2014). By focusing on an organization that engages 
with the future, I focus on one type of organization that received scant attention in the 
literature, but nevertheless occupies an important role in enabling institutional change. 
By focusing on an organization engaging with the future, I was able to highlight that 
although an organization cannot predict the future or anticipate a course of actions to enact 
the future, it can adopt specific features that will enhance its ability to engage with the future. 
This focus on organizational properties is in line with the call made by King and colleagues 
for “recontextualing organizational decision-making as a function of the organizational actor, 
focusing on the organization's unique properties as structuring elements of the decision 
process” (King et al., 2010). By making this call, King and colleagues did not argue for a 
particular theoretical lens, but emphasized the importance of understanding “how 
organizations’ unique constituencies shape their ability to act autonomously and exert 
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influence over the environment” (King et al., 2010, p. 299). The specific organizational 
properties, discussed at length in this dissertation, were properties that can help an 
organization identify and seize opportunities aligned with its vision for the future.  
Finally, and although not discussed at length in this dissertation, my research suggests 
that foresight cannot be looked at in isolation from actions: actions also inform foresight 
through the feedback received from the environment when the organization conducts actions 
that have the potential to change the landscape. This observation is in line with the literature 
that looked at the phenomenon from a practice perspective (Sarpong & Maclean, 2014; 
Waehrens & Ove Riis, 2010), which presented the process as a serendipitous one. It is also in 
line with Narayanan (2004) who suggested that navigating is a paradox of pathways to the 
future. My research reemphasized this point through the eyes of an organization that 
dedicates its actions to the enactment of a particular vision for the future.  
7.2.2 Implications for strategic management 
My dissertation contributes to the field of strategic management by focusing on how an 
organization can develop some form of effectiveness when it comes to engage with the 
distant, a topic that has received scant attention from strategy scholars (Gavetti, 2012). One 
nascent theory that aims to explain how an organization can succeed at engaging with the 
distant is “behavioral strategy” (Gavetti, 2012; Powell et al., 2011). Behavioral strategy is 
concerned with addressing a number of questions, such as how to improve the psychological 
architecture of firms, how particular forms of behavior arise in and among organizations, and 
how individual cognition scale to collective behavior (Powell et al., 2011). It aims to ground 
strategic management theories in realistic assumptions about human cognition, emotion, and 
social interaction to enrich strategy theory; it also calls for a plurality of approaches to the 
study of strategy.  
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An important recognition of behavioral strategists is the role of human agency in 
influencing organizational life (Gavetti, 2012). This recognition aims to reconcile the field 
with the influential assumption of bounded rationality that is at the core of the behavioral 
theory of the firm (Cyert & March). With regards to the question of why certain firms might 
succeed where others fail at engaging with the distant, Gavetti (2012) proposed that the core 
of a firm’s success lies in strategic leaders’ ability to counter the behavioral bounds 
surrounding the ability to identify superior opportunities (which, incidentally, are assumed to 
be cognitively distant), to convince internal audiences of these opportunities, and to lead their 
firm in their attempt to shape the landscape. If the strategic leaders of the organization are 
unable to master the mental processes that are involved in identifying, acting on, and 
legitimating opportunities that go against the norm, their organization will fail. If this 
recognition is a welcome contribution that breaks with the tradition of perpetuating the myth 
of bounded rationality (Porac & Tschang, 2013), it also raised skepticism from scholars. It 
has left some of them questioning whether the theory was going too far in acknowledging the 
role of individuals in a firm’s successes, at the expense of the recognition that not everything 
can be controlled by individuals. For instance, serendipity and contextual factors are assumed 
to play a central role in opportunity recognition (Felin et al., 2014; Winter, 2012). Hence, 
focusing on strategic leaders alone cannot provide full explanations in terms of predicting 
how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with the distant.    
In contrast, my study adopted a holistic approach (Burgelman, 2011) to the study of 
how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with the distant. It empirically focused 
on a single organization over many years to develop insights as to what contributed to the 
successes (failures) of this organization. The features identified (flexibility, stability, and 
diversity) are not new, but by contextualizing my research through an historical case study 
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approach, I was able to explain why these properties matter and how they impact an 
organization’s ability to engage with the distant. In particular, it highlights that if an 
organization cannot predict the future with certainty, it can prepare itself to recognize 
opportunities aligned with its vision for the future when they present themselves. In itself, 
this contribution is important because it brings back the organization within behavioral 
strategy by providing elements of answers with regards to the psychological architecture of 
firms and how individual cognition scale to collective behavior. It also provides prescriptions 
as to what properties can help an organization succeed in its attempts to shape the landscape. 
The insights generated by my study are not incompatible with the role of human 
agency in organizations. In fact, it complements previous findings on the topic. Creating the 
right context is the task of strategic leaders, or at least the one that has the greatest impact on 
a firm’s longevity (Burgelman & Grove, 2007). If they cannot be involved in all spheres of 
the organization’s activities, they can favor the implementation of structures, practices, and 
processes that can help their organization succeed. By making this distinction, I break with a 
recent trend that has unrealistic expectation about agents within an organization (Denrell, 
Fang, & Winter, 2003; Mitsuhashi, 2012), while at the same time recognizing the important 
role of these individuals in their organization’s successes.  
7.2.3 Implications for international management 
My dissertation also has implications for international management theory and practice. 
International management is concerned with the study of international business phenomenon, 
including the study of multinational enterprises (Forsgren, 2013; Ghoshal & Westney, 1993). 
In the case I investigated, I used the complexity of Greenpeace as a global organization to 
make a contribution to an understudied phenomenon (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Roth & 
Kostova, 2003). Nevertheless, the research setting (a global organization), the object of 
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investigation (shaping the landscape), and the methodological approach (case study based on 
historiography to develop contextualized explanations) have important implications for 
international management theory. More specifically, it informs current research on cognition 
and attention in the multinational enterprise, a stream of research that has gained interest in 
the recent years (e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009; Maitland & Sammartino, 2014).  
My dissertation changes the current conversation on attention and cognition in the 
multinational enterprise by providing additional insights on the mechanisms enabling 
attention and action across the organization. Prior studies have been instrumental in 
highlighting the antecedents of headquarters’ attention to locations (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, & 
Ambos, 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Plourde et al., 2014) and its consequences on 
the influence (Ambos, Andersen, & Birkinshaw, 2010) and performance of subsidiaries 
(Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). It also contributed to identify the activities associated with 
international attention (i.e. ability to identify issues that are global in scope) in the 
multinational enterprise (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2011), and the impact of those activities on 
the economic performance of multinational enterprises (Bouquet et al., 2009). Yet, these 
studies focused on amounts of attention (measured based on the recognition received by 
subsidiaries from headquarters) or on the activities used by firms to capture signals in the 
environment. These studies did not seek to isolate the specific concerns of the firms under 
investigation; they also focused on economic measures of performance instead of measures 
of effectiveness with regards to the ability of firms to identify and seize opportunities. This 
lack of contextualization is problematic because cognition and attention in an organizational 
context is also part of a broader process at its core issues and answers. Without 
contextualization on an organization’s concerns, it is difficult to understand with precision 
  192
what were the effects of the different structures, processes, and practices that have been 
associated with international attention.  
In contrast, my study focused on an organization where the issues and its actions 
could be clearly identified and observed. The contextualization aimed to provide 
explanations on how specific properties can enhance an organization’s ability to engage with 
the future, with an understanding that engaging with the future implies identifying, pursuing, 
and seizing opportunities aligned with one’s vision of the future. This way of contextualizing 
the phenomena provides additional explanations as to why we find the effects highlighted in 
prior literature. For instance, previous research suggests that the ability to identify changes in 
the environment can be enhanced through attention-sustaining and focusing devices (Bouquet 
& Birkinshaw, 2011; Bouquet et al., 2009), and through the allocation of individuals who 
have ties with the center of decision (Plourde et al., 2014). My study provides precisions with 
regards to these findings, clarifying how activities associated with international attention (i.e. 
discussions about global issues, communication between units, as well as factors associated 
with a “global mindset”) influence the ability of the organization to identify and seize 
opportunities that are global in scope. For example, providing simple rules to national 
organizations enhanced their ability to understand what type of opportunities was important 
for Greenpeace, while providing them with sufficient flexibility to identify opportunities 
aligned with these goals, and to test and experiment ways to seize these opportunities.  
This contextualization in terms of the focus of attention of Greenpeace also provides 
an opportunity to revisit previous findings on the attention market of the MNE (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2009). For instance, the location and the institutional background of a subsidiary 
within the MNE network are both factors known for increasing (limiting) the attention certain 
units receive from headquarters (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008); they are also known to affect 
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the recognition by headquarters of opportunities held within a given country (Plourde et al., 
2014). Within Greenpeace, these factors were also creating biases in terms of which countries 
received more attention. That said, strategic leaders recognized the necessity to build on their 
diversity to be more effective at identifying and seizing opportunities aligned with their 
mission. To foster engagement and to send the signal that all countries mattered if 
Greenpeace was to succeed at shaping the landscape, and that all countries could be a source 
of solutions to the problems the organization was trying to address, they adopted an 
internationalist approach and granted equal voting rights to all NROs. These measures 
contributed to foster engagement from organizational members and to break biases with 
regards to wealthy countries’ voices.  
The contextualization of my research also has implications for practitioners. Over the 
years, a number of suggestions have been provided to practitioners in terms of how the 
attention of senior executives can be channeled and managed to improve the performance of 
their firm (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2007; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009; Plourde et al., 2014). 
By highlighting how the organizational context impacted the effectiveness of Greenpeace at 
enacting its environment, my research provides additional insights as to what practices, 
structures, and processes can be implemented to enable the benefits of flexibility, diversity, 
and stability on the ability of an organization to identify and seize opportunities aligned with 
its vision for the future. Given that change in organizations takes time, and attention and 
efforts of senior leaders are scarce resources, it provides ideas in terms of which of these 
practices they should prioritize, and how.  
7.3 Limitations and boundary conditions 
No research can be accurate, simple and generalizable at the same time (Shah & Corley, 
2006; Weick, 1979). My research built on an unusual research setting through historiography, 
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an approach that led to rich insights on a phenomenon that has received scant attention 
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010; Weick, 2007). This approach lends itself for greater accuracy (or 
“particular generalization”40), which addresses ongoing concerns from scholars about 
traditional approaches that are said to “sacrifice analytical precision at the organizational 
level for causal explanations at the environmental level” (King et al., 2010). Nevertheless, 
this is done at the expense of the generalizability of the insights generated by the study; it 
thus requires a careful look at limitations and boundary conditions created by the context and 
the potential transferability of the insights to other settings.  
In terms of limitation and boundary conditions, it is important to take a careful look at 
the particular context of Greenpeace. Greenpeace undertakes actions that aim to persuade 
other actors in the environment to act with regards to the issues it targets. This implies it does 
not have ownership or control over what can lead to the future it is aiming for. The 
organization is thus reliant on its environment in terms of what can be achieved. A 
consequence of that is that opportunities to enact a particular vision of the future are often 
aligned with unforeseen events. These events open windows to persuade other actors of the 
importance of addressing the issues targeted by the organization. This extreme reliance on 
events in the environment as well as on the willingness of other actors to take actions 
contrasts with other organizations, where a greater share of the organization’s ability to shape 
the landscape is expected to be tied with its ability to generate innovation. A salient example 
of this can be found in Apple and Google, which both enact their environment by generating 
break-though innovation with regards to the way we use technology and innovation. The 
changes they initiate concern the way we use technology, but their primary focus remains on 
identifying and releasing products and services that will generate superior returns. This 
                                                        
40
 Particular generalization implies that the generalization is specific to the case under investigation (Burgelman, 
2011). It thus favors accuracy as opposed to generalizability. 
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distinction implies that the nature of Greenpeace activities limits the transferability of the 
insights of my study to other research settings.  
Nevertheless, a number of authors (e.g. Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Kilduff et al., 
2011; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007) have highlighted the similarities between the 
management of technological innovation and social movements, as both are involved in 
institutional change. For instance, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2006) see institutional change 
as “a dialectical process in which partisan actors espousing conflicting views confront each 
other and engage in political behaviors to create and change institutions”. Kilduff and 
colleagues (2011) emphasized different approaches and conflicting views regarding 
innovation and science more generally, and how activists and businesses compete for the 
same space of persuading actors in the environment to follow one path over the other. Hence, 
although Greenpeace activities and actions are extreme and unconventional in nature, they 
adopt a similar logic of shaping the future. This implies that the insights generated by my 
study can also apply to other settings. These settings are discussed in the following section.   
7.4 Transferability of insights to other settings 
The most obvious type of organizations to which the insights generated by my study can 
apply is other international NGOs. These organizations, which have been overlooked in the 
management literature (e.g. Kistruck, Qureshi, & Beamish, 2013; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 
2004), create value by addressing issues unaddressed by governments and businesses. This is 
particularly true for advocacy organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human Rights 
Watch, which aim to persuade other actors to take actions to favor progress with regards to a 
specific cause. Amnesty International, for instance, aims to ensure human rights are respected 
all around the world. To fulfill the organization’s mission, they must scan their environment 
for potential issues and take actions that have the potential to solve these issues. Similar to 
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Greenpeace, they have an ambitious global mission, manage significant resources, and 
operate across national boundaries. Because one reason for these organizations to operate as 
global organizations is to develop global scanning and sensing capabilities to identify and 
seize opportunities on a worldwide basis, similar challenges for Greenpeace are likely to be 
observed.  
Another type of international NGO is operational NGOs, such as Red Cross or 
Doctors Without Borders. These organizations, which are also operating on a worldwide 
basis, dedicate their actions to crisis situations. They create value by such as offering services 
to refugees, or providing care after environmental disasters, contributing to fill voids when 
institutions collapse (Doh & Teegen, 2002; Teegen et al., 2004). Their focus is on addressing 
issues directly on the field, either through their own actions, financed through fundraising 
efforts, or by persuading other actors to take actions as we have seen in the recent Ebola 
crisis in Africa. They do not engage with the future per se, but by focusing on one crisis at a 
time, they contribute to shape the landscape as well. A central challenge for these 
organizations is that many of the issues they aim to address are to remain unforeseen until 
they occur. This requires them to be able to react quickly, as soon as signals of a crisis 
emerge. In the case of these organizations, flexibility, stability, and diversity have the 
potential to enhance their ability to act on their environment, but through different forms.  
The settings presented above correspond to NGOs, but as mentioned in the limitations 
sections, for-profit corporations can also face similar challenges. Global service firms, like 
IBM and Accenture, are one type of organization that shares similarities with Greenpeace. 
These firms' longevity depends on their ability to see broader changes within their 
environment and identify trends before they emerge. In certain circumstances, they will also 
attempt to shape their environment with regards to the use of specific technologies or 
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practices which, in return, can fundamentally change the way individuals and organizations 
behave. A salient concern for these firms is what will be the next practices of their industry 
(Anand, Gardner, & Morris, 2007; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003): instead of selecting 
environmental issues to be attended internationally by the organization, the challenge is to 
decide what services to offer to their clients, when, and how. This is particularly true for 
these firms because opportunities for new services and the development of practices and 
services that match those opportunities can come from any location. Despite a wider pool of 
resources, they still need to identify and make a decision about what practices and services 
they should pursue, since developing those practices, pitching them to their clients, and 
ensuring the development of those practices worldwide requires time and effort that engage 
significant organizational resources. Once commitments have been made, windows of 
opportunities are expected to play a similar role. Given this, it is believed that flexibility, 
stability, and diversity will be beneficial to these organizations, and the manifestations of 
these properties are likely to take a similar form.  
Finally, the transferability of the insights generated from the study of Greenpeace is 
not expected to be limited to organizations that are operating on a worldwide basis. The 
themes approached in this dissertation are universal: many organizations that are more 
limited in scope attempt, through their actions, to shape their environment in a way that 
aligns with their vision of the future. It is thus expected that properties of flexibility, stability, 
and diversity will be beneficial to these organizations as well, although they might take 
different forms.  
7.5 Implications for future research directions 
This dissertation sheds light as to how an organization can enhance its ability to engage with 
the future. It also raised a number of additional questions that are worth mentioning. First, 
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with regards to flexibility, stability, and diversity, researchers might seek to understand when 
these properties matter the most and how they might materialize in different contexts. Within 
Greenpeace, flexibility, stability, and diversity were seen as conditions that were key to 
success, and the performance of the organization with regards to its ability to shape the 
landscape provides compelling evidence of the impact these properties can have on the 
ability of an organization to engage with the future. Nevertheless, and as mentioned in the 
limitations sections, the importance of these properties might vary depending on the nature of 
the opportunities pursued by the organization. The degree to which the pursuit of a specific 
future is controversial within a given environment is another dimension that has the potential 
to modify the importance of one or the other of the properties identified in this dissertation. A 
number of additional conditions have the potential to influence the saliency of each 
dimension. Understanding the circumstances under which these properties are more or less 
important by exploring the effectiveness of other organizations in engaging with the future 
could provide valuable insights as to which property should be prioritized depending on the 
particular context an organization is dealing with. 
A second research direction is the link between the specificities of a particular vision 
of the future and their impact on the process of engaging with the future. As highlighted in 
the narrative describing the rationality, plasticity, and shaping ability of Greenpeace over 
time, environmental problems that were relatively easy to grasp could be handled internally 
without thorough discussions on the problem itself: the main challenge was to coordinate the 
actions of different actors within the organization and to develop creative ways to 
communicate information about the problems, to capture the attention of external audiences. 
More complex problems, however, were more difficult to legitimize to internal and external 
audiences. This finding, not thoroughly discussed in this dissertation, highlights a critical 
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aspect of engaging with the future, which is the process itself. My analysis of Greenpeace 
suggests that when a future is too distant from reality, the aforementioned properties appear 
to become more important in order to seek “small wins”. Comparing how this process differs 
depending on the specific issues aligned with one’s vision of the future could provide further 
insights in terms of the challenges encountered by organizations that attempt to enact a 
particular vision of the future.  
Finally, not discussed in this dissertation, is the role of other actors in the enactment 
of a particular vision of the future. Over the years, Greenpeace built on its external network 
to gather information that could be used to identify opportunities and to ally with a number 
other actors in the environment to seize these opportunities. This suggests that an 
organization attempting to enact its environment cannot work in isolation if it is to succeed at 
identifying and seizing opportunities aligned with its vision. Focusing on the interactions 
between actors can thus provide additional insights on the process of engaging with the 
future, and the factors contributing to an organization’s success at engaging with the future.  
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Appendix 1: Greenpeace International income and expenditures, 1988-2011 (as reported) 
Greenpeace International 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Income USD (‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
  Grant from National Offices 22,905 27,151 31,833 39,492 37,358 32,549 31,115 34,798 30,019 31,64 28,294 25,342 
  Other Grants and Donations 998 2,588 1,423 730 669 517 175 -- 264 177 180 4,472 
  Interest Income 33 278 143 36 39 1,107 632 496 333 99 328 410 
  Other income 87 28 160 66 1,01 177 236 1,188 0 0 30 459 
Total Income 24,023 30,055 33,559 40,324 39,076 34,343 32,156 36,482 30,616 31,916 28,832 30,683 
  Fundraising Expenditures 703 2,188 1,39 1,421 1,172 1,483 1,88 1,846 1,948 1,315 1,431 1,553 
Total income less fundraising 23,32 27,867 32,169 38,903 37,904 32,86 30,276 34,636 28,668 30,601 27,401 29,13 
Expenditures             
  Grants to National Office 328 4,66 1,715 2,15 1,206 6,7 4,263 6,927 6,602 5,484 4,715 4,514 
  Campaigns  18,105 15,939 24,204 28,204 28,47 23,56 26,743 25,024 21,106 18,879 17,548 20,256 
  Organizational support 4,377 4,15 7,17 13,092 9,741 4,528 2,566 5,788 5,094 5,952 3,779 3,72 
  Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss -289 698 486 -529 -150 -1,1 919 701 -- -- -- -- 
Total expenditures 22,521 25,447 33,575 42,917 39,267 33,688 33,572 37,739 32,802 30,315 26,042 28,49 
Surplus for the year 799 2,42 -1,406 -4,014 -1,363 -1,53 -2,238 -556 -2,186 1,601 2,79 2,193 
                          
Greenpeace International 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Income Euros (‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
  Grant from National Offices 30,471 35,259 36,221 35,233 37,188 39,071 40,569 47,611 46,13 54,947 58,982 59,709 
  Other Grants and Donations 3,398 3,14 572 404 2,418 6,151 1,447 1,506 3,08 743 1,497 1,255 
  Interest Income 560 664 364 292 286 375 569 693 884 546 515 -181 
  Other income 74 206 67 86 41 88 23 77 526 0 33 47 
Total Income 34,503 39,269 37,224 36,015 39,933 45,685 42,64 49,905 50,66 56,263 61,027 60,83 
  Fundraising Expenditures 1,371 1,301 970 952 952 1,116 1,188 1,517 1,956 2,831 2,465 2,16 
Total income less fundraising 33,127 37,968 36,254 35,063 39,981 44,569 41,452 48,388 48,504 54,432 58,562 58,67 
Expenditures             
  Grants to National Office 4,749 4,692 4,159 4,38 4,2 6,782 7,36 7,125 7,044 8,437 11,204 15,656 
  Campaigns  25,476 33,245 26,557 25,782 24,687 28,021 27,507 27,817 30,326 35,174 31,44 34,33 
  Organizational support 4,599 4,913 5,02 6,862 6,281 5,716 5,716 6,443 7,036 7,843 7,201 9,848 
  Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss -- -- -- -- -- -- -78 449 1,862 -153 -767 374 
Total expenditures 34,824 42,85 35,736 37,024 35,168 40,519 40,505 41,834 46,268 51,301 49,078 60,208 
Surplus for the year -1,697 -4,892 518 -1,961 3,813 4,05 947 6,554 2,236 3,131 9,484 -1,538 
Source: Greenpeace International annual reports, various editions  
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Appendix 2: Greenpeace Worldwide (consolidated) income and expenditures, 1994-2011 
Greenpeace Worldwide 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Income USD (‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
USD 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
  Grant and Donations 128,682 138,318 134,826 120,816 107,068 121,644 139,184 153,169 161,304 
  Interest Income 3,452 4,256 3,724 3,206 2,808 2,38 3,182 3,27 2,643 
  Merchandising and Licensing -- -- 1,345 1,626 957 1,999 1,29 1,291 2,643 
Other income 5,224 10,231 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total Income 137,358 152,805 139,895 125,648 110,833 126,023 143,646 157,73 165,349 
Fundraising Expenditures 45,992 59,453 39,011 23,857 21,357 29,659 40,553 45,361 47,887 
Total income less fundraising 91,366 93,352 100,884 101,791 89,476 96,364 103,093 112,369 117,462 
Expenditures          
  Campaigns 56,752 54,378 82,553 83,049 67,488 72,14 79,912 92,267 90,308 
  Organizational support 18,978 26,855 23,736 21,118 15,489 17,075 20,375 18,761 22,024 
  Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss 8,805 6,554 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Total non fundraising expenditures 84,535 87,787 106,289 104,167 82,977 89,215 100,287 111,028 112,332 
Surplus for the year 6,831 5,565 -5,405 -2,376 6,499 7,149 2,806 1,341 5,13 
                    
Greenpeace Worldwide 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Income Euros (‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
Euros 
(‘000) 
  Grant and Donations 159,47 158,527 169,555 171,367 204,982 196,62 195,876 226,277 236,862 
  Interest Income 2,297 2,304 3,943 4,863 7,063 4,583 1,744 1,472 1,999 
  Merchandising and Licensing 1,672 1,212 -34 768 194 -474 150 97 -167 
Other income -- -- 0 23 77 1,834 2,087 2,711 2,421 
Total Income 163,439 162,043 173,464 177,021 212,316 202,563 199,857 230,557 241,114 
Fundraising Expenditures 42,947 43,005 44,054 49,205 55,648 60,332 63,149 68,837 77,267 
Total income less fundraising 120,492 119,038 129,41 127,816 156,668 142,231 136,708 161,72 163,848 
Expenditures          
  Campaigns 86,474 86,532 95,57 97,3 99 107,688 108,993 113,58 123,001 
  Organizational support 24,77 24,597 24,097 24,097 27,997 30,455 31,067 31,883 37,257 
  Foreign exchange (Gain)/Loss -- -- -- 1,449 4,034 3,355 -1,604 -5,97 -391 
Total non fundraising expenditures 111,244 111,129 119,667 122,848 131,031 141,498 138,456 139,493 159,867 
Surplus for the year 9,41 7,911 9,743 4,968 25,637 734 -1,748 22,227 3,981 
Source: Greenpeace International annual reports, various editions 
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Appendix 3: List of Identified Events from 1971 to 2001 
Year Events 
1971 N* Greenpeace protests voyage against US nuclear tests in Amchitka, Alaska, 
leading to an important public mobilization;  
1972 N* The Don’t Make a Wave committee changes its name to Greenpeace 
Foundation; 
1977 G* First Global Reunion held in Vancouver, Canada; 
1978 N* Greenpeace San Francisco registers the Greenpeace USA trademark;  
1978 N* Greenpeace Inc. is registered in the UK; 
1978 G* Second Global Reunion held in Vancouver, Canada; 
1979 N* Greenpeace Foundation files a lawsuit directed at Greenpeace San Francisco 
over name ownership and policy control; 
1979 G Founding of Stitching Greenpeace Council (SGC) to take control over 
Greenpeace trademark worldwide. SGC uses the generic name of 
‘Greenpeace International’ (GPI). The original Council includes 5 voting 
members (Australia, Canada, France, UK, USA) which effectively act as the 
Board of Directors; 
1979 G First Annual General Meeting (AGM), held in Amsterdam, NL; 
1979 G David McTaggart becomes International Chairman of SGC;  
1980 G Adoption of principles for the role of the International Greenpeace Council, 
which is to act as the international headquarters of Greenpeace. These 
principles emphasize Council’s role for communications between regions and 
with the trustees. Council’s expenses are to be covered by the revenues 
generated by its international fundraising activities apportioned between 
member countries in proportion to their gross income (2 percent);  
1980 G The Council Chairman is authorized to move the central office to a location 
that he/she deems appropriate; hire an executive director, three support staff, 
and an accountant with the choice of director being subject to approval of the 
trustees; undertake international fundraising, subject to the approval of 
individual trustees, that no conflict arises with national fundraising and 
subject to Trustee control over the revenues received; negotiate and facilitate 
the development of new country offices under the general guidance of the 
Trustees; develop a restructuring plan to merge the different Greenpeace 
groups across the USA; 
1981 N Founding of Greenpeace Film and Photo following a proposal submitted by 
Greenpeace France to manage the portfolio of images of Greenpeace; 
1981 G Launch of a newsletter from GPI to NROs to improve communications 
between the different Greenpeace offices; 
1981 G Establishment of guidelines for communications with the media. National 
organizations will be responsible for adapting the message based on their 
knowledge of their national press situation; 
1981 N Hiring of a professional fundraiser by Greenpeace USA and establishment of 
a process between national organizations and Greenpeace International to 
liaise about large donations; 
1982 G A Board of Directors is created to make decisions between Council meetings 
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as geographic and numeric expansion made frequent meetings impossible. 
The Board is made up of four members, two representing ‘Europe’ and the 
other two elected by ‘ANZUSCA’: Australia, New Zealand, the US, and 
Canada. Board members are elected from ranks of Executive Directors, 
Trustees, and Campaigners. The Board chair takes active role in management 
issues; 
1982 G Separation of the role of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Managing 
Director; 
1982 G Standardization of the accounting year for all NROs with December 31st used 
as the year end; 
1982 G Standardization of Greenpeace logo across all NROs to develop a unified 
image; 
1982 G Development of an inventory of all assets worldwide. This inventory is used 
to develop knowledge on Greenpeace tools and assets, and is falling under 
the responsibility of the Marine Division;  
1982 G Creation of an inventory of the libraries of the European and North American 
photography departments with the intent to integrate both departments;  
1982 G Creation of the role of international coordinator for all international 
campaigns. Clear instructions are given to them as well as offices 
administering national budgets to spend such approved monies on the issues 
for which they are allocated and that any transfer of funds from one campaign 
issue to another be carried out only after the unanimous approval of all 
council trustee; 
1982 G Consolidation of advertising and merchandising to seek economies of scale; 
1982 G Adoption of clear procedures for managing the international campaigns. The 
procedures include a Council Campaign Committee for administering the 
approved funds for campaigns area and for selecting the international 
campaigners in charge of managing the day-to-day activities. The double-
veto principle is also designed at that point, allowing international 
campaigners to veto an action that might be detrimental to GPI, and the 
national campaigners to veto an action in their country that might be 
detrimental to their NOR; 
1983 G The Marine Division obtains representation during Council meetings;  
1984 G Implementation of a reporting system for Greenpeace campaigns. The 
reporting system is to ensure that campaigns are staying within budget and 
spending is done carefully; 
1984 G Revision of Greenpeace financial system and implementation of the 24 
percent rule; 
1985 O Bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by the French secret services; 
1985 G Adoption of policies on controversial issues to provide guidance to the 
different national organizations and greater coherence in all Greenpeace 
activities;  
1985 G Attribution of the auditing contract to a single international auditing firm as 
opposed to several firms in different countries, to solve problems with 
regards to the lack of standardization between countries, differences in 
terminology, format, and interpretation; 
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1985 G The photo division, in Paris at the time, is moved to Amsterdam as part of a 
long-term plan to incorporate the three service divisions and the 
administration in one location; 
1985  G Creation of an international media coordinator role to coordinate the media 
image of the organization with particular reference to planned campaigns and 
to educate the media about what Greenpeace is all about and facilitate media 
access; 
1985 G Integration of the lobbying work conducted regionally and internationally 
across issues under the Convention project to strengthen, in the long term, the 
preservation of the oceans. The Conventions Project is to fall under the 
responsibility of the Political Unit, a newly created GPI division; 
1985 G Creation of organizational divisions based on issue areas. From this point on, 
all proposals have to fall under a specific issue area to be considered for 
discussions. Also, all issue areas fall under the responsibility of an 
international coordinator; 
1986 G Creation of a working group to clarify Greenpeace organizational structure 
and the role of different boards. The Board of Directors is moving out of 
daily administration to give a greater place to the executive committee; 
1986 G Distribution of the first organizational development plan. The focus of the 
plan is on Greenpeace geographic expansion. The plan comes with a fund and 
the allocation of resources to develop new markets; 
1986 G Adoption of new rules for voting rights: each NRO has to contribute 24 
percent of its income to GPI for two years in a row to have the right to vote in 
Council;  
1986 G Launch of a skill-sharing program, known as the Training Project, to 
facilitate the development of campaigning skills across Greenpeace and share 
best practices between NROs; 
1986 G Creation of Greenpeace Communications Ltd. to provide communication 
services to GPI and NROs. Greenpeace Communications Ltd. mandate is to 
secure maximum media coverage of Greenpeace campaigns and to provide 
international news agencies with photos, prints, and video material originated 
or acquired by Greenpeace. It is based on a merger of Greenpeace Films and 
the Photo department in Paris. Greenpeace Communications Ltd. is to be 
based in London, UK;  
1986 G Creation of Greenpeace Science Unit ad adoption of a principle over the use 
of science, which focuses on a qualitative analysis of evidence rather than 
providing hard, quantified evidence; 
1986 G The Council commissions a ‘Long Term Plan’, a plan that is intended to give 
strategic direction to the organization. The plan is to be supervised by the 
board of directors; 
1987 G Circulation of the first version of the Long Term Plan for feedback ahead of 
Council. The document emphasizes the challenge of managing an 
organization for which there is no previous successful model. From this 
discussion, several items in the LTP were presented for approval, including 
the adoption of guidelines for equipment purchases by NROs and the 
adoption of a policy on acceptable damages to property; 
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1988 G Publication of the final version of the Long Term Plan. The plan calls for: the 
creation of a ‘Terrestrial Ecology’ campaign; for the expansion of 
Greenpeace into Russia, Latin America, and Japan in a ‘first tier’ expansion, 
and China, India, and Africa as a second-tier expansion; as well as a new 
voting right system. It also includes a list of the most salient issues 
Greenpeace should address.  
1988 G Steve Sawyer becomes Executive Director of GPI in place of David 
McTaggart;  
1988 N Germany raises concerns about NROs not making sufficient progress in terms 
of fundraising. Germany is to submit a proposal on the issue at the 1990 
AGM which is to include the suspension of voting rights of NORs not 
making sufficient progress; 
1989 G David McTaggart is elected Chairman of the Board of Directors; 
1989 G Adoption of a motion to review the voting rights structure of Greenpeace. 
The Voting Rights Mechanism Review Committee (VRMR) consists of the 
Executive Director, one member of the Board of Directors, and one 
representative from Canada, Denmark, Germany, USA, and Latin America; 
1990 G Creation of a Steering Committee to reconsider the role of the 
Communications department in light of the recent organizational changes;  
1990 N Germany and Switzerland raise concerns about the challenges they face in 
connecting with their local supporters, identifying the centralization trend that 
occurred in the recent years as an impediment to their capacity to engage 
volunteers in their causes;  
1991 G Greenpeace voting rights structure is modified to include votes for regions. 
This measure is expected to counter-balance the weight of NROs from 
industrialized countries, which are the main contributors to GPI. Under this 
new structure, each NRO fulfilling its financial obligations towards GPI has 
one vote, and each NRO is associated with a region which has a vote on its 
own regardless of its financial contribution to GPI;  
1991 G Setting-up of a Rapid Response Team Working Group to address a list of 
scenarios that might require a rapid action, and how these scenarios could be 
handled by Greenpeace;  
1991 G David McTaggart resigns as Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
becomes ‘Honorary Chairman’; Matti Wuori becomes the new Chairman of 
the Board;  
1991 G Publication of Greenpeace's first annual report. The annual report includes a 
‘Letter from the Executive Director’, summarizing the key achievements 
during the year, a review of each issue area and organizational division, as 
well as financial statements for GPI; 
1991 G Initiation of a second strategic planning exercise labeled as the ‘One 
Greenpeace’ plan. Contrary to the previous strategic planning exercise (i.e. 
the ‘Long Term Plan’), this exercise is based on an organization-wide 
consultation process;  
1991 G Creation of a Global Issue Working Group (GIWG) as part of the strategic 
planning exercise to agree on global issues and to develop a greater degree of 
understanding about their complexity as well as the importance that they be 
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resolved for the organization as a whole; 
1992 G Revision of the Training Project to cope with increased competition for 
media attention;  
1992 G Creation of the International Action Team to facilitate the conduct of direct 
actions worldwide; 
1992 G Communication of McTaggart about the original idea behind Greenpeace as a 
response to the organizational crisis; 
1992 G Publication of Greenpeace Communications Operational Review, a report 
from KPMG Management Consulting, in October 1992. The report 
emphasized the “lack of a formal, defined mission and strategic objectives 
driven from the top”; 
1992 G The Global Issue Working Group issues its report. The report states that: 
“Greenpeace over-riding priority is the defense of the environment. We 
achieve that by taking on and winning focused international campaigns on the 
most significant threats to the environment, in ways that show leadership, 
boldness and which are not open to compromise. As we develop as a global 
organization, we recognize that we have a lot to learn from and about all the 
cultures and societies in which we work, which will be important in 
developing appropriate strategies and tactics for our campaigns.” 
The report calls for cross campaigning, although there is no agreed definition 
of cross-campaigning. They understand is that there are many links between 
campaign issues: they want to develop links so that the arguments in one 
campaign can help them win another. They also need to be aware of 
contradictions so they can resolve them in advance.  
1992 G Initiation of a restructuring process that emphasizes greater integration of 
fundraising and media within campaign work, to maximize impact, and 
greater coordination among the fundraisers of different countries; The 
restructuration process also includes layoffs and budget cuts as a way to 
reduce expenses;  
1992 G Steve Sawyer resigns as Executive Director. Discuss the process for hiring a 
new Executive Director;  
1993 G Paul Gilding becomes the new Executive Director of GPI; 
1993 G Publication of the Greenpeace Strategic Plan as the outcome of the strategic 
planning exercise initiated in 1991. The report offers a diagnosis on the 
problems faced by the organization in light of changes in the environment 
and of its recent growth. It also includes a number of propositions for the 
adoption of a mission statement, the allocation of resources, the division of 
tasks and responsibilities within the organization, and for the creation of area 
advisors. Few of its recommendations will be implemented in the short-term 
due to leadership turmoil;  
1993 G Publication of the Greenpeace Global Resources report, to give an overview 
of Greenpeace assets worldwide;  
1993 G Adoption of new guidelines for resource allocation based on the 50/30/20 
system, with 50 percent of resources allocated to priority campaigns (short 
term pushes to save a given ecosystem or have a piece of legislation adopted), 
30 percent to ongoing campaigns (campaigns that are focusing on issues that 
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require a long-term and ongoing commitment, such as the protection of 
whales), and 20 percent allocated to contingencies arising from unpredictable 
events;  
1993 G Adoption of a formal mission statement;  
1994 G Paul Gilding is forced by the Board of Directors to resign as Executive 
Director of GPI; Steve d’Esposito replaces him for the interim;  
1994 G The Board of Directors of GPI is forced to resign upon the dismissal of Paul 
Gilding as Executive Director; Following the resignation of the Board of 
Directors, a new Board is elected and a committee is established to revise 
Greenpeace's structure and clarify the role of the different boards and 
committees;  
1995 G Thilo Bolde becomes the new Executive Director of GPI;  
1995 G Introduction of Joint Committee Meetings as part of the strategic planning 
process to favor greater integration of Greenpeace actions across campaigns 
and countries;  
1995 G Introduction of Executive Directors Meetings (twice a year) to exchange on 
best organizational practices across NROs and to adopt a proactive approach 
towards organizational issues; 
1995 G Initiation of the program of reform to improve international and national 
relationships. The program of reform aims to clarify the relationship between 
the different governance boards, to maximize the organization’s 
effectiveness;  
1995 G Introduction of regional bureaus to facilitate special events, rapid response, 
and foster the identity of Greenpeace.  
1995 G Launch of Greenpeace website by Greenpeace Communications; 
1995 N Greenpeace UK and Greenpeace Netherlands launch an action against the 
sinking of the Brent Spar oil platform by Shell. The action becomes highly 
successful and leads to an important mobilization of the organization and a 
significant increase in donations and memberships;  
1995 G Approval by Council of the new principles of governance, which includes the 
renewal of Greenpeace articles of association, rules of procedures, and the 
implementation of the Program of Reforms by NROs; 
1996 G The Communications department, previously based in London, UK, is moved 
to Amsterdam, at international headquarters. It is identified as a strategic 
decision to ensure the thorough integration of the Communications 
department with campaigns and all other international functions, to prevent 
performance issues that occurred in the past;  
1996 G Relocation of international campaign coordinators to Amsterdam, to facilitate 
the integration of communications and campaign activities;  
1996 G Dismantling of the Latin America Regional Structure;  
1996 G Ratification of new Articles of Association, Rules of Procedures, and NROs 
Guidelines; 
1996 G Brainstorming session on ‘Finding Talent’ to favor the recruitment of the best 
employees;  
1996 G Publication of a report analyzing four cases of successful campaigning that 
occurred in the past 10 years (Lead in Europe, etc.) in order to identify 
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success factors in Greenpeace actions;  
1996 G Revision of the planning process for campaigns: the planning process 
becomes an ongoing activity involving different committees to further 
integrate Greenpeace activities across functions. As part of this process, 
issues no longer have to fit into a ‘box’ to be approved or supported by the 
organization;  
1996 G Circulation of the document “Thoughts on the Role of Greenpeace in the 
World.” The document emphasized that “discussions on Greenpeace’s role in 
society should be ongoing at every level of the organization.” (EDD 1996 
February: p. 9) 
1997 G Publication of guidelines for the third strategic planning exercise. The 
process had been initiated in 1996 and involved the Board, the Council, 
NROs, and Executive Directors to develop a common vision for the 
organization. It is emphasized that “strategic planning is a continuous process 
that should overlap with implementation.” (EDMM 1997: p. 6). This is a 
sharp contrast with the two previous strategic planning exercises where 
planning and implementation were considered as two distinct phases. The 
Strategic Plan includes several components: Greenpeace 2000, which consists 
in a strategic vision for the organization in terms of campaigning, the role of 
Greenpeace in the world, offices, finance and fundraising, relations between 
GPI and NROs, human resources, and ships.  
1998 G Design of a policy on ‘Greenpeace working with business’. The documents 
explain that ‘business is as much part of the solution as part of the problem. 
Greenpeace campaigning involving fixed-term strategic alliances with sectors 
of the business community is a necessary and legitimate tactic in achieving 
the organization’s aims. Strategic alliances with the business community may 
be an integrated part of Greenpeace campaign strategy.’ (EDMM 1998a: p. 
27) 
1998 G Publication of a report on globalization and its impact on Greenpeace 
International.  
1998 G Blue Sky discussions on re-visioning how Greenpeace works and should 
work.  
1998 G Global expansion is now based on experimentation through campaign offices 
and fundraising before further commitment is made.  
1999 G Publication of the Greenpeace Global Presence report to the Executive 
Directors. It presents a detailed report on Greenpeace international presence.   
1999 G Publication of the ‘One Greenpeace’ report as a sequel to the Program of 
Reforms and as part of the ongoing strategic planning exercise initiated in 
1997. One Greenpeace is “to respond to have been the decline in the 
importance of national boundaries socially and politically, the rise of the 
Internet and new forms of communication, the networking of economies and 
the growth in the power and scope of transnational corporations.” (Board 
Meeting Minutes 2000a: p. 6).  
1999 G Adoption of an innovation budget for “campaigning, which goes beyond 
business as usual with the aim to test new ideas and approaches.” The budget 
is established at USD 500,000.  
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1999 G Launch of an Internet/Interactive Digital TV global environmental news. The 
project is divided into several phases and is partially funded by working 
alongside hardware and software companies and forming alliances with large 
NGOs such as WWF.  
1999 G Use of Global Teams: Global Teams are considered as an alternative for 
smaller offices to develop expertise and improve their local performance. 
Global teams have a longer horizon compared to project teams.  
1999 G Introduction of Centers of Excellence, although there is not a unanimous 
support given the need for campaigns and Greenpeace functions to work 
closely with one another. Centers of Excellence would dedicate their time to 
a specific function, such as fundraising, actions warehouse, trademarks, 
specific policy development, or specific campaign concepts.  
1999 G Introduction of ‘Greenpeace 2000’ and the ‘Key Opportunity Projects’ 
(KOPs) at the JCM, which is a two-stage process which consists in first 
identifying ‘key opportunities’, and then run those as campaign projects, 
aiming to reinforce any of them that begin to grow into truly global or 
regionally significant campaigns that resonate strongly with the public. In 
1999, this led to the identification of 20 potential campaigns to follow.   
2000 G Various initiatives to improve the performance of GPI with regards to human 
resources, communications, the International Marine and Actions 
Department, and staffing levels.  
2000 G Prelaunch of the “One Greenpeace” project. 
2000 G Exploration of possibilities offered by new medias. 
2001 G Thilo Bolde retires as International Executive Directors of Greenpeace 
International. He is replaced by Gerd Leopold.   
2001 G Launch of a program for knowledge management and improvement of IT 
infrastructures.  
2001 G Relaunch of the Rapid Response project, to redefine how this should be done 
to enhance Greenpeace ability to respond quickly to disasters.  
aThe letters beginning items indicate their provenance. “G” is Greenpeace International 
headquarters; “N” is a National Organization; “O” is an outside event.  
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Appendix 4: Chairman's Speech to Council 
“I would like to start by quoting from Man and Superman by George Bernard 
Shaw: -‘The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists 
in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the 
unreasonable man.’ 
In this context, I am an unreasonable man! And GREENPEACE'S success to-date 
is based on the same premise of trying to adapt the world to our long-term goals and 
objectives! We are a most unreasonable gang of men and women - and, if we are to be 
worth our salt, precisely this is expected of us, with dedication.  
There can be little doubt in anyone's mind that the problems we have encountered 
and faced up to during the past twelve months, have been amongst the most difficult and 
complex in the history of our organisation. We have initiated a dramatic restructuring, 
following the new priorities that were laid down for us at the Regional Trustees meeting. 
As a result, we have now laid the firm foundations of a political control structure that 
will allow us to build for the future. We have also got 'to grips with the lack of financial 
realism that has been prevalent in many parts of the organisation over the past few years. 
This has necessitated the recent round of budget cuts that have impacted on both our 
staff and the execution of our campaigns, and this has been a painful process for all of 
us. But better financial rigour, coupled with streamlined fiscal management and accurate 
and timely reporting, will be crucial as we enter another year of economic recession and 
growing political uncertainty in both the OECD and non-OECD world. We must play to 
our strengths and reinforce our internationalism at every opportunity. This will 
inevitably mean building stronger bonds between the ‘national’ and ‘international’ 
aspects of our organisation and exploiting this partnership for the greater good of 
Greenpeace. Greenpeace IS one Greenpeace, remember? The qualitative steps that we 
have already taken in refocusing the organisation would be applauded by Alfred 
Chandler, the current Professor of Business History at Harvard University. His major 
belief is that the structure of an organisation should follow on from the strategy that is 
adopted, and that the distinction between the two is crucial. For him, STRATEGY is the 
determination of basic long-term goals and objectives, together with the adoption of 
courses of action and the allocation of resources for carrying out these goals. 
STRUCTURE is the organisation, which is devised to administer the activities, which 
arise from the strategies adopted. As such it involves the existence of leadership, the 
distribution of work, as well as lines of authority and communication. Although we have 
consciously chosen to proceed in an inverted order, defying established text book 
solutions to organisational renewal, and although both are in need of further 
development, we now have the basic elements of strategic thinking and of structure there 
and on behalf of the Board, I would like to congratulate Steve and his senior staff at 
International, for their dedication and commitment to implementing this difficult 
process. Intermediary steps are still missing and many of the pieces we have must still 
fall in place. Yes, there is still much to be done, but the worst is past. The foundations 
have now been laid to enable us to move forward. 
We are, in every sense of the word, at the crossroads in our development. There 
are only two roads to follow: the one ahead, or the one behind us. Remaining at the 
crossroads is not an option. We have already chosen a POSITIVE rather than a 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGY. In this sense we have recreated GREENPEACE as a real 
force for the 90's. We also have the advantage of being able to see and predict some of 
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the obstacles on the road ahead, so that we can either negotiate or overcome them. But 
we will only be successful, if we move ahead together. At the risk of sounding cliché, we 
should take the slogan UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL as one of the main 
themes for this historic AGM […].  
For the first time in years, the Pre-Council consultative process has cleared the 
decks of a lot of business that would normally take up time on the Council floor. Over 
the next few days, we will have time to address some of the vitally important issues that 
are now facing us. Previously hidden agenda's have been brought out into the open and 
aired many disputes and contentious issues have already been resolved. We have had no 
choice in this matter, but the time constraints placed upon us, have freed us up to tackle 
the really important problems facing us. You have all been involved in this process […]. 
We can no longer afford the luxury of divisive or centrifugal disputes and debates about 
issues that are secondary or irrelevant to our overriding goals and objectives. We can 
still be masters of our own destiny, but we will only succeed if we are united behind our 
mission. 
We know that one of the reasons that we have so much support is because we are 
international (while we could and should be even more so!) because we do maximise our 
unique characteristics and resources to unite issues in time and place [emphasis added]. 
We do this in order to take on our adversaries where ever they are, and where ever the 
consequences of their global policies may manifest themselves. 
What we need is financial stability, intellectual rigour and the flexibility to adapt 
our tactics in an ever more dramatically changing political, social, moral and economic 
climate [emphasis added]. Right now we are approaching the fourth great economic 
cycle since the birth of modern capitalist economy (or more accurately since 1812). This 
cycle coincides with the biological life of my generation, starting after the Second World 
War and reaching its peak in 1967. What is at stake now is not just recession and 
eventual recovery of ‘business as usual’. The planet will not survive a fifth cycle. It 
would be growth into bankruptcy, and this phenomenon is part of the cross roads we 
have reached and must face up to, just one of the many challenges that lie ahead. 
The political and economic face of the world has changed dramatically since the 
beginning of the decade and this change is accelerating at an alarming rate. The 
environment is under greater threat than ever before as the transnationals position 
themselves to take over the new ‘economic order’. Green washing is becoming part of 
our daily lives and poses one of the most significant threats to the survival of the 
environmental movement. The global recession, eco-fatigue, a satiated media, and the 
moral crisis are further challenges that we will have to face in the future. In the post 
UNCED era our 5 million members and countless millions of passive supporters are 
looking to us as the best hope for the future. This is an awesome and terrifying 
responsibility. Time and time again, we have proved that we can win against great odds. 
We still have an overall income in excess of $140m, nearly 1,000 staff, a fleet of ships, 
an international media organisation, nearly 5 million members and we are a household 
name in many countries. 
BUT our most valuable assets are the talent, dedication and commitment of our 
staff. Let's face it: Greenpeace is not just about supporters, shoes and ships and sealing 
wax. Greenpeace is an IDEA. Offices, ships or (heaven forbid!) satellites are only tools. 
What matters 'is the idea and the know-how to make it work. We should not become too 
attached to any particular hardware, be it a ship or a personal computer or an instrument 
of any kind, as long as we ensure that we have adequate tools to work with. (Come to 
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think of it: Where is PHYLLIS CORMACK now?) Our hardware must be in top shape, 
but at the end of the day it's the software that counts, the idea. We intend to take care of 
both. To optimise them. And with physical and human resources such as these we can 
make a real impact, rather than a dent, on the environmental crisis and really change the 
world. 
Whichever way you look at it, I believe that we are stronger now than ever before. 
We have been through a painful learning experience. We are leaner, fitter and more 
focussed. Over the past few months there has sometimes been a tendency to play safe, to 
hide behind group decisions, and for certain national offices to assume some of the 
functions of the International Board. I have heard Greenpeacers say that there was a 
sense of paralysis, demoralisation, of working in a vacuum, of lack of direction, as we all 
tried to come to terms with the urgent need to restructure, fix new priorities and make 
hard financial and budgetary decisions, all up against the clock! I am not therefore 
surprised that some of these perceptions should have been prevalent and that there was 
real concern throughout the organisation. But we have come through the process and the 
ED and International staff should take pride in the professional and humanitarian way in 
which they have handled the crisis. However we must not now make the mistake of 
being over cautious. That will only lead to stagnation and standstill and status quo, 
powerful forces that we are trying to fight wherever they rear their ugly heads. As an 
industrialist (Gordon Forward, President of Chaparral Steel) said: - ‘You've got to have 
an atmosphere where people can make mistakes. If you're not making mistakes, you're 
not going anywhere.’ Or as Sochiro Honda, founder of the Japanese multi-national put 
even more dramatically:- ‘Many people dream of success. To me success can only be 
achieved through repeated failure and introspection. In fact, success represents the 1% of 
your work which results from the 99% that is called failure.’ 
I am not suggesting this is the case with us or recommending that we adopt that 
ratio. What I am suggesting is that mistakes are an unavoidable part of innovative human 
endeavour. Caution is for those who are satisfied with things as they are or too timid or 
powerless to change them. It is the favourite preoccupation of bureaucrats. ·we are for 
dynamic change. Therefore we must accept risks and the possibility of mistakes, but 
minimise them through professionalism. 
I can certainly assure you that the Board will not be faint of heart as we face the 
challenges of 1993. We will not succumb to the temptation to play safe and will continue 
to support bold, courageous strategies and tactics. But we will also develop long-term 
strategic plans and closely monitor the financial health of the organisation. Moreover, we 
will be working to release the tremendous potential Greenpeace has, and-which still has 
not been fully utilised. 
I do not believe that I have underestimated the problems in the future, but I do 
have a real sense of optimism. I believe that 1993 will be a landmark in Greenpeace's 
development and that as we move forward together, as a truly united organisation, we 
will all look back on this AGM as one of the most positive in the history of Greenpeace. 
As I said in my opening quote from George Bernard Shaw, ‘progress is in the hands of 
unreasonable people’, Greenpeace is full of unreasonable people and we will triumph 
through our unity of purpose.” 
 
     - David McTaggart (SGC 1992 AGM, p. 41-45) 
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